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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to characterize the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position in the light of a
reassessment of the semantic framework of the Russell/
Strawson controversy and analyze what would be the early
and the later Wittgenstein's solution to such a problem.
In the first part, the Russel1/Strawson controversy
is characterized. On the basis of Strawson's account, a
general concept of semantic presupposition against which
other theories may be tested is constructed. This allows
the formulation of the problem above mentioned. Further
analysis of the accounts involved reveals that Frege's
concept of a 'semantic prerequisite' generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position is an instance of the
general concept. But Frege also held the view that simple
proper names do not generate semantic prerequisites. The
Fregean referential dualism suggests that the Russell/
Strawson controversy, as far as only these authors'
accounts are involved, is undecidable at the purely
semantic level. This is the semantic framework against
which Wittgenstein's philosophies are tested in the second
part.
The "Tractatus" adopts a modified version of the
Russel1ian Theory of Descriptions. Even so, the Tractarian
account seems to be ultimately equivalent to Russell's.
Further analysis reveals that the doctrine of simple signs
in isolation, but not its conjunction with the picture
theory, is consistent with the general concept of semantic
presupposition.
The "Investigations" adopts the programmatic
principle of searching for the use of the words. But the
question about the 'referring use' of descriptions in a
specific language-game is consistent with, and in the
spirit of, the "Investigations". The framework of the
question involves the appeal to the Kripkean notions of
'semantic referent' and 'speaker's referent'. The analysis
of the referring use in the language-game of reporting an
event reveals that the later Wittgenstein tends to reject
the semantic concept of presupposition. Further analysis
reveals that he would tend to reject Russell's Theory of
Descriptions and most of the variants of the pragmatic
concept. The analysis seems to confirm that the Russell
/Strawson dispute is idle at the purely semantic level.
Even so, the later Wittgenstein's account of language is
such that it is possible to imagine some particular
language-games in which relationships occur that bear some
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The word 'presupposition', in its most usual
sense, refers to certain conditions which must be
fulfilled so that a certain state of affairs can obtain.
In this sense, presupposition is a species of entailment:
if a certain state of affairs obtains, then some
conditions are satisfied. As such, the concept of
presupposition plays an important role in metaphysics.
Kant's doctrine of the presuppositions of scientific
knowledge and Co 11ingwood's doctrine of absolute
presuppositions are two significative examples among
several others.
But there is another sense of the word
'presupposition': it may refer to a logical relationship
which is distinct from entailment. As such,
'presupposition' denotes the conditions which must be
satisfied so that some expressions of our language can
refer to an object. In this sense, we normally use the
expression 'semantic presupposition'. Although
controversial, the concept of semantic presupposition has
played an important role in Anglo-American philosophy in
the last 40 years. This may be explained by the
philosophical commitments entailed by the concept. In
fact, if the concept expresses an existing logical
relation in our language, then it may be a powerful
instrument in the analysis of some complex referential
mechanisms; but if the concept is empty, then it may be a
powerful source of misunderstanding in the analysis of
these mechanisms. Thus, philosophers are somehow compelled
to take a position on the issue.
B. Russell, for example, in his papers "On
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Denoting" (1905) and "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism"
(1918), explained the referential mechanism of definite
descriptions in a way such that the concept of semantic
presupposition was excluded. According to Russell,
definite descriptions are only apparently referring
expressions. They are in fact 'incomplete symbols' which
originate a complex conjunction of propositional functions
when the sentences containing them are fully analyzed. In
addition, descriptions must be distinguished from
logically proper names. A logically proper name always
denotes an object. The logically proper name can have a
meaning, even though the sentence in which the name occurs
has no meaning at all. A definite description, in turn,
has no meaning by itself. The meaning of the description
is determined by the meaning of the sentence in which it
occurs. Therefore, definite descriptions are not logically
proper names. Russell's Theory of Descriptions was
considered a brilliant example of analysis for quite a
long time.
Approximately five years after the end of the
Second World War, Strawson challenged the Russellian
account. In his papers "On Referring" (1950), "A reply to
Mr. Sellars" (1954), and in his books "Introduction to
Logical Theory" (1952), and "Individuals" (1959), Strawson
developed a Theory of Presuppositions which is applied to
definite descriptions in subject-position. According to
Strawson, Russell's Theory of Descriptions is mistaken. A
sentence containing a definite description in
subject-position implies that the object referred to by
the description exists. But the word 'implies' has not its
usual sense here. Accordingly, it cannot be understood as
a synonym of 'entails' . It expresses a new kind of logical
relationship. Later on, in his "Introduction to Logical
Theory", Strawson exchanges 'implies' for 'presupposes'
and gives a more accurate definition of the relationship
in question: a statement ' S' presupposes a statement 'P'
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if the truth of 'P' is a precondition of the truth-or-
falsity of 'S' (Strawson 1952: 175). So, Strawson firmly
opposes to the Theory of Descriptions and installs the
debate on the issue. The reaction of the philosophical
community to Strawson's views was one of controversy.
In his challenge to the Theory of Descriptions,
Strawson seems to have revived a Fregean view. There are
indications that in the famous paper "Ueber Sinn und
Bedeutung" (1892), Frege introduced the concept of
semantic presupposition in order to explain the reference
of certain subordinate clauses in ordinary speech. The
Fregean analysis of subordinate clauses involved the
analysis of definite descriptions in subject-position.
Frege's concept seems to express the relation of semantic
presupposition because it requires that the truth of a
presupposed thought be a necessary condition for the
corresponding presupposing thought to have a reference.
His concept is basically an attempt to uncover a failure
in ordinary language which allows for the existence of
empty expressions. Such expressions, although having a
correct grammatical form, fail to designate an object. The
mentioned failure can only be avoided by a logically
perfect language in which every grammatically well
constructed expression designates an object. But it is not
clear whether or not Frege in fact held a view of semantic
presupposition. Given that the Frege's view is likely to
be one of the sources of the Russe11/Strawson dispute, a
more accurate analysis of Frege's account is required.
After Strawson's challenge of Russell by means
of the concept of semantic presupposition, the framework
for further discussion was somehow established.
Philosophers dealing with presupposition usually refer to
the debate originated by the opposition between the
Russellian and the Strawsonian approach. But the dispute
seems to be undecided so far. Thus, it seems that further
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investigation is needed in order to obtain a more
perspicuous view of the semantic aspects involved by the
issue.
The interest on the Russe11/Strawson controversy
is very much alive in contemporary philosophy. The recent
approaches became increasingly sophisticated and added new
questions to the old ones. But the semantic framework of
the Russe11/Strawson debate remains a strong point of
reference for the discussion. One surprising thing is that
neither Russell's account nor Strawson's seems to do
justice to the referential mechanism which is hidden in
the way definite descriptions are used in subject-
position. In fact, it is not evident that a sentence
involving a definite description in subject-position can
be rendered by Russell's complicated paraphrase. As to
Strawson's account, the very disputabi1ity of the concept
of semantic presupposition speaks for itself. Even so, as
it has been said, the opposition between the two
philosophers remains a crucial point of reference.
Another equally surprising thing is the fact
that what underlies the dispute is the basic question
about the very possibility of semantic presupposition : is
this relation an adequate explanation for the referential
function of definite descriptions in subject-position or
not? This is so far an open question.
If we now turn to Wittgenstein, it is a
commonplace to say that he has developed at least two
different and important philosophies throughout his life.
In the "Tractatus Logico-Phi1osophicus", it seems that a
specific account of the referential mechanism of definite
descriptions in subject-position plays an important,
although not yet clearly explicated, role. The early
Wittgenstein's account seems to be in clear opposition to
the Strawsonian proposal. In the "Philosophical
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Investigations", once again it seems that another specific
account of the referential mechanism of definite
descriptions plays an important, although not yet
explicated, role. The later Wittgenstein's account seems
to be more tolerant as regards the Strawsonian concept of
presupposition, but no one knows to what extent.
If one now considers the importance of
Wittgenstein's thought in contemporary philosophy, one
realizes that a full understanding of his two different
accounts might give an important contribution to the
philosophical puzzle about the referential role of
definite descriptions. Surprisingly, this subject has not
yet been studied in detail in Wittgenstein's philosophies.
We still do not know in detail how the early and the later
Wittgenstein approaches the semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position.
Therefore, a study about the significance of the concept
of presupposition in the evolution of Wittgenstein's
thought is required.
The purpose of this research is then to make a
study of each of Wittgenstein's possible accounts of the
referential mechanism involved by definite descriptions in
subject-position and test them against the reassessed
semantic background which led to the conceptual framework
of the Russe 11/Strawson dispute. In the light of this
reassessment, my research question may be formulated as
follows: what are the essential features of the early and
the later Wittgenstein's account of the referential
mechanism of definite descriptions in subject-position,
and what is the contribution such accounts may possibly
offer to a better understanding of the question about
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position? This is an important
question concerning the history of the concept of semantic
presupposition.
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An adequate answer to the above question will
involve answering to some important subsidiary questions.
For example, we will be able to tell: i) what is the
specific contribution of Wittgenstein's early philosophy
to a possible solution of the problem of the referential
mechanism of definite descriptions; ii) what is the
specific contribution of Wittgenstein's later philosophy
to a possible solution of the problem of the referential
mechanism of definite descriptions; iii) what is the basic
difference between Wittgenstein's early and later approach
to the referential mechanism involved by definite
descriptions in subject-position? Both the research
question and its subsidiary questions require an answer
which will help in a better understanding of the history
of the problem concerning the referential mechanism of
definite descriptions in subject-position.
The main steps to be taken in order to
accomplish the task proposed will be as follows. My work
will have three parts. In the first one, I shall present
and discuss some aspects of the semantic background of the
Russe11/Strawson controversy. The first part will be
subdivided into two chapters. In chapter 1, I shall make
a characterization of the Russe11/Strawson controversy and
then construct a general concept of semantic
presupposition to be tested against the accounts involved.
On the basis of the general concept, I shall formulate and
discuss the relevant aspects of the question of which the
answer will be pursued in the analysis of Wittgenstein's
philosophies. The question will be called 'the problem of
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position'. In chapter 2, some
aspects of the Fregean semantics will be discussed. This
will provide us with the elements required for analyzing
the semantic features of the Russe11/Strawson controversy.
The whole discussion is intended to provide the general
framework for analyzing Wittgenstein's solutions to the
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above problem.
In the second part, I shall analyze
Wittgenstein's solutions to the problem as formulated in
chapter 1. Part two will be subdivided into two chapters.
In chapter 3, I shall analyze the early Wittgenstein's
account of the referential role of definite descriptions
in subject-position against the background of the
reassessed semantic aspects of the Russe11/Strawson
controversy. In chapter 4, mutatis mutandis, I shall do
the same with the later Wittgenstein's account. The main
source for the analysis of the early philosophy will be
the "Tractatus", and the main source for the analysis of
the later philosophy will be the "Philosophical
Investigations". The remaining Wittgensteinian works will
be used as supplementary sources of information. The
intermediary period of Wittgenstein's philosophy will not
be considered.
In the third and final part, I shall formulate
the main conclusions of the previous analysis.
For reasons of space, I shall concentrate my
discussion on the semantic presuppositions generated by
definite descriptions in subject-position. Some related
problems will be considered only by the way; others, like
the projection problem, will simply be left aside. The
relevant connexions which obtain among these accounts and
related problems, such as e.g. referential function of
proper names, will be considered. Given that the
bibliography on the problem of semantic presupposition is
huge, papers of secondary importance will be left aside.
The terminology will be adapted to the analysis of each
account.
The expectation is that the above procedure will
allow me to formulate the problem of semantic
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presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position in its essential terms and deal as





CHARACTERIZATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM
OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS GENERATED BY
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
I - PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In this chapter, I shall try to characterize and
discuss the framework of the main question with which I
shall be concerned in my work. As already mentioned in the
introduction, the question is related to the
Russe11/Strawson controversy concerning the referential
role of definite descriptions in subject-position. Thus,
in order to characterize the question, I shall do as
follows. First, I shall present and discuss the relevant
aspects of Russell's Theory of Descriptions. Second, I
shall present and discuss the relevant aspects of
Strawson's alternative account to Russell's Theory. Third,
on the basis of Strawson's concept, I shall try to
construct and discuss a general concept of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position. Fourth, on the basis of the opposition
between Russell's account and the general concept of
semantic presupposition obtained, I shall try to formulate
and discuss the question with which I shall be concerned
in my work. The question will be called "the problem of
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position". I expect it will be
revealed that, although the problem has been defined in
terms of the Russe11/Strawson controversy, there are
important solutions to the problem which are not based
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upon the axis of the dispute. Some of these alternative
solutions will then be presented and discussed in order to
make complete the background to the problem.
II - RUSSELL'S ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
In his famous paper "On Denoting", B. Russell
acknowledges the importance of the subject of denoting for
logic, mathematics and theory of knowledge (1905: 479). He
is concerned with what he calls 'denoting phrases', such
as 'a man', 'some man', 'every man', and so on. These
expressions include phrases containing the definite
article. Now Russell thinks definite descriptions have a
privileged status among denoting phrases. In his words,
"These are by far the most interesting and
difficult of denoting phrases" (1905: 481).
In order to justify his claim, Russell invokes the fact
that the word 'the', when it is strictly used, involves
uniqueness (id.). Thus, he paraphrases a sentence like
(1) 'The father of Charles II was executed'
by




if y begot Charles II, y is identical with x
AND
x was executed'^.
The above paraphrase or any of its equivalents is the
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well-known Russellian Theory of Descriptions. When
occupying the subject-position in an assertion, the
definite description 'the father of Charles II' is
dissected into a set of propositional functions asserting
at the same time the existence and the uniqueness of
someone who begot Charles II. In order to simplify my
terminology and facilitate exposition, I shall divide the
conjunction expressed by (2) into its three basic
components, namely
(3) 'There is at least one x such that x begot
Char1es II',
(4) 'For all y, if y begot Charles II', y is
identical with x'
and
(5) 'x was executed'.
Given the fact that each of these sentences plays a
particular role in the interpretation of (1), I shall name
each of them in accordance with its respective role. Thus,
(3) will be named 'defining clause', because it is the
function involving the property that defines the object
apparently denoted by the definite description; (4) will
be named 'uniqueness clause', because it is the function
attributing uniqueness to this object; (5) will be named
'predicate clause', because it is the function attributing
a determinate predicate to this object. This terminology
roughly describes the basic roles played by the three
clauses involved in the Russellian paraphrase of a
sentence like (1), and may be adopted for convenience.
Now suppose the definite description is the
grammatical subject of an existential sentence like
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(6) 'The father of Charles II exists'.
In this case, Russell claims that the sentence is to be
interpreted as




if y begot Charles II', y is identical with x'.
(6) is now analyzed into the conjunction of a defining
clause and a uniqueness clause. The predicate clause is
missing. Thus, an existential sentence containing the
definite description 'the father of Charles II' in
subject-position is dissected into a complex conjunction
of propositional functions asserting both the existence
and the uniqueness of someone who begot Charles II. And it
is worth noticing that, in all cases considered so far,
the apparently denoting phrase vanishes after analysis.
Now the Russellian account of denoting phrases
involves an explanation of the referential role of
definite descriptions in subject-position. For the account
reveals that definite descriptions are not authentic
referring expressions. The word 'the' in a description
only misleadingly suggests that the description is a
referring expression. The description only apparently
refers to an object in the world. For this reason,
descriptions are what Russell calls 'incomplete symbols',
that is, as symbols which have a meaning in use, but not
in isolation (Russell 1925: 67). Thus, definite
descriptions in subject-position, although they look like
referring expressions, are in fact the external dressing
for a complex conjunction of propositional functions.
After analysis, the descriptions vanish and are replaced
by the corresponding conjunction of propositional
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functions at the same time asserting the existence,
defining uniquely and ascribing a predicate to the object
which fits the description and which is only apparently
referred to by the description. With respect to the nature
of the sentence containing a definite description in
subject-position, the Russellian account entails some
consequences of which the most important are related to:
i) the adequacy of the description involved as regards the
object described; ii) the sense of the sentence; iii) the
truth-values yielded; iv) the ways the sentence may be
negated; v) the language layers involved. These aspects
will be discussed in what follows.
First, consider the adequacy of the description
in subject-position to the object to which the description
apparently refers. In virtue of the specifications made by
both the defining and the uniqueness clause, the definite
description applies uniquely to an object in the world.
But this involves an important postulate. The description
in subject-position must always be paraphrased in a way
such that the complex expression obtained contains a
propositional function which defines an object and is
uniquely ascribed to it. In other words, Russell
postulates that it is always possible to find an adequate
propositional function that defines the object apparently
referred to by the description in order to eliminate the
word 'the'. In Russell's words:
"A phrase containing 'the' always presupposes
some initial propositional function not containing
'the'; thus instead of 'x is the father of y' we
ought to take as our initial function 'x begot y';
then 'the father of y' means the one value of x which
satisfies this propositional function" (1925: 30;
italics mine).
Although this constitutes an important assumption of the
Theory of Descriptions, it has never been proved and may
be properly called 'Russell's postulate'.
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Second, consider the sense of the sentence
containing a description in subject-position. As revealed
by analysis, the assertion of existence and uniqueness of
the object apparently referred to by the description is
part of the whole assertion made by the sentence in
question. In our previous example, if we assert that the
father of Charles II was executed, we are simultaneously
asserting the existence and uniqueness of someone who is
father of Charles II.
Third, consider the truth-value of the
proposition made by means of the sentence. Analysis
reveals that a sentence of the form 'the D is P' is
equivalent to a complex sentence beginning with the
existential quantifier. Thus, if 'the D' makes sense, the
complex sentence obtained yields a proposition which is
always either true or false, but never truth-value 1 ess.
For a proposition of the form 'there is an x such that x
is D and x is unique and x is P' has the following
interesting property: if there is in fact an object
satisfying the description, the proposition is true or
false, depending on whether the property 'is P' fits or
not the object; if there is not an object satisfying the
description, then the proposition is simply false. This
fact entails the important consequence that in Russell's
account a sentence containing an empty definite
description in subject-position always yields a false
proposition when asserted. In fact, Russell's account
establishes that every meaningful sentence yields a
proposition that is either true or false, but never
truth-valueless. Thus, the principle of bivalence applies
universally to all sentences. Even the cases of
referential failure with empty descriptions constitute no
exception to this rule. And this fact surely gives the
Theory of Descriptions a comfortable position with respect
to classical semantics.
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Fourth, consider the ways a sentence containing
a definite description in subject-position may be negated
in conformity with Russell's account. The negation of any
such sentence may be interpreted in either of the
following ways: i) as an external negation of the fact
expressed by the whole sentence; ii) as an internal
negation of the ascription of the predicate to the
description. For example, if a speaker says that the
father of Charles II was not executed, he may mean two
quite different things by that. On the one hand, he may
mean that there is a unique person who begot Charles II
and this person was not executed. On the other hand, he
may mean that it is not the case that there is a unique
person who begot Charles II and was executed. In the
former case, the description 'the father of Charles II'
has what Russell calls a 'primary occurrence'; in the
latter, it has what he calls a 'secondary occurrence'.
This distinction entails that negation is ambiguous in
ordinary language and enables Russell to explain the
status of sentences containing empty descriptions in
subject-position. Thus,
(8) 'The King of France is not bald'
is false if it means that there exists uniquely a King of
France at present and he is not bald (primary occurrence
of 'the King of France'); if (8) means that it is not the
case that there exists uniquely a King of France at
present and he is bald, then it is true (secondary
occurrence of 'the King of France').
Fifth, consider the language layers involved by
Russell's Theory. From the above paraphrase, one may infer
that Russell postulates the existence of two layers of
syntactic structure. In fact, the Theory of Descriptions
assumes that there are two different and sometimes
competing structures in the expressions and sentences of
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ordinary language. These expressions and sentences have a
surface grammatical structure which is misleading as
regards the logical relations actually involved by them.
For example, an expression occupying the position of the
grammatical subject may in fact be a logical predicate; an
expression occupying the position of a predicate may in
fact be a logical subject; two sentences may have the same
grammatical structure and yet have radically different
logical structures; and so on. These expressions and
sentences also have a deep logical structure which is
somehow hidden beneath its surface grammatical structure.
The logical structure reveals the real connexions existing
among expressions, among sentences, and among expressions
and sentences. According to Russell, this is the only way
to escape from many logical and philosophical puzzles
which have their origin in the naive acceptance of the
deceptive surface grammatical form. The logically correct
structure must be obtained by a meticulous and
discriminating analysis of the surface form in order to
reach its deep form equivalent.
Thus, the Russellian analysis unveiled, in a
surprising way, that definite descriptions in subject-
position are not authentic referring expressions. Their
referential role is played in a somehow indirect way. In
virtue of its fascinating explanatory power, Russell's
account became a paradigm of logical analysis for quite a
long time.
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Ill- STRAWSON'S CHALLENGE TO RUSSELL'S
ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE PLAYED BY
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
Although brilliant, Russell's account of the
referential role of definite descriptions in subject-
position was not the sole alternative. Forty five years
after the publication of "On Denoting", P. F. Strawson
challenged Russell's Theory. In his equally famous paper
"On Referring" (1950), Strawson turned his attention to
the classes of expressions which are most commonly used in
the uniquely referring way, like singular demonstrative
pronouns, proper names, singular personal and impersonal
pronouns, and phrases beginning with 'the' followed by a
noun, qualified or unqualified, in the singular ('the
so-and-so'). All these are what Strawson calls "referring
expressions" (1950: 320). He confined his attention to
cases in which the referring expression fulfils the
twofold condition of being used in the uniquely referring
way and of occurring as the grammatical subject of a
sentence (1950: 320-1). This is clearly connected with the
referential role of definite descriptions in subject-
position .
In "On Referring", Strawson argued against
Russell that definite descriptions are in fact authentic
referring expressions. The statement made with a sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position does
not assert either the existence or the uniqueness of the
object referred to by the description; instead, the
statement implies the existence and uniqueness of the
object. However, this is a very peculiar and odd sense of
the word 'implies', because it is not the same as what the
statement entails. That this is so is explained by the
following reasons.
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First, the existence and uniqueness of the
object referred to by the description is a necessary
condition for making a statement having a truth-value.
Whenever one asserts, say,
(9) 'The King of France is bald',
one makes a true or false statement only if there is
actually one and no more than one King of France.
Second, if there is no King of France on the
occasion of the utterance of (9), then our linguistic
intuition suggests that the question whether the statement
is true or false simply does not arise.
Third, sentence (9) is significant even when
there is no King of France, and the same applies to any
sentence belonging to the same class as (9).
Fourth, a sentence like
(10) 'There is no King of France'
does not contradict (9). When true, (10) rather explains
why the question whether (9) is true or false does not
arise. To sum up, a sentence can be significant previously
to its being used to make a true or false assertion. What
makes a true or false statement is the use of the
sentence. If the description contained in the sentence in
fact refers to an object, then the use of the sentence
yields a statement having a truth-value. In this case, we
have truth-value and significance simultaneously. If, in
turn, the description does not refer to any object at all,
i.e. if it is empty, we only have significance and no
truth-value. In contrast to Russell's account, this is
what happens in fiction (1950: 329-31).
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Thus, Strawson holds to a tetratomy in the
classification of the uses of sentences containing a
definite description as the grammatical subject. A
sentence of this class can be either nonsensical or
significant. On the one hand, if it is used in a way such
that it disrespects the linguistic rules that yield
meaning, then it is nonsensical. On the other hand, if it
is used in compliance with such rules, then it is
significant. But a significant sentence can be either
correctly or spuriously used. If it is correctly used,
that is, if the conditions of existence and uniqueness of
the object mentioned by the description are fulfilled,
then the statement made has a truth-value; otherwise, the
question of truth-value does not arise.
Two years later, in his "Introduction to Logical
Theory", Strawson adopted the word 'presupposition' to
refer to what the use of a sentence containing a definite
description in subject-position "oddly" implies. In his
book, Strawson treats presupposition as a new logical
relation which is in fact distinct from entailment. For
example, if a statement 'C' entails a statement 'D', then
it is surely contradictory to conjoin 'C' with the
negation of 'D'. But if a statement 'C' presupposes a
statement 'D', then, Strawson argues, the conjunction of
'C' with the negation of 'D' is another kind of logical
absurdity. This is so because 'not D' makes 'C' false
whenever 'C' entails 'D', but 'not D' makes 'C'
truth-valueless whenever 'C' presupposes 'D' (1952: 175).
If 'C' entails 'D' then the conjunction 'C and not D' is
a contradiction; whereas if 'C' presupposes 'D', then the
conjunction 'C and not D' is truth-valueless. Thus, it is
possible for us to contradict a statement only when we
accept its presuppositions (1952: 213).
Although Strawson asks a pragmatic question
about the uniquely referring use, he obtains a semantic
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relation between statements. In fact, he makes an
important distinction between 'type', 'use of type' and
'utterance of type' (1950: 324-9). In our case, the 'type'
is sentence (9) which can be used by different persons in
different occasions. For example, a person may have
uttered (9) in the reign of Louis XV. In this case, the
person would have used the type involved in order to refer
to Louis XV. Alternatively, another person may have
uttered (9) in the reign of Louis XVI. Now this person
would have used the type involved in order to refer to
Louis XVI. But a person may also utter (9) in our days,
mistakenly using- the type in order to refer to the present
King of France (this would give an odd status to (9)).
Thus, Strawson's distinction entails that meaning (in at
least one important sense) is a function of the type,
whereas referring is a function of the use of the type
(1950: 327). From the distinction it may be inferred that
for a type to be meaningful it is sufficient that it can
be used to make a statement assessable for truth-value, or
alternatively, that tokens of it can make statements
assessable for truth-value. Besides, a type may have a
meaning even though some of its tokens do not make
statements assessable for truth-value".
As a result, in Strawson's view the uniquely
referring use of a type sentence containing a definite
description in subject-position may yield a statement
which semantically presupposes another statement. For
example, an utterance of (1) with the purpose of making a
uniquely referring use of (1) yields a statement that
semantically presupposes the statement made with
(11) 'There is exactly one father of Charles II'.
In fact, it may be inferred from Strawson's account that
if the statement made with (11) is true, then the
statement made with (1) and the one made with its negation
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has a truth-value; if the statement made with (11) is
false, then the tokens of (1) and its negation do not
yield statements assessable for truth-value. The relation
is between statements, not sentences, for the following
reasons. First, only statements are assessable for truth-
value; sentences are types which have many different uses;
sentences may yield statements only if they are used in
order to refer to something. Second, in Strawson's
definition of presupposition the statements are not used,
but mentioned; that is why they are quoted. A similar
procedure occurs in Strawson's definition of entailment
which also involves statements (1948).
Now there is an important ambiguity in
Strawson's account. The ambiguity concerns the status of
a token sentence when the presupposed statement is false.
For example, if (1) ['The father of Charles II was
executed'] is used to refer uniquely and there is no
father of Charles II, then the token obtained may yield:
i) a truth-valueless statement or ii) no statement at all.
Unfortunately, Strawson is not explicit about the
alternative to which he adheres. But it is possible to
make a reasonable conjecture with respect to this .
Suppose he adheres to (i). In this case, the use
of (1) would yield a truth-valueless statement and
Strawson's account would have to face the following
consequences. First, he would have to abandon the
principle of bivalence for non-existential statements
containing empty descriptions in subject-position. Second,
his distinction between 'sentence' and 'statement' would
be somehow blurred. For it may be inferred from the above
discussion that the essential feature of a statement is
its assessabi1ity for a truth-value, whereas a sentence is
not assessable for truth-value. Now if there are truth-
valueless statements, this would require further
qualifications in order to distinguish them from the type
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sentence of which the statements are actual uses.
Now suppose Strawson adheres to (ii). In this
case, an utterance of (1) does not yield a statement when
there is no father of Charles II. The token of (1) is
neither true nor false, for it is not assessable for
truth-value. Here, bivalence would be preserved and the
distinction between 'sentence' and 'statement' would be
clear-cut. Thus, although this is only a conjecture, I
would say that (ii) is more likely to be Strawson's
position.
Despite the above ambiguity, Strawson succeeds
in obtaining a purely semantic relation, because although
the relation has been obtained by means of a pragmatic
question concerning the referring use, it ultimately
involves only statements and their truth-values,
independently of considerations about speakers and
contexts.
Now compare Strawson's account with Russell's.
The accounts may be compared because they constitute
alternative explanations of the same phenomenon. In doing
the comparison, we shall obtain some understanding of the
important differences in the way descriptions function and
in the way a sentence containing a definite description in
subject-position is interpreted.
First, consider the adequacy of the description
to the object described. Given that Strawson needs not
paraphrase the sentence containing the description in
subject-position, he does not need to postulate a
Russel1ian-1ike propositional function which would
eliminate the definite article.
Second, consider the sense of a sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position. By
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contrast with Russell, the sense of the sentence in
question does not express either the existence or the
uniqueness of the object referred to by the description.
In fact, the existence and uniqueness are rather implied,
or presupposed, by the statement made with the sentence.
Thus, when we assertorically use a sentence like (1), we
are not asserting, but rather presupposing, that there is
exactly one father of Charles II.
Third, consider the truth-value of the statement
yielded by the sentence in question. Given the
presuppositional relation defined by Strawson, whenever
the presupposed statement is true, the statement made with
the sentence will be assessable for truth-value; but if
the presupposed statement is false, the token sentence
involved will not yield a statement assessable for truth-
value. For example, the uniquely referring use of (1)
yields a statement assessable for truth-value, for the
presupposed statement that there exists exactly one father
of Charles II is true. However, if the presupposed
statement is false, the uniquely referring use of (1)
would not yield a statement assessable for truth-value. As
a result, when we assertorically use a type sentence
containing an empty description in subject-position, the
token sentence involved does not yield a false proposition
as in Russell's account, but yields no statement and has
no truth-value.
Fourth, consider the ways the sentence in
question may be negated. In Russell's case, a sentence
like (1) may be negated in two ways, depending on whether
the description has a primary or a secondary occurrence.
In Strawson's case, there is no explicit treatment of
negation and we shall have to make a conjecture. In this
respect, I shall argue that, despite appearances to the
contrary, negation does not seem to be ambiguous in
Strawson's account. The whole issue is connected with the
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example below. Suppose the father of Charles II did not
exist and consider the following reply to (1):
(17) 'The father of Charles II was not executed, for
there is no father of Charles II'.
On the one hand, Strawson might have interpreted
(17) as negating that the predicate 'was executed' can be
attributed to 'the father of Charles II' on the basis that
there is not such a person. This would make negation
ambiguous in Strawson's account. For the negation of (1)
would involve the following alternative truth-conditions:
either i) the father of Charles II exists but the
predicate 'was executed' cannot be attributed to such a
person; or ii) the father of Charles II does not exist and
for this reason the predicate 'was executed' cannot be
attributed to such a person. But then this would involve
two different presuppositional readings of the negation of
a statement. In fact, only alternative ' i' involves the
semantic presupposition that the father of Charles II
exists. Suppose for example that the statement 'P'
semantically presupposes ' Q' . If 'not P' is ambiguous,
then under the one reading 'not P' semantically
presupposes 'Q'; under the other reading, 'not P' does not
semantically presuppose 'Q'. This is an unpalatable result
which does not seem to cohere with the spirit of
Strawson's account. True, one may argue against my
interpretation that, for example, Van Fraassen follows
Strawson, and Van Fraassen's account implicitly entails an
ambiguity between internal and external negation (Van
Fraassen: 1968; 1969; 1970). In reply to this, I would
recall that Van Fraassen's motivation is the construction
of formal systems which, although originally inspired by,
may deviate from, the inexact logic of ordinary language,
whereas Strawson's motivation is the accurate description
of such a logic. Thus, they may have different accounts of
the negation of a sentence.
On the other hand, Strawson might have
interpreted (17) as rejecting the statement that (1) only-
apparent ly makes by revealing that its semantic
presupposition, namely (11), is false. In this case, (17)
would not constitute an authentic negation of (1). For if
(11) is false, (1) is no statement at all and cannot be
properly negated. Thus, (17) asserts that (1) is not true,
but this does not entail that (1) is necessarily false. In
the presuppositional account, 'not true' does not always
mean 'false'. Since (1) is no statement when (11) is
false, (1) is truth-valueless and thus not submitted to
the principle of bivalence. This seems to fit better
Strawson's claim that it is possible for us to contradict
a statement only if we accept its presuppositions (1952:
213). It seems that if the claim is taken literally, the
presupposing statement has only one negation1*. Although
Strawson does not deal explicitly with this issue, the
non-ambiguous account of negation seems to be the one that
coheres best with his account. As a result, as far as the
way negation is interpreted, Strawson's account and
Russell's are different.
Fifth, consider the language layers involved by
the sentence in question. In Russell's case, the assertion
made with the sentence has two layers of syntactic
structure: the surface and the deep one. The semantic
contents of both layers is the same. In Strawson's case,
the assertion made with the sentence has two layers of
significance. On the one hand, there is the layer
corresponding to what is asserted by the referring use of
the sentence. On the other hand, there is the layer
corresponding to what is presupposed by the referring use
of the sentence. Thus, when we use (1), for example, in
the referring way, we are asserting that the father of
Charles II was executed and presupposing that there is
exactly one father of Charles II.
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The above features concern the type sentences
used, to refer and the presupposing statements yielded.
Strawson's approach also entails an important feature
concerning the presupposed statements. It is the fact that
the existential statements presupposed by
subject-predicate statements cannot be taken themselves as
subject-predicate statements (1952: 190-1). In fact,
Strawson claims that if a statement of the form 'x's
exist' is assimilated to any of the four traditional
forms, then it would presuppose itself. And we would be
led to the absurd situation that such a statement would
have a truth-value only if it were true, or that the
question whether it had a truth-value would not arise if
it were false (id.). This casts a different light on the
question whether 'exists' is a predicate or not:
"When we declare or deny that 'there are' things
of such-and-such a description, or that things of
such-and-such a description 'exist', the use of the
quoted phrases is not to be assimilated either to the
predicative or to the referring use of express ions"
(1952: 191; italics mine).
Surprisingly, Strawson's claim about the nature of
existential statements has a counterpart in Russell's
analysis of propositions of the form 'the so-and-so
exists'. For although (1) ['The father of Charles II was
executed'] and (6) ['The father of Charles II exists']
have the same superficial grammatical form, their
corresponding Russellian paraphrases are different.
Anyway, the above explanation of the referential
role of definite descriptions in subject-position is taken
by Strawson as a valid alternative to Russell's Theory of
Descriptions. Strawson thinks that his account is in
closer proximity to ordinary speech, although with some
minor reservations. What is more, the account explains in
a more natural way the traditional Square of Opposition.
As far as the latter is concerned, Strawson believes he is
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rejecting an implicit assumption of quantification logic,
that is, the assumption that the only genuine
subject-predicate statements are statements in the
singular; that all other categorical statements are
positively or negatively existential (1952: 182).
So far, we know that Strawson's account opposes
Russell's in the way it explains the referential function
of definite descriptions in subject-position. Strawson
claims that such descriptions generate semantic
presuppositions with the features above discussed. But the
nature of my research requires generalizing the concept of
semantic presupposition in a way such that its existence
may be investigated in alternative accounts to Strawson's.
This situation raises the following question. Is there in
fact a general concept of semantic presupposition which
may be extracted from Strawson's account? If there is such
a concept, then it is the general relation expressed by
the concept, and not the Strawsonian instance of it, that
originally opposes the Theory of Descriptions. Thus,
before I may formulate the problem with which I am
concerned in my work, I shall have to discuss the above
question. This will be done in the next section.
IV - CHARACTERIZATION OF THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF SEMANTIC
PRESUPPOSITION: MAIN ASPECTS AND INVOLVEMENTS
In the previous section, the question about the
existence of a general concept of semantic presupposition
for definite descriptions in subject-position was raised.
Now I believe we may infer from the discussion so far that
it is in fact possible to construct such a concept. This
would be like extracting the consequences of generalizing
Strawson's account. Thus, in what follows I shall try to
formulate the general concept of semantic presupposition
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and then discuss its main features. This does not mean I
am taking the concept of semantic presupposition as the
correct explanation of the referential role of definite
descriptions in subject-position. The fact is that I need
to do this in order to characterize clearly the background
of the problem that I am going to define in the next
section.
From the discussion in the previous section we
learn that the relation of semantic presupposition has the
following aspects: i) both the Strawsonian statement and
its negation have the same semantic presupposition; ii) if
the presupposed Strawsonian statement is true, the
presupposing statement and its negation have opposite
truth-values; iii) if the presupposed Strawsonian
statement is false, both the presupposing statement and
its negation are not assessable for truth-value; iv) the
sense of the presupposing Strawsonian statement does not
include the sense of the presupposed statement.
Now the relationship expressed by the general
concept of semantic presupposition may be defined as
follows. Given that I shall be discussing Frege, Russell,
Strawson and Wittgenstein in the next chapters, let 'P'
and * Q' be variables standing for a pair of Fregean
thoughts, or Strawsonian statements, or Russellian
propositions, or Tractarian propositions or later
Wittgensteinian ordinary language statements. Now it is
clear that although Fregean thoughts, Strawsonian
statements, Russellian propositions, etc. differ from each
other, they all share the two following important
properties: i) each of them corresponds to the objective
contents of the assertion made by means of a declarative
sentence; ii) they are all assessable for truth-value.
Thus, 'P' and ' Q' are variables related to the above
common properties. The twofold requirement for belonging
to the domain defined by these variables is to correspond
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to the objective contents of an assertion and to be
assessable for truth-value". In this case, we may say that
•P' semantically presupposes ■Q' if and only if: i) if 'P'
is true, then 'Q' is also true; ii) if the negation of 'P'
is true, then 'Q' is also true; iii) whenever 'Q• is true,
both ' P' and its negation have a truth-value; iv) whenever
1Q' is false, both 'P' and its negation are truth-
valueless. The relation expressed by the general concept
of semantic presupposition has the properties described
be 1ow.
First, the relationship is different from
logical entailment". In fact, 'P' entails 'Q' if and only
if: i) when 'P' is true, 'Q' must also be true; ii) when
' Q' is false, 'P1 must also be false; iii) when 'P' is
false, 'Q' may be either true or false. Now the relation
of semantic presupposition as above defined differs from
entailment in two ways, for if 'P' semantically
presupposes 'Q', then when 'Q' is false, 'P' has no truth-
value (against (ii)); when 'P' is false, 'Q' must be true
(against (iii)). The distinction involved by the general
concept may be illustrated by the following example:
(18) 'The King of France is a bachelor'
entai1s
(19) 'The King of France is a man'
and semantically presupposes
(20) 'There is exactly one King of France'.
Thus, if (19) is false, then (18) is also false, whereas
if (20) is false, then (18) has no truth-value; if (18) is
false, then (19) may be true or false, whereas (20) must
be true. Even so, given that the general concept is a
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generalization of Strawson's concept, in both logical
entailment and semantic presupposition the Fregean
thoughts, or Strawsonian statements, or Russellian
propositions, etc. are'mentioned and not used.
Second, if 'P' semantically presupposes 'Q' in
the sense above defined and 'P' is expressed by a sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position,
then *Q' is expressed by a uniquely existential sentence.
Of course, there are other ways of defining
presupposition, such as the 'sortal' one or the 'factive'
one7. These alternative ways would involve different kinds
of sentences in the definition of the relation of
presupposition. But the discussion so far and the problem
with which I am concerned allow me to focus the attention
only on the kind of existential presupposition above
defined.
Third, if ' P ' semantically presupposes ' Q' , then
' Q' must have a particular logical status which may be
characterized by the following features:
i) 'Q' affirms the existence and uniqueness of
the object referred to by the description. Therefore, 'Q'
is related to an existential sentence containing the
description in subject-position. The statement (or
thought, or proposition) expressed by the sentence is
essentially bivalent and always has a truth-value. For
everything of the form 'The F exists uniquely', where 'The
F' stands for a definite description, has the interesting
property that it is either true or false, even though 'The
F' is an expression like 'The green idea'. In addition, as
applied to ' Q' , all the laws of the classical mathematical
logic hold good, because 'Q' is essentially bivalent;
ii) 'Q' has no presuppositions at all: it is the
end of the presuppositional chain. This striking property
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may be inferred from Strawson's claim that 'Q' cannot be
taken as a subject-predicate statement. For if it is
assimilated to that form, then it would presuppose itself.
This would lead to the absurd that 'Q' would have a truth-
value only if it were true, or that the question whether
' Q' had a truth-value would not arise if it were false
0
(1952: 190-1) . The property in question is very important
and must belong to the general concept of semantic
presupposition.
Fourth, if ' P' , 'R', 'S', 1T' and so on are
statements (or thoughts, or propositions) expressed by
sentences containing the same definite description, say
'The F', in subject-position, then if 'Q' is a statement
(or thought, or proposition) expressed by the sentence
expressing the existence and uniqueness of the F, 'Q* will
be the common semantic presupposition for* 'P', 'R', 'S',
'T' and so on. For example, 'The President of USA is
married', 'The President of USA is a republican' and 'The
President of USA declared war on Iraq' semantically
presuppose 'There is exactly one President of USA'.
Fifth, the general presuppositional relation
does not entail that the negation of 'P' must be ambiguous
in Russell's sense. For the general concept does not need
to appeal either to primary or secondary occurrences of
the description in subject-position. The fact that 'P' has
a truth-value is determined by the fact that 'Q' is true.
According to the general concept, the description is an
authentic referring expression. Thus, if ' Q' is true, then
'P' will be true or false depending on whether the
predicate in 'P* fits or not the object referred to by the
description. In addition, the dichotomy determined by the
principle of bivalence is not valid in case of
presuppositional failure. For if ' Q' is false, then the
token sentence involved by 'P! fails to express a
statement (proposition) and is neither true nor false.
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Although the token sentence may not fail to express a
thought, the fact is that both the sentence and. the
thought will also be neither true nor false. Thus, in case
of presuppositional failure, the resulting utterance will
be truth-valueless in all cases considered. As for
negation, it is worth noticing that 'not true* is not
logically equivalent to 'false' here. The equivalence only
holds in case of presuppositional success9.
The general concept above defined makes two
important philosophical assumptions that must be made
explicit. The assumptions concern the nature of what is
asserted and the sense of an expression without
denotation. I shall discuss them in what follows.
The first assumption concerns the fact that the
concept requires that there must be a clear cut
distinction between what is asserted and what is
presupposed when we utter a declarative sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position.
Thus, suppose I assert
(21) 'the Queen of England is married'.
In this case, the assertion made must include: i) the
presupposition that there is one and only one Queen of
England; ii) the assertion that the Queen of England has
the attribute of being married. The existence and
uniqueness of the person referred to by the description
'the Queen of England' are not part of what is asserted by
(21). But the ascribing of the predicate 'being married'
to the Queen of England does belong to the assertion made
by (21). Hence, the assertive use of a sentence like (21)
yields two different layers of significance. And this
means that statements (or thoughts, or propositions) that
semantically presuppose in the above sense have an extra
semantic load as compared to statements (or thoughts, or
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propositions) that do not presuppose in this sense. This
raises the following difficulty: the adherents to the
general concept of semantic presupposition have to explain
why certain expressions have a greater semantic load than
others.
The second philosophical assumption concerns the
fact that the general concept of presupposition requires
that an expression, or a complete sentence, may have a
sense even though it has no denotation. According to both
Frege and Strawson, the fact that an expression has no
denotation does not necessarily entail that the expression
is senseless; and the fact that a sentence involving an
empty expression has no denotation does not necessarily
entail that the sentence is meaningless either. For
example, although sentence (9) contains the empty definite
description 'The King of France', (9) still has a sense.
It is no coincidence that these authors admit that there
may be some domains of discourse in which the sense is
more important than the denotation, as in fiction.
Although this feature is an important consequence of both
their accounts, it raises a difficulty for them:
expressions which have a sense but no denotation are
awkward, for they are neither true nor false, thus
excluding the commitment to strict bivalence.
The adherents to the general concept of semantic
presupposition have to face the above difficulties in
various degrees, depending upon the particular account
which is involved. In the same way, the two following
difficulties must be added. First, the relation expressed
by the concept is such that it is the truth of a statement
(thought, proposition) that determines the fact that
another statement (thought, proposition) has a truth-
value. Although this does not seem to yield any
contradiction, it appears to involve an awkward
circularity. Second, the status of the token sentence when
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the presupposed statement (thought, proposition) is false
creates a problem for the logician who intends to
construct a formal system involving strict bivalence.
For reasons of space, I shall not discuss the
above difficulties further. In addition, it will be shown
in the next section that my analysis will not require
appealing to these difficulties. Anyway, the general
concept does not seem to be prima facie the better choice
as an explanation of the referential role of definite
descriptions in subject-position. But given the attraction
exerted by the concept on Strawson and other authors, it
remains an important alternative model and deserves our
attention.
The above considerations exhaust the definition
and discussion of the general concept of semantic
presupposition I shall need in the course of my work. This
takes us to the next step, that is, the attempt to
formulate the problem I shall be pursuing in the next
chapters. This shall be done in the next section.
V - FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM OF SEMANTIC
PRESUPPOSITIONS GENERATED BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
IN SUBJECT-POSITION AND DISCUSSION OF ITS FRAMEWORK
So far, we have seen that Russell suggested that
definite descriptions in subject-position are not
authentic referring expressions in the sense that after
analysis they are replaced by a complex conjunction of
propositional functions. By contrast, Strawson suggested
that definite descriptions in subject-position are
actually authentic referring expressions which yield a
true or false statement only if the object referred to by
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them exists uniquely (Strawson 1950: 329-30). The
existence and uniqueness of the object referred to by the
description is not part of what is asserted, but rather
semantically presupposed, by the sentence containing the
description in subject-position (id.). This in turn
suggests the possibility of constructing a general concept
of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position, of which the Strawsonian
account would be an instance.
Now both the Russel1/Strawson controversy and
the general concept of semantic presupposition raise an
interesting problem concerning the referential role of
definite descriptions in subject-position. This
constitutes what I shall call from now on the problem of
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position. The problem may be
characterized on the basis of the following
considerations.
First, all the theories discussed so far may be
said to have definite descriptions in subject-position as
their common field of application. Thus, in order to be
precise, I shall restrict and direct my analysis towards
the referential task of definite descriptions in subject-
position. For the sake of clarity and strict delineation
of the subject matter, the consideration of the
referential status of whatever expressions which may
possibly have functions analogous to those of definite
descriptions in subject-position will be excluded here.
This notwithstanding, the analysis of the restricted
problem will surely have its effects upon the way other
related expressions refer or presuppose.
Second, according to Strawson, the point of
controversy between himself and Russell may be
characterized by the following question:
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"Given an utterance which suffers from radical
reference-failure, are we to say that what we have
here is just one special case of false statement or
are we to say that our statement suffers from a
deficiency so radical as to deprive it of the chance
of being either true or false?" (1964: 82).
I have no doubt this is an excellent formulation of the
point of disagreement between Strawson and Russell. But it
is not the adequate formulation of the purpose of my work,
that is, the problem of semantic presuppositions generated
by definite descriptions in subject-position. Even so,
Strawson's wording may serve as a reference for the
formulation of my own problem. In this spirit, I may say
that, for my purpose, his wording is simultaneously too
narrow and too wide a formulation of the problem. On the
one hand, it is too narrow because it seems to include
only the logical status of an utterance suffering from
radical reference-failure. On the other hand, it is too
wide a formulation of the problem because it allows the
inclusion of sentences which may not have definite
descriptions in the subject-position. What is more,
Strawson's question assumes the previous existence of
alternative theoretical explanations for the referential
behaviour of definite descriptions. Thus, what he
characterizes as being at stake is in fact a mere issue
concerning the application of these previously elaborated
Theories. The more general issue concerning a rational
choice between the alternative Theories themselves must
be included in the question so that we can grasp the
essentials of the problem.
Thus, an adequate formulation of the problem of
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position needs to satisfy the
following requirements. First, the formulation should not
be so narrow as to include only the logical status of
utterances suffering from radical reference-failure.
Second, it should not be so wide as to include the problem
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of presuppositions of expressions which are not definite
descriptions or cannot be replaced by a description.
Third, it must account for the existence of alternative
Theories which may explain the referential phenomena
involved and which may have a wider scope than the one
determined by the present issue.
Besides, the previous discussion of the general
concept of semantic presupposition in the present chapter
provides us with the necessary clues for a more accurate
characterization of the problem. These clues are: i)
although the underlying motivations of the alternative
solutions are different, their common field of application
clearly includes definite descriptions; ii) the
alternative solutions involve different attempts to
explain, logically and philosophically, the referential
task of definite descriptions.
As a result, the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position may be formulated as follows: does a
definite description in the subject-position of a
declarative sentence yield a statement (or proposition, or
thought) that semantically presupposes the statement (or
proposition, or thought) that the object referred to by
the description exists uniquely in the sense of the
general concept previously defined? The problem may be
understood as a complex question concerning the way
definite descriptions function in language. An adequate
answer to such a question requires a clear explanation of
the following sub-questions: i) whether descriptions yield
statements (thoughts, propositions) that semantically
presuppose or not; ii) if descriptions do not yield
statements (thoughts, propositions) that semantically
presuppose, then: iia) how do they actually function?; ii^)
what are the logical and philosophical requirements for a
non-presuppositional account of the referential task of
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statements (thoughts, propositions) containing
descriptions in subject-position?; iii) if descriptions do
yield statements (thoughts, propositions) that
semantically presuppose, then: iiia) how do they generate
the semantic presuppositions involved?; iiib) what are the
logical requirements for a consistent elaboration of the
concept of semantic presuppositions generated by
descriptions?; what are the philosophical
requirements for a consistent elaboration of the concept
of semantic presuppositions generated by descriptions? Of
course, there are many other related questions, but the
above may be taken to be the basic ones.
Although the starting point of the problem just
defined is the Russe11/Strawson controversy, other factors
are involved in its discussion. This is so because the
Theory of Descriptions and the Theory of Presuppositions
are not the only alternatives to the explanation of the
referential role of definite descriptions in subject-
position. In fact, the problem is complicated by the
intersection of the concepts of semantic and pragmatic
presupposition. This requires that I make explicit the
conceptual framework to which I shall be appealing in the
course of my work. In what follows, I shall make a brief
analysis of the relationships between semantic and
pragmatic presupposition and their connexions with the
problem above defined in order to clarify my assumptions
in this field.
According to Morris, semantics is the part of
the general theory of signs (semiotics) which studies the
relationships between the signs and the objects they apply
to (Morris 1938). Semantics differs from syntax because
the latter studies the relationships between the signs
themselves, independently of the objects designated by the
signs (id.). There are many other definitions of
semantics, but as far as the above problem is concerned,
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a definition of semantics as the study of meaning, the
main concern of which are concepts like truth,
designation, fulfilment (of conditions), definition,
naming, sense, and so on, will do. Thus, one of the basic
features of semantics is that it deals with signs and
their denotations in abstraction from the speakers and the
contexts of use. I would suggest that in my work such a
feature may be used as a criterion for determining whether
a relationship is in fact semantic or not. On the basis of
this criterion, I may claim that semantics is different
from syntax, that is, the study of signs and their
relations in abstraction from denotations, speakers and
contexts of use. For the denotations are excluded here.
As for pragmatics, Morris defines it as the part
of semiotics that studies the relation between the signs
and their interpreters (Morris 1938: 6). The interpreters
are the speakers and the hearers of the language.
Following Morris' suggestion, I would say that pragmatics
may be defined as the study of the uses the speakers make
of the expressions and sentences of language in different
contexts. Thus, one of the basic features of pragmatics is
that it adds the consideration of speakers and contexts to
the analysis of sentences and expressions. From this point
of view, Bar-Hillei's claim that pragmatics is concerned
with the interpretation of indexical expressions (Bar-
Hil lei 1954) is mistaken. For the interpretation of
indexical expressions undoubtedly involves the
consideration of their truth-conditions, and such a
consideration belongs to semantics. The same applies to
Montague's definition of pragmatics as an interpretation
of indexical sentences (Montague 1972). In making this
claim, I am following Kempson (1975: 137).
Now given the above definitions of syntax,
semantics and pragmatics, it is clear that the concept of
presupposition of which the general framework has been
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expounded in a previous section is a semantic one. For the
concept in question expresses the truth-conditions of a
statement (thought, proposition) by means of a
relationship between statements (thoughts, propositions)
in abstraction from the speakers and the contexts of use.
Therefore, the relation of semantic presupposition goes
beyond syntax in virtue of its concern with denotations
and truth-conditions; it does not go up to pragmatics in
virtue of the abstraction it makes from speakers and
contexts.
The incorporation of the concept of semantic
presupposition into logic and linguistic considerations
raises a problem. In fact, there is always the caveat that
the relationship seems to require a three-valued logic. If
the concept is incorporated into logic and linguistics, it
follows that the logic of ordinary language is no longer
two-valued, but is to be replaced by a three-value
presuppositional logic. Although our linguistic intuitions
cannot be considered the final court of appeal in order to
decide issues like the one I am analyzing, this seems to
be counter-intuitive enough to require further explanation
by the adherents to the general concept of semantic
presupposition.
In the light of the above framework, the
following three main views as regards the referential role
of descriptions in subject-position have developed.
Although most accounts of semantic presupposition are
versions of the Strawsonian concept, there are alternative
pragmatic concepts.
First, there is the Strawsonian view
represented by the Theory of Semantic Presupposition. The
basic feature of this view is the acceptance of the
presuppositional relation as an adequate explanation of
the referring role of definite descriptions in subject-
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position. But this view may be subdivided into two groups:
one considers that radical reference-failure falls outside
of the scope of logic, whereas the other includes radical
reference-failure within that scope. The former group is
chiefly represented by Strawson'" and, as it will be shown
in the next chapter, Frege11. The latter is represented by
Van Fraassen (1968; 1969; 1971) and Lambert (1962; 1964)t2.
These authors have developed what they call free
description theories, that is, formal systems including
definite descriptions in a way such that: i) against
Russell, expressions of the form 'the so-and-so' are
interpreted as authentic referring expressions: ii)
against Frege, nothing is assigned in the domain of
discourse to those cases in which the description fails to
be true of exactly one object (Lambert 1972: 184). All the
free description theories add to a free logic, that is, a
certain first order theory with identity, the following
13.axiom1J:
(22) '(X)[(x=(ix)Fx) <—> (Fx & (y)(Fy —> y=x)]',
or any equivalent expression. According to Lambert, (22)
is an important distinguishing principle, for it fails to
hold in any Fregean system in which an empty description
has to stand for the null class (Lambert 1972: 184).
Second, there is the view represented by the
Pragmatic Theories of Presupposition. The basic feature of
this view is that presuppositions derive from previous
knowledge and beliefs involved in the communication
between speakers and hearers. Thus, the presuppositional
relation involved by the use of descriptions in
subject-position is no longer a relation between the
presupposing and the presupposed statements, but a
relation between the speaker and his utterance. The
pragmatic view usually explains presupposition in terms of
contextual factors, background knowledge and beliefs
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involved., Gricean conversational principles or notions
from speech act theory. Although differing from the Theory
of Semantic Presupposition, the pragmatic account
undoubtedly arose from the theories of Frege and Strawson,
because both authors introduce presupposition by means of
a fundamental distinction between the asserted and the
presupposed (Van der Sandt 1988: 8; 23-4).
The pragmatic view also admits a subdivision
into two main groups. Authors belonging to the first group
usually define presupposition as the set of conditions for
the "correct" (or whatever equivalent) use of linguistic
expressions. For example, Sellars (1954) defines as
'correct' the utterance of a sentence of which the speaker
believes the presuppositions are true. In the case of
definite descriptions in subject-position, to say that an
utterance of 'the King of France is bald' presupposes
'There is exactly one King of France' is to say that it is
correct to assert the conjunction 'there is exactly one
King of France and he is bald' only if the speaker
believes there to be exactly one King of France and that
this belief is shared by the hearer. Thus, if the hearer
replies that 'the King of France is bald' is false, he
also presupposes that the uniqueness condition is
satisfied. And even though both the original utterance and
the reply presuppose that the King of France exists
uniquely, the utterance is false if such a uniqueness
condition is not satisfied (Sellars 1954: 207-8)^.
Authors of the second group usually define
presupposition in terms of the Gricean 'implicature'.
Grice (1978) remarks that the total information of an
utterance may be divided in two different ways: firstly,
into what is said and what is implicated; secondly, into
what belongs to the conventional meaning of the utterance
and what does not. Thus, the total information conveyed by
a given utterance may have three different dimensions:
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what is said; what is conventionally implicated; what is
non-conventionally implicated (Grice 1978: 113). Earlier,
Grice called what is conventionally implicated and what is
non-conventionally implicated 'conventional implicatures'
and 'non-conventional implicatures1 respectively. As he
puts it,
"In some cases the conventional meaning of the
words used will determine what is implicated, besides
helping to determine what is said. If I say (smugly),
He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, I have
certainly committed myself, by virtue of the meaning
of my words, to its being the case that his being
brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an
Englishman. But while I have said that he is an
Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want
to say that I have SAID (in the favoured sense) that
it follows from his being an Englishman that he is
brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so
implicated, that this is so. I do not want to say
that my utterance of this sentence would be, STRICTLY
SPEAKING, false should the consequence in question
fail to hold (Grice 1975: 44-5).
As for the non-conventional implicatures, they are linked
to the conversational 'cooperative principle' which is to
be obeyed both by the speaker and the hearer: 'make your
informative contribution in accordance with the
requirements of the conversation'. To the cooperative
principle is subordinated a set of rules which are called
by Grice 'conversational maxims' (Grice 1975: 45-7; 48
ff.). The most important subclass of non-conventional
implicatures is what Grice calls 'conversational
implicatures'. Thus,
"A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p has implicated that q, may be said
to have conversationally implicated that q, PROVIDED
THAT (1) he is to be presumed to be observing the
conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative
principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that,
or thinks that, q is required in order to make his
saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE
terms) consistent with his presumption; and (3) the
speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to think
that the speaker thinks) that it is within the
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competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) IS
required (Grice 1975: 49-50).
Given the above Gricean conceptual framework,
most of the authors belonging to the second group consider
the notion of 'presupposition' to be either explicable in
terms of Gricean principles or replaceable by the concept
of implicature. For example, Kempson tries to show that
Grice's framework can provide an adequate explanation of
the phenomena which both logicians and linguists have
labelled 'presupposition' (Kempson 1975: 138). Thus, her
explanation of the functioning of non-anaphoric definite
descriptions in subject-position depends upon three
factors characteristic of implicatures: i) the prior
specification of the linguistic system; ii) the Gricean
cooperative principle, its conversational maxims, and the
Gricean pragmatic definition of meaning; iii) a deduction
process by means of the conversational maxims in the face
of an apparent violation of them (Kempson 1975: 181). And
she thinks the impl icatures involved in this case are
general conversational implicatures (id.)lj.
semantic and the pragmatic accounts of presupposition,
although they are different, may be put together within a
wider theoretical account. As Van der Sandt correctly
observes, one might relate these views by appealing either
to Grice's theory of conversation or to Searle's speech
act theory. In fact, suppose that the statement 'P'
semantically presupposes the statement 'Q'. In this case,
according to Searle's sincerity condition (Searle 1969:
66-7) or to Grice's maxim of quality (Grice 1975: 46), the
assertion of 'P' in whatever context requires that the
speaker believes 'P' and its obvious entailments, such as
' Q' ; otherwise, the assertion would be defective.
Therefore, a semantic presupposition of a statement made
by means of a sentence may require the conjunction with a
At this point, it is worth noticing that the
51
pragmatic presupposition of the user of the sentence. But
the converse does not hold, that is, a pragmatic
presupposition of the user of the sentence does not
necessarily require the conjunction with a semantic
presupposition of the statement made by means of the
sentence. For if an utterance of a sentence is defective,
that does not necessarily effect the truth-value of the
assertion made by means of the sentence (Van der Sandt
1988: 26). A similar suggestion was previously made by
Stalnaker (1970: 279).
Third and finally, there is the view represented
by those who think that the concept of semantic
presupposition is mistaken. The basic feature of this view
is the refusal to admit the concept of presupposition as
a coherent concept of logical theory. Thus, according to
this view, any attempt to recur to the notion of semantic
presupposition in order to explain the referential
function of definite descriptions in the subject-position
of declarative sentences is doomed to fail. The most
important representative of this view is still Russell.
Other important adherents to the anti-presuppositionalist
view are M. Dummett (1978: xv-xix; 1-24; 25-8) and G.
Evans (1982: 51-60).
It is important to recall that the above three
main views as regards the semantic presuppositions of
descriptions admit of some overlapping. For example, as
already mentioned, in order to explain some
logico-1inguistic phenomena one might recur both to the
concept of semantic and of pragmatic presupposition
without contradiction; alternatively, one might firmly
adhere to Russell's Theory of Descriptions and at the same
time recur to the concept of pragmatic presupposition for
sentences containing indexicalised descriptions. The only
major restriction involved here seems to be the
contradiction which would arise on the simultaneous
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adoption of both the Theory of Presuppositions and the
Theory of Descriptions in order to explain the referential
behaviour of non-indexicalised definite descriptions in
subj ect-position.
So far, the following important step has been
taken in the course of my work. On the basis of the
Russe11/Strawson controversy, the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position is formulated, the framework involved is
made explicit and the main features of the possible views
on the problem are outlined.
Now given the importance of Wittgenstein to
contemporary thought, the basic question with which I am
concerned in my work is to check whether or not he has an
answer to the above defined problem both in the early and
in the later philosophy. In other words, I shall be trying
to answer the following questions in the course of my
work: i) according to the "Tractatus", do definite
descriptions in the subject-position of declarative
sentences yield propositions that semantically presuppose
the existence and uniqueness of the object referred to by
the descriptions in the sense of the general concept
previously defined? ii) according to the "Investigations",
do definite descriptions in the subject-position of
declarative sentences yield statements that semantically
presuppose the existence and uniqueness of the object
referred to by the descriptions in the sense of the
general concept previously defined? To give an answer to
these questions will involve giving answers to the sub-
questions above mentioned in the case of Wittgenstein's
philosophies. At this point, it is worth recalling that
the above questions are in harmony with the main purpose
of my work, that is, neither to offer an account of
semantic presupposition nor to discuss the difficulties
raised by such a relation, but simply to analyze the early
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and the later Wittgenstein's answers to the question about
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position.
VI - FINAL REMARKS
In this chapter, I stressed the importance of
the problem concerning the referential role of definite
descriptions in subject-position. The relevant aspects of
Russell's solution to the problem and Strawson's
alternative one were discussed. The analysis of Strawson's
concept allowed the construction of a general concept of
semantic presupposition to be used in the analysis of
Wittgenstein's early and later solution. The general
concept was also used to formulate the problem with which
I shall be concerned in the course of my work. The
framework of the problem and some of its possible
solutions were discussed, thus clearing the path for the
posterior discussion.
Once this is done, it would seem we might now
turn our attention to Wittgenstein. But before we do this,
there must be some discussion to do with definite
descriptions in subject-position and some aspects of the
views of Frege, Russell and Strawson on what is involved.
This will be done in the next chapter.
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NOTES
1. In reality, Russell's paraphrase of (1) in "On
Denoting" is: "It is not always false of x that x begot
Charles II and that x was executed and that 'if y begot
Charles II, y is identical with x' is always true of y"
(1905: 482). Although this is equivalent to (2), I chose
the latter in virtue of its being closer to contemporary
terminology.
2. I owe this formulation to Wolfram (1989: 42).
3. The analysis that follows is inspired by Sainsbury
(1979: 117-22).
4. Even though (17) is interpreted as an external
negation of (1), it would be a negation in virtue of
reasons which are different from Russell's. For it would
be an external negation in virtue of the falsity of the
presupposed statement, not in virtue of primary or
secondary occurrences of the description.
5. On the basis of Lemmon (1966), Lewis (1972) and
Davidson (1967), Kempson believes that sentences also do
have a truth value relative to some context of utterance
(1975: 38). Thus, she argues that it is legitimate to
speak of semantic presuppositions of sentences (1975: 51-
2) . She does so because she adheres to an account of
meaning in terms of truth-conditions. But this involves
some difficulties as regards handling the truth conditions
of deictic sentences. As I am not committed to an account
of meaning in terms of truth-conditions, I shall stick to
the claim that only statements, not sentences, can have a
truth-value.
6. For reasons of space, I shall not consider the
controversy on the question whether or not presupposition
is a logical relationship different from entailment. On
this subject, see, for example, Nelson (1946); Strawson
(1948); Barker (1956); Hancock (1960); Peterson (1960);
Nehrlich (1967); Roberts (1969); Montague (1969); Linsky
(1971); Donne 11 (1972); Kane (1972); Nelkin (1972); Cooper
(1974: 34 ff.) .
7. In this respect, see, for example, Martin (1979:
15 ff.).
8. In other words, if 'P' presupposes 'Q', then 'Q'
has a logical form which is different from 'P''s and has
no presuppositions. It is worth noticing that Russell's
argument goes the opposite way: if 'not Q' has no
presuppositions, then, by parity of form between 'P' and
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'Q', ' P' has no presuppositions either. As it may be
inferred from Russell's words: "Indeed, it seems to me
evident that the judgement 'there is no such object as the
round square' does not presuppose that there is such an
object. If this is admitted, however, we are led to the
conclusion that, by parity of form, no judgement
concerning 'the so-and-so' actually involves the so-and-so
as a constituent" (1976: 162).
9. It would be possible to construct an alternative
general concept of semantic presupposition in which
negation is ambiguous. Call it 'n-presupposition'. It
might be defined in a way such that it shares all the
previous features with the general concept of semantic
presupposition I am characterizing so far. As for
negation, the n-presupposition would be as follows. If 'P'
is an assertion made by means of a sentence containing a
definite description in subject-position, then the
negation of such a sentence may be interpreted in either
of the following ways: i) as an external negation of the
fact expressed by the whole sentence; ii) as an internal
negation of the predicate ascribed to the description in
subject-position. Consider, for example, the following
sentences:
(9a) 'The King of France is not bald',
and
(9b) 'The King of France is not bald, because there
is no King of France'.
(9a) may be interpreted in either of the two following
ways: i) it assumes that there is a King of France and
negates that he is bald; ii) it negates that there is a
King of France who is bald. (9b), in turn, negates that
there is a King of France who is bald. The existence of a
complex form such as the one of (9b) seems to be a
confirmation of the possibility of the above two
interpretations for the negation of 'The King of France is
bald'. Thus, the ambiguity of negation depends upon
whether the referring expression in subject-position is
empty or not. If the referring expression is non-empty,
the predicate is denied of the reference of the expression
(internal negation); if the expression is empty, the
predicate cannot be denied of the reference of the
expression, but the entire sentence may be denied
(external negation).
But this yields the unpalatable consequence that the
positive form of (9a), that is, 'The King of France is
bald' may also be interpreted in either of the two
following ways: i) it asserts of the referent of 'The King
of France' that he is bald; ii) it asserts the existence
of a King of France who is bald. Under interpretation (i),
(9a) semantically presupposes the existence and uniqueness
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of the King of France; under interpretation (ii), however,
(9b) is existential and has no presuppositions.
The above consequence leads some authors to deny-
strongly the ambiguity of negation. For example, Kempson
thinks the claim that negation is ambiguous is wrong. She
argues that the incorporation into natural-language
semantics of an additional denial operator has some
awkward consequences (Kempson 1970: 95-100).
In my opinion, the above discussion reveals that it
is more likely that Strawson's account does not entail
ambiguity of negation. But it is worth noticing that I am
only stating what seems to be an important property of the
general concept of semantic presupposition, and not
defending the concept. To evaluate the problematic concept
of semantic presupposition is not my concern here.
10. Austin (1962: 14 ff.; 50-1; 52; 131; 136)
formulates the same view, but in terms of speech acts
theory. This is an illustration of the fact that the above
division into three main views on presupposition is not,
and does not intend to be, either comprehensive or
exhaustive.
11. See next chapter.
12. On this subject, see Van der Sandt (1988: 8;
13-49; 50-86), from which most of the general information
given in this Section is extracted and adapted. He calls
those, who attempt to formalize the concept of
presupposition, 'neo-Strawsonians'. Some of the authors he
quotes, as examples of this trend, are: Keenan (1972),
Hausser (1976), and Blau (1978) (van der Sandt 1988: 13).
13. For convenience, I shall adopt from now on the
following adapted notation: dots will be replaced by the
brackets '(' and ')'; 'E' will stand for the inverted 'E';
'—>' for the horseshoe; '<— >' for equivalence; 'i ' for
the inverted iota; '&' for conjunction; ' v' for non¬
exclusive disjunction; for negation.
14. As a matter of fact, Sellars argument is applied
to a definite description containing an indexical ('the
table over here'). But I believe his account may be
adapted to the case of a definite description without
indexicals. Sellars also argues that Strawson confuses
ellipsis with indexicality and thus assimilates
descriptions to indexical expressions. For example, 'the
table is large' in fact means something like 'the table
over here is large' (Sellars 1954: 198-201). In his "Mr.
Strawson on Referring", Russell seems to admit that a
definite description containing indexicals has semantic
presuppositions in Strawson's sense (Russell 1957: 120).
As other examples of authors adhering to the
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pragmatic view, van der Sandt quotes: Karttunen (1973),
who appeals to the term 'sincere', and later on to the
term 'felicitous' (1974); Thomason (1977), who uses
'acceptable'; Fillmore (1969) and Stalnaker (1973), who
use 'appropriate' (van der Sandt 1988: 25).
15. According to van der Sandt, Sadock (1978) and
Karttunen & Peters (1979) consider that presupposition is
reducible to the notion of 'conventional implicature' (van
der Sandt 1988: 70); Kempson (1975), Wilson (1975), Boer
and Lycan (1976), Atlas (1977) and Grice 1981) consider
that presuppositions are part of the entailments of simple
sentences, and invoke the Gricean theory of conversation
in order to explain how presuppositions are preserved in
embeddings that usually do not preserve entailments (van
der Sandt 1988: 70; 76).
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CHAPTER 2
FREGE, RUSSELL, AND STRAWSON
ON SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS
GENERATED BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
IN SUBJECT-POSITION
I - PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The analysis of Wittgenstein's solution to the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position requires the prior
consideration of some important aspects in Frege's,
Russell's and Strawson's views. In this chapter, I shall
deal with these aspects in the following way. First, I
shall argue that Frege held the view that definite
descriptions in subject-position generate what may be
called semantic 'prerequisites'. Second, I shall try to
prove that the Fregean semantic 'prerequisites' generated
by definite descriptions are in fact semantic
presuppositions in the sense of the general concept
defined in the previous chapter. Third, I shall argue that
Frege's concept of semantic presupposition entails that
the expressions he calls 'proper names' play two distinct
referential roles in language. Fourth, on the basis of the
twofold referential function suggested by Frege, I shall
argue that Russellian logically proper names and definite
descriptions which generate semantic presuppositions when
in subject-position are not incompatible. Thus, Strawson's
criticism of Russell in "On Referring" will be revealed to
be mistaken. Fifth and finally, I shall argue that, as far
as the accounts discussed are concerned, we may draw the
conclusion that the dispute is undecidable at the purely
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semantic level. The whole discussion is intended to
prepare the field for asking what would be Wittgenstein's
early and later solution to the problem of semantic
presupposition generated by definite descriptions in
subj ect-position.
II - FREGE'S CONCEPT OF A 'PREREQUISITE' GENERATED
BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
In his challenge to the Theory of Descriptions,
Strawson seems to have revived a Fregean concept of
semantic presupposition. In fact, there are strong
indications that Frege held a view which is similar to
Strawson's. So, some discussion of the relevant aspects of
the Fregean semantics is needed. This will take us back to
Frege's famous 1892 paper "On Sense and Reference". In
this section, I shall analyze a particular semantic
relation which is expounded in that paper.
Consider the Fregean analysis of the sentence
(1) 'Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery'.
According to Frege, it contains the clause
(2) 'Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits'
which has a reference, that is, designates an object, only
if a certain sentence is true (Frege 1892a: 69). The
sentence the truth of which is a condition of (2)'s having
a reference is:
(3) 'There was someone who discovered the elliptic
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form of the planetary orbits' (id.).
Frege claims that the sense of (3) is not included in the
sense of (1) (1892a: 69-70). In addition, the truth of (3)
is a precondition not only for the subordinate clause (2)
to have a reference, but also for sentence (1) to have a
truth-value. These features define a semantic relation
involving subordinate clauses, sentences containing these
clauses and their Fregean references. I shall call it the
Fregean relation of semantic prerequisite. In doing this,
I am following Geach and Black's suggestion in their
somewhat free translation of Frege's text1.
If the above interpretation is correct, the
Fregean relation of semantic prerequisite may also be
applied to the explanation of the referential task of
definite descriptions in subject-position. True, in "On
Sense and Reference", Frege does not deal explicitly with
the semantic prerequisites generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position. Instead, he analyses the
prerequisites generated by noun clauses like (2); he then
passes on to the prerequisites of adjectival, adverbial,
and conditional clauses (1892a: 70-1). But the existence
of the relationship of semantic prerequisite in the case
of sentences containing definite descriptions in
subject-position may be inferred from Frege's treatment of
some of the above clauses.
First, consider the case of noun clauses. It may
be shown that some noun clauses can be expressed by means
of definite descriptions. Suppose the description
(4) 'The discoverer of the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits'
which may occupy the subject-position in the sentence
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(5) 'The discoverer of the elliptic form of the
planetary orbits died in misery*.
In conformity with the pattern of the above analysis of
(1), we may say that (5) has the semantic prerequisite
(6) 'There is a discoverer of the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits'.
On the basis of the above example, I feel at ease to
suggest the point that there are noun clauses which have
the form of definite descriptions such that, when they
occupy the subject-position, they may generate sentences
that have semantic prerequisites in the sense above
defined.
Second, consider the case of adjectival clauses.
Frege's analysis reveals they can be used to construct
compound proper names, but in a peculiar way. Adjectival
clauses function as grammatical adjectives, and for this
reason they only form part of the noun clause; they yield
a complete noun clause only when they are linked to
another expression. Frege's example of an adjectival
clause is
(7) 'which is smaller than 0'.
According to Frege, (7) cannot express a complete thought
and have a reference by itself. In fact, its sense can
only be part of a thought and its reference cannot be an
independent object. But the clause can be part of the
following compound proper name:
(8) 'the square root of 4 which is smaller than 0'.
In some cases, with the help of a single adjective, one
may construct an expression having the same reference as
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(8). For instance, in the adequate numerical system, (8)
is equivalent to
(9) 'the negative square root of 4'.
In his analysis of adjectival clauses, Frege
also makes an important and explicit qualification about
definite descriptions:
"Adjective clauses also serve to construct
compound proper names, though, unlike noun clauses,
they are not sufficient by themselves for this
purpose. These adjective clauses are to be regarded
as equivalent to adjectives. Instead of 'the square
root of 4 which is smaller than 0', one can also say
'the negative square root of 4'. We have here the
case of a compound proper name constructed from the
expression with the help of the singular definite
article. This is at any rate permissible if the
concept applies to one and only one single object"
(1892a: 70-1; italics mine).
Here, the definite description is taken as a referring
expression which is constructed with the help of the word
'the'. And Frege clearly states that the use of this word
requires not only that the object referred to exists, but
also that it be unique. The same requirement of existence
and uniqueness is explicitly formulated in Frege's paper
on "Negation":
"The definite article 'the' in the expression
'the negation of the thought that 3 is greater than 5'
shows that this expression is meant to designate a
definite single thing. This single thing is in our
case a thought. The definite article makes the whole
expression into a singular name, a proxy for a proper
name" (Frege 1977: 50).
As a result, (6) should be more rigorously
rendered as
(9) 'There is exactly one discoverer of the elliptic
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form of the planetary orbits'.
Now turn to (8) and (9). Both are definite
descriptions. Although Frege does not offer any example of
semantic presuppositions generated by them, I believe I
may easily suggest one. Consider the sentence
(10) 'the square root of 4 which is smaller than 0 is
a real number'.
If we adapt Frege's analysis of (1) to the case of (10),
we shall find that (10) has the semantic prerequisite
(11) 'there is exactly one thing which is the square
root of 4 which is smaller than 0'.
All adjectival clauses like (7) have the same features. If
this is correct, the above analysis reveals that
adjectival clauses may be used to construct definite
descriptions which generate semantic prerequisites when in
subject-position .
The claim that in Frege' s view definite
descriptions in subject-position generate semantic
prerequisites is consistent with some of his hints
concerning the features of definite descriptions in "On
Sense and Reference". The first hint is that empty
definite descriptions are expressions having a sense but
no reference. As an example, he offers the description
(18) 'the least rapidly convergent series' (1892a:
58) .
He also offers some examples of empty definite
descriptions outside the strict domain of mathematics,
such as:
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(19) 'the celestial body most distant from earth'
(1892a: 58),
and
(20) 'the will of the people' (1892a: 70).
More precisely, Frege argues that (18) has a sense, but
demonstrably has no reference (1892a: 58); that (19) has
a sense, but hardly has a reference (id.); and that it is
easy to establish that (20) has no generally accepted
reference (1892a: 70). Now the relation of semantic
prerequisite as defined in Frege's case requires that some
expressions may have a sense but no reference. For when
there is a prerequisite failure, that is, when the
sentence being the semantic prerequisite is false, the
sentence having the prerequisite must still have a sense,
although it has no reference. And the way to obtain this
is to construct the sentence in question by means of
expressions which have a sense but no reference. From the
first Fregean hint, it is clear that empty definite
descriptions belong to the class of expressions which can
have a sense but no reference, thus being valid candidates
for generating semantic prerequisites when in subject-
position.
The second hint is the fact that Frege offers
an example of an empty description in connexion with his
discussion about the causes of the existence of semantic
prerequisites generated by noun clauses (1892a: 70). After
analyzing the case of noun clause (2) ['Whoever discovered
the elliptic form of the planetary orbits'], Frege argues
that the existence of expressions of this kind, that is,
expressions which have a reference only if a correlated
sentence is true, arises from an imperfection of language.
He then claims that a logically perfect language can avoid
this by the stipulation that combinations of symbols that
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seem to stand for something but have no reference should
stand for the number 0 (id.). In the discussion that
follows, Frege offers the previously mentioned definite
description (20) ['The will of the people'] as an example
of such empty combinations of symbols (id.). Thus, once
again we may infer that in Frege' s view a definite
description in subject-position generates semantic
prerequisites.
So far, we know that Frege held a view that some
expressions in subject-position generate semantic
prerequisites and that definite descriptions are a subset
of such expressions. In what follows, I shall argue that
the Fregean semantic prerequisite is in fact a kind of
semantic presupposition.
Ill - FREGE'S CONCEPT OF A 'PREREQUISITE' IS AN INSTANCE
OF THE GENERAL CONCEPT OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION
In this section, I shall argue that the Fregean
semantic 'prerequisite' above discussed is an instance of
the general concept of semantic presupposition which was
abstracted from Strawson's account.
As already mentioned, there are strong
indications that Frege held a view of semantic
presupposition. This may be illustrated by an interesting
1975 paper entitled "Frege's Polymorphous Concept of
Presupposition and its Role in a Theory of Meaning", in
which Jay Atlas extracts not only one, but three different
notions of presupposition from Frege's "On Sense and
Reference". Among such notions, Atlas distinguishes a
Fregean semantic presupposition which he characterizes as
a relationship between thoughts (Atlas 1975: 29). The
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source of the concept is the following Fregean passage:
"The sense of the sentence 'After
Schleswig-Holstein was separated from Denmark,
Prussia and Austria quarrelled' can also be rendered
in the form 'After the separation of
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, Prussia and Austria
quarrelled'. In this version, it is surely
sufficiently clear that the sense is not to be taken
as having as a part the thought that
Schleswig-Holstein was once separated from Denmark,
but that this is the necessary presupposition in
order for the expression 'after the separation of
Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark' to have any
reference at all. To be sure, our sentence can also
be interpreted as saying that Schleswig-Holstein was
once separated from Denmark. We then have a case
which is to be considered later. In order to
understand the difference more clearly, let us
project ourselves into the mind of a Chinese who,
having little knowledge of European history, believes
it to be false that Schleswig-Holstein was ever
separated from Denmark. He will take our sentence, in
the first version, to be neither true nor false but
will deny it to have any reference, on the ground of
absence of reference for its subordinate clause. This
clause would only apparently determine a time" (Frege
1892a: 71; Atlas 1975: 30)r.
According to Atlas' reading of Frege, the above paragraph
brings out Frege's semantic notion of presupposition
(1975: 30). Atlas argues that the existence of a temporal
reference for the adverbial clause
(21) 'After the separation of Schleswig-Holstein from
Denmark'
semantically presupposes
(22) 'Schleswig-Holstein was once separated from
Denmark'.
Atlas claims that the thought expressed by a sentence
containing (21) will have a truth-value only if the
presupposed thought expressed by (22) is true. And this is
equivalent to the relation of semantic presupposition in
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the sense previously defined by Atlas: the thought ' P'
semantically presupposes the thought ' Q' if and only if
the truth of 'Q• is a necessary condition of 'P''s having
a truth-value (Atlas 1975: 29; 30).
As far as the relation of semantic
presupposition is concerned, I think Atlas' reading of
Frege is right. But in conformity with the purpose of my
work I would add two important qualifications.
First, the Fregean relation of semantic
presupposition spotted by Atlas is an instance of the
general concept of semantic presupposition. In fact, the
relation is semantic, for it only involves thoughts and
their truth-values. In addition, suppose two thoughts, say
'P' and 'Q'. If the truth of 'Q' is a necessary condition
of 'P''s having a truth-value, we may say that both 'P'
and 'not P' semantical ly presuppose ' Q' in the sense of
the general concept. For if 'P' is true, then 'P' has a
truth-value and this means ' Q' is true; if 'not P' is
true, then 'P' is false, that is, has a truth-value and
this means that 'Q' is true; the same holds if 'P' or its
negation is false". As a result, it seems reasonable to
assume that 'P' semantically presupposes ' Q' in Atlas'
reading if and only if: i) if 'P' is true or false, then
' Q' is true; ii) if 'not P' is false or true, then 'Q' is
true; iii) if 'Q' is true, then 'P' will be either true or
false and 'not P' will be either false or true; iv) if 'Q'
is false, then neither 'P' nor its negation will have a
truth-value. In analogy with Strawson's case, the status
of the "thought" in (iv) is difficult to determine. For
the falsity of 'Q' would involve the commitment to
paradoxical truth-valueless "thoughts". Therefore, I would
claim that the relation spotted by Atlas in Frege is an
instance of the general concept of semantic presupposition
as defined in the previous chapter.
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The second qualification to be made is the
following. I would add to Atlas' reading the important
fact that in Frege's view definite descriptions in
subject-position may also be shown to generate semantic
presuppositions in the sense above defined. This may be
inferred from Frege1s analysis of the referential role of
subordinate clauses in "On Sense and Reference". I shall
argue that, although Frege does not use the word
'presupposition' in his analysis of the referential role
of subordinate clauses and adopts a different phrasing,
the relation involved is equivalent to semantic
presupposition.
There is a striking similarity between the
relation of semantic prerequisite in the case of thoughts
expressed by sentences containing subordinate clauses and
the relation of semantic presupposition in the case of
thoughts expressed by sentences containing adverbial
clauses. Consider, for example, sentences (5) ['The
discoverer of the elliptic form of the planetary orbits
died in misery'] and (9) ['There is exactly one discoverer
of the elliptic form of the planetary orbits']. In fact,
both (5) and its negation entail (9) in the sense that the
truth of (9) is a necessary condition of (5)'s having a
truth-value; if (9) is true, then (5) and its negation
have opposite truth-values; if (9) is false, then neither
(5) nor its negation have a truth-value. This allows the
conclusion that (5) semantically presupposes (9) .
If this is correct, then Frege held a view of
semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position. Besides, his view may be
considered an instance of the general concept of semantic
presupposition as defined in the previous chapter. In
order to prove this, consider initially the undeniable
fact that there are differences between the Fregean and
the Strawsonian account. For example, Frege is asking a
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semantic question of which the answer may be extended in
order to explain the referential role of definite
descriptions in subject-position, whereas Strawson clearly
asks a pragmatic question about the uniquely referring use
of definite descriptions in subject-position; Frege
obtains a semantic relation between thoughts, whereas
Strawson obtains a relation between statements.
These differences notwithstanding, I would argue
that the previous discussion of Strawson's account and
Frege's allows one to infer that both accounts are
instances of the more general concept of semantic
presupposition. For suppose we abstract from the above
differences. In this case, although the motivating
research question is different in each author and
statements are different from thoughts, the relation
obtained by Frege shares some properties with the relation
obtained by Strawson. In fact, both relations: i) are
semantic; ii) involve assessabi1ity for truth-value only
in case of presuppositional success; iii) involve - non-
assessabi1ity for truth-value in case of presuppositional
failure. If we go further, we may also claim that: i) both
the Fregean thought (or, alternatively, the Strawsonian
statement) and its negation have the same semantic
presupposition; ii) if the presupposed Fregean thought
(or, alternatively, Strawsonian statement) is true, then
the presupposing thought (or, alternatively, Strawsonian
statement) and its negation have opposite truth-values;
iii) if the presupposed Fregean thought (or,
alternatively, Strawsonian statement) is false, both the
presupposing thought (or, alternatively, Strawsonian
statement) and its negation are not assessable for
truth-value; iv) the sense of the presupposing Fregean
thought (or, alternatively, Strawsonian statement) does
not include the sense of the presupposed thought (or,
alternatively, Strawsonian statement).
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In addition, the Fregean presupposed thought,
which is expressed by a uniquely existential sentence,
seems to share an important property with the Strawsonian
uniquely existential presupposed statement: it has no
presuppositions at all. Suppose 'P' and ' Q' are Fregean
thoughts such that 'P' is expressed by a sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position, 'Q'
is expressed by a uniquely existential sentence containing
the same description, and 'P' semantically presupposes
' Q' . Although Frege does not deal explicitly with this
subject, his treatment of noun clauses in "On Sense and
Reference" suggests that 'Q' has no presuppositions. For
it may be inferred from his account that noun clauses in
subject-position have a reference only if a thought
stating the existence and uniqueness of the object
referred to by the noun clause is true (1892a: 69). Given
that ' Q' is essentially bivalent, that is, ' Q' has a
truth-value even though the description it contains is
empty, it follows that ' Q' does not semantical ly
presuppose itself and needs not to presuppose semantical ly
any other thought.
If the above interpretation is correct, then
Frege seems to hold a view of semantic presupposition
which is not only an instance of the general concept
defined in the previous chapter, but also very close to
Strawson's account. As already mentioned, even the status
of the Fregean presupposing "thought" when the presupposed
one is false is ambiguous, in an striking analogy with the
ambiguous status of the Strawsonian presupposing
"statement" yielded by the use of a sentence containing an
empty description in subject-position. As a result,
Frege's explanation of the referential role of definite
descriptions in subject-position opposes Russell's Theory
of Descriptions in a way which is similar to Strawson's.
For example, in Frege's account, as in Strawson's: i)
there is no need to postulate a propositional function in
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order to eliminate the definite article in the way it is
needed by the Theory of Descriptions; ii) the uniquely
existential presupposed thought is not part of what is
asserted by the presupposing thought; iii) when the
presupposed thought is false, the presupposing one has no
truth-value; iv) there is no such a thing as a primary or
a secondary occurrence of the description; v) there are
two layers of significance involved in the relation, that
is, the layer corresponding to what is asserted and the
one corresponding to what is semantically presupposed.
In addition to the above semantic concept, Frege
also seems to have held a pragmatic concept of
presupposition. But the latter may be shown to be
different from the former. In order to prove this, return
to Atlas' previously mentioned 1975 paper. Here he also
distinguishes a Fregean pragmatic presupposition which is
defined as a relationship between persons, contexts and
thoughts6. As the source of the notion, he quotes the
Fregean passage:
"Idealists or sceptics will perhaps long since
have objected: 'You talk, without further ado, of the
Moon as an object: but how do you know that the name
'the Moon' has any reference?' I reply that when we
say 'the Moon', we do not intend to speak of our idea
of the Moon, nor are we satisfied with the sense
alone, but we presuppose a reference. To assume that
in the sentence 'The Moon is smaller than the Earth'
the idea of the Moon is in question, would be flatly
to misunderstand the sense. If this is what the
speaker wanted, he would use the phrase 'my idea of
the Moon'. Now we can of course be mistaken in the
presupposition, and such mistakes have indeed
occurred. But the question whether the presupposition
is perhaps always mistaken need not be answered here;
in order to justify mention of the reference of a
sign it is enough, at first, to point out our
intention in speaking or thinking. (We must then add
the reservation: provided such reference exists.)"
(Frege 1892a: 61-2; Atlas 1975: 30)7.
Atlas interprets the above passage as belonging to a wider
context in which Frege defends a distinction between: i)
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the idea a person associates with an expression; ii) the
sense of the expression: iii) the reference of the
expression (1975: 30). Thus, to the idealists' and the
sceptics' objection that we cannot talk about the objects
in the world, Frege' s reply is that the name 'the Moon'
presupposes a reference. And Atlas thinks this particular
employment of the term 'presupposition' suggests a
pragmatic conception involving a relation between a
speaker and a thought (id.). He formulates the conception
in a way derived from Stalnaker: a speaker ' S'
pragmatically presupposes a thought 'P' in a context 'C'
if and only if S takes for granted that 'P' is true (1975:
29; see too Stalnaker 1970: 279-80).
But Atlas' suggestion is in need of some
qualification. First, Atlas' reading shifts from the
pragmatic presupposition of a Fregean name like "the Moon"
to the pragmatic presupposition of a complete thought. As
a matter of fact, thoughts are not mentioned in the above
passage. Second, I would argue that the shift from names
to definite descriptions is allowed. True, Frege's
suggestion seems merely to be that someone who sincerely
asserts something like 'the Moon is so-and-so'
pragmatically presupposes that the name 'the Moon' has a
reference. But at the bottom of the passage we may find a
more general formulation. Here, Frege argues that in order
to justify mention of the reference of a sigrn it is
enough, at first, to point out our intention in speaking
or thinking. This is a wording general enough to allow the
conclusion that pointing out our intention in speaking or
thinking justifies mentioning the reference of a definite
description. Therefore, someone who sincerely asserts that
'the so-and-so is such-and-such' pragmatically presupposes
that 'the so-and-so' has in fact a reference. Third, the
pragmatic concept in the Fregean passage only involves
persons and signs, whereas Atlas' reading, inspired by
Stalnaker, involves persons, thoughts and contexts. Thus,
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strictly speaking, it would seem that Atlas is not allowed
to liken Stalnaker's concept to Frege's. If this is
correct, then Atlas is right in his suggestion that Frege
offers a concept of pragmatic presupposition, but wrong in
his claim that such a concept is analogous to Stalnaker's.
Thus, Atlas' reading is at least correct in the
claim that the Fregean account appeals not only to a
concept of semantic presupposition, but also to a
pragmatic one. And I would argue that the two concepts
mentioned are different from each other. For the semantic
concept is a relation between thoughts and their truth-
values, in abstraction from speakers, whereas the
pragmatic concept is a relation between speakers, their
intentions and the signs used. As already mentioned,
although the concepts are different, they are compatible
and may be put together in the same account of language.
Thus, Frege's account seems to entail that a speaker who
sincerely asserts (5) ['The discoverer of the elliptic
form of the planetary orbits died in misery'] involves the
following relations: i) the thought expressed by (5)
semantically presupposes the thought expressed by (9)
['There is exactly one discoverer of the elliptic form of
the planetary orbits']; ii) the speaker pragmatically
presupposes that the description 'the discoverer of the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits' has a reference.
Both presuppositions may be put together in the Fregean
account of language without yielding contradiction.
Once the above distinction is made and the
Fregean semantic concept of presupposition is clearly
characterized, we may now turn our attention to an
important consequence that the adoption of such a concept
brings to Frege's semantics. The consequence concerns the
different ways the referential role may be played by the
Fregean proper names. This will be discussed in the next
section.
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IV - SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS GENERATED BY
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
AND FREGE'S ACCOUNT OF PROPER NAMES
According to my interpretation of Frege,
definite descriptions are referring expressions which
generate semantic presuppositions when in subject-
position. But this view raises an important consequence in
Frege1s account.
In fact, the concept of semantic presupposition
introduces an important distinction in the ways a Fregean
proper name may refer. For Frege's concept of 'proper
name' includes not only simple proper names, but also
compound ones, a subset of which comprehends definite
descriptions. And only definite descriptions seem to have
semantic presuppositions in the sense previously defined.
Fregean simple proper names have a different semantic
relationship with their denotations. I shall explain this
in what fo11ows.
In Frege's view, a proper name is anything
which is a sign for an object (1892b: 47). A proper name
may be simple or compound (Frege 1892a: 69). Thus, several
expressions, like definite descriptions or some
subordinate clauses, may function as compound proper
names, provided that they stand for an object. The usual
proper names, like 'Kepler' or 'Sachse', are included in
the category of 'simple proper names'. Obviously, Frege
expands the concept of proper name in a way such that it
comprehends the whole class of 'referring expressions'.
This fact suggests that according to Frege proper names
and definite descriptions basically function in the same
way in our language, and that there is no significant
difference between them. But this claim is to be tested by
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means of the application of Frege's concept of semantic
presupposition to simple proper names.
According to the concept, the employment of,
say, the name 'Kepler' in a sentence like
(23) 'Kepler died in misery'
would semantically presuppose
(24) 'Kepler exists'.
Now we may ask about the nature of (24). According to
Frege, (24) would make sense only with some special
qualifications.
On the one hand (24) is equivalent to
(25) 'There is Kepler',
which is neither true nor false, but merely a senseless
utterance (Frege 1892b: 50). One might suspect that the
correct formulation of (24) should be
(25) 'There is a man whose name is Kepler',
but Frege argues that although (26) has a sense, the word
'Kepler' does not any longer function as a name here. It
now belongs to the predicate 'a man whose name is Kepler'.
(26) has a sense because 'there is' and its equivalents is
a second level predicate, that is, it may be ascribed only
to concepts (Frege 1891: 37-8). What is more, a word like
'Kepler' can never be a proper predicate, although it can
form part of a genuine predicate (Frege 1892b: 44). The
general result from this case is that it would be
incorrect to say that the thought expressed by (23)
semantically presupposes the thought expressed by (24) in
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the same sense as a thought containing a definite
description in subject-position semantically presupposes
a uniquely existential thought.
On the other hand, (24) makes sense only if it
is understood as signifying the metalinguistic principle
that the name 'Kepler' has a reference. This is stated by
Frege when he analyzes the same problem as regards the
name 'Sachse' in his "Dialogue with Ptinjer on Existence":
"If 'Sachse exists' is supposed to mean 'the
word 'Sachse' is not an empty sound, but designates
something', then it is true that the condition
'Sachse exists' must be satisfied. But this is not a
new premise, but the presupposition of all our words
- a presupposition which goes without saying" (Frege
c. 1884: 60).
In the case of the name 'Kepler' and (24), one may infer
from the above passage that (24) is a condition that must
be satisfied if the name 'Kepler' is not an empty sound.
(24) is not a new premise, but expresses the
presupposition of all our words. Frege thinks that the
presupposition goes without saying, and this might be
interpreted in two ways: either it refers to the
relationship between the name 'Kepler' and its denotation
in abstraction from the speaker's beliefs or it expresses
the speaker's beliefs. In the former case, the
presupposition would be semantic; in the latter, it would
be pragmatic. But given that Frege's account of language
includes the appeal both to semantic and pragmatic
presuppositions, it would be perfectly consistent to
assume that the presupposition which goes without saying
has both a semantic and a pragmatic reading. The semantic
reading would abstract from the speaker's beliefs and only
involve the principle that a simple proper name must
designate something if it is not an empty sound. In this
sense, the semantic principle is not to be confounded with
the pragmatic principle that the name 'Kepler' has a
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reference. For the pragmatic principle concerns the
speaker's belief that there is exactly one object referred,
to by the name 'Kepler' when he sincerely uses the name in
order to make an assertion; by contrast, the semantic
principle concerns the relationship between the name
'Kepler' and its denotation, in abstraction from the
speaker's beliefs and contexts. Thus, the semantic
presupposition of a simple proper name is in fact a kind
of Fregean semantic principle governing the use of our
words. The principle can only be metalinguistically
expressed and is so evident that it usually goes without
saying. Once again, the general result from this case is
that it would be incorrect to say that (23) semantically
presupposes (24) in the same sense as a thought containing
a definite description in subject-position semantically
presupposes a uniquely existential thought concerning the
object referred to by the description.
As a result, the use of simple proper names in
subject-position does not seem to yield semantic
presuppositions in the same way as definite descriptions
do. And Frege's concept of 'proper name' involves an
unexpected dualism in the referential function. In fact,
his account entails that there are at least two kinds of
proper name. First, there are proper names which function
like definite descriptions in subject-position. These
expressions generate semantic presuppositions which are
expressed by thoughts asserting the existence and
uniqueness of the object referred to by the description.
Thus, a thought expressed by a sentence of the form
(27) 'The F is so-and-so'
semantically presupposes the thought expressed by a
sentence of the form
(28) 'There is one and only one F'.
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Second, there are proper names which function like the
simple proper name 'Kepler' in subject-position. These
expressions do not have semantic presuppositions in the
same sense as definite descriptions. For a sentence of the
form
(29) 'a is so-and-so'
in which 'a' is a simple proper name does not semantically
presuppose
(30) 'a exists'.
As already mentioned, (30) is either senseless or
expresses the metalinguistic principle that the name 'a'
has a reference. The metalinguistic principle may be taken
as a semantic principle, but it is not equivalent to the
uniquely existential thought presupposed by the definite
description in subject-position.
Now the above interpretation clashes with
Kripke's claim that in Frege's account simple proper names
are abbreviated or disguised descriptions (Kripke 1980: 27
ff.; see too Curry 1982: 169-71). True, Dummett has
already argued against Kripke on this issue (Dummett
1981a: 110 ff.). But now Dummett's argument may be
reinforced by the consideration of the semantic
presuppositions generated by the expressions involved. For
although a simple proper name may be substituted by a
description having the same reference, a thought
containing the simple proper name in subject-position is
only committed to the semantic principle that the name has
a reference, whereas a thought containing the description
in subject-position semantically presupposes a uniquely
existential thought. In other words, although 'the pupil
of Plato' may sometimes successfully replace 'Aristotle',
the sentence
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(31) 'The pupil of Plato is a greek philosopher'
semantically presupposes
(32) 'There is one and only one pupil of Plato'
whereas
(33) 'Aristotle is a greek philosopher'
is only committed to the Fregean semantic principle which
metalinguistically expresses the fact that the name
'Aristotle' designates something and does not semantically
presuppose that there is exactly one Aristotle. Of course,
one might object that (32) is equivalent to the semantic
principle that the description 'the pupil of Plato'
designates something. But the fact is that, in Frege's
view, to the semantic principle concerning the description
there corresponds the sentence (32) at the linguistic
level, whereas to the semantic principle that the name
'Aristotle' has a denotation there corresponds nothing- at
the linguistic level.
In addition, the above difference between the
semantic mechanisms entails that a mock simple proper name
is different from a mock description. As a matter of fact,
the mock proper name is possible in virtue of the pretence
that the semantic principle that it has a reference is
fulfilled. But the mock description is possible in virtue
of the pretence that the thought affirming the existence
and uniqueness of the object referred to by the
description is true.
As a result, if simple proper names and definite
descriptions in subject-position are submitted to
different semantic relationships, they play different
roles in language, and simple proper names cannot be
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considered equivalent to concealed descriptions. In fact,
although both definite descriptions and simple proper
names belong to the same class of referring expressions,
they must be different from each other in virtue of their
different referential mechanisms. This may be considered
a general result of Frege's account on simple proper
names and definite descriptions. Thus, Kripke's claim is
inspired by a mistaken interpretation of Frege's view.
As a result, the Fregean explanation of the
referring function of definite descriptions by means of
the concept of semantic presupposition yields a twofold
account of the way a Fregean proper name refers: if the
proper name is compound, then it refers in a way such that
it generates semantic presuppositions in subject-position;
if the proper name is simple, then it refers in a way such
that it is submitted to the semantic principle that the
name has a reference. Now the important conclusion to be
drawn here is that both referring functions may coexist in
the same system without yielding contradiction. True,
Frege denounces the existence of the mechanism of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position as an imperfection of our language
(1892a: 70). But by means of the procedure of only
introducing a new sign as a proper name if it has been
secured a reference, Frege is able to construct a
logically perfect language in which definite descriptions
that generate semantic presuppositions when in subject-
position do coexist with simple proper names that are only
submitted to the Fregean semantic principle. True, the
relation of semantic presupposition is ignored by the
perfect language. But it still exists and requires special
stipulations in order to avoid the introduction of empty
definite descriptions. The formal system in "Grundgesetze"
illustrates this possibility. Now this affects the
relationship between Russell's logically proper names and
definite descriptions in subject-position, as well as
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Strawson's criticism of the Theory of Descriptions. I
shall discuss this in the next section.
V - RUSSELL AND STRAWSON ON
SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS GENERATED BY
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
The advantages of Russell's Theory of
Descriptions are well known. If definite descriptions are
incomplete symbols, their referential mechanism may be
reducible to the way authentic proper names refer and the
odd relationship of semantic presupposition may be
dispensed with. But there is an important point to be made
as regards the relationship between the Theory of
Descriptions and the doctrine of logically proper names.
This will involve discussing the following points: i) the
referential mechanism of Russellian logically proper
names; ii) the status of the Russellian paraphrase; iii)
the different ways the gap between ordinary language and
a perfect language containing logically proper names may
be fi1 led.
First, consider the referential mechanism of
Russellian logically proper names. It seems that they also
are submitted to the Fregean semantic principle. True, we
cannot deny that there are significant differences between
Russellian logically proper names and Fregean simple
proper names. For example: i) the logically proper name
does not have a sense, whereas the Fregean simple proper
name has got one; ii) logically proper names denote
Russellian 'simple objects', whereas Fregean simple proper
names denote Fregean 'objects'; iii) logically proper
names are combined to form Russellian 'atomic sentences',
whereas Fregean simple proper names are combined to form
Fregean 'sentences'. These differences notwithstanding, we
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may say that the logically proper name shares the
following important properties with the Fregean simple
proper name in a perfect language: i) its meaning is its
bearer (Russell 1918: 187; in Fregean terminology: its
reference is its bearer); ii) it is a meaningless noise if
there is no bearer (Russell 1918: 187-8; 1940: 245; in
Fregean terminology: it is an empty name if there is no
bearer); iii) it cannot be ascribed the predicate 'exists'
(Russell 1925: 241, 250, 252; 1940: 165; in Fregean
terminology: it cannot be ascribed the predicate
'exists'). Now the above properties reveal that the
essential features of the Fregean semantic principle were
applied in the explanation of the referential mechanism of
Russellian logically proper names. Actually, the logically
proper name is such that it must designate something if it
is not an empty sound; this fact can only be expressed
metalinguistically. Besides, a sentence containing a
logically proper name in subject-position cannot be said
to presuppose semantically the corresponding existential
sentence, for the logically proper name cannot be ascribed
the predicate 'exists'. Thus, Russellian logically proper
names are in fact submitted to the Fregean semantic
principle and this means they can, under the appropriate
circumstances, be compatible with definite descriptions
which generate semantic presuppositions when in subject-
position.
Second, consider the status of the Russellian
paraphrase. Suppose someone says
(34) 'The book of verses is red'.
According to Russell, (34) is equivalent to
(35) 'There is an x such that x is a book of verses
and for all y, if y is a book of verses, then y is x, and
x is red'.
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(35), in turn, may be completely formalized as
(36) 1 (Ex) (Bx & (y) (By —> y=x) & Rx) • ,
where 'B' and 'R' respectively stand for the predicates
'is a book of verses' and 'is red'. 'The book of verses'
is the subject-expression in (34), and this fact suggests
that the description refers to an object in the world. But
Russell's analysis reveals that this is not the case, for
the description is no longer the subject-expression in
(35) and (36). 'The book of verses' is replaced by a set
of propositional functions which do not refer to an object
in the world, but which have an argument-place for an
object in the world. In fact, the propositional functions
may be true or false, provided there is an object in the
world that satisfies them.
But this is not the end of the matter. For the
argument for the variables in propositions (35) and (36)
is a determinate book of verses, and things like books are
mere logical fictions in Russell's account. As a matter of
fact, the complete analysis of (34) goes further and
yields a complex proposition containing either logically
proper names or variables for logically proper names.
Since we do not know the detailed logical form of the
complex proposition, we may at least suppose that its
generic form might be
(37) '(Exj)... (EXjj) ((B{Xj. . . xn} & i?{xj... xn)}] ' .
Here, '(Ex,)... (Exn) [ ]' stands for an existential
function of which the variables 'x.. . . xn' represent the
cluster of atomic constituents that satisfy both the
functions ' J3{xj. . . xn> ' and ' R{x,. . . xE} ' ; ' B{x,. . . xn> '
stands for a kind of function of which the predicate ' B'
represents the cluster of predicates that are satisfied by
the cluster of atomic constituents ' Xj. . . x ' in a way such
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that they uniquely characterize the object referred to by
the description 'The book of verses'; ' 2?{xj. . . xn> ' stands
for a same kind of function of which the predicate ' R'
represents the cluster of predicates that are satisfied by
the cluster of atomic constituents 'x^... x„' in a way such
that they exhaustively characterize the ordinary language
predicate 'is red'. Thus, the variables 'x}' . . . 'xn' stand
for the Russellian atomic constituents which are known by
acquaintance and designated by logically proper names; ' B'
and 'J?' are abbreviations respectively for the clusters of
predicates that specify the articulations of atomic
constituents characterizing a unique book of verses (' B' )
that is red ('i?'). The atomic variables and the clusters
are such that they exhaustively give the truth conditions
of (37). Since (37) is equivalent to (34), (35) and (36),
(37) equally gives the truth conditions of all these
propositions.
Now consider the sentences (34) and (37): (34)
belongs to ordinary language and contains an unauthentic
subject-expression ('the book of verses') standing for an
unauthentic object (the book to which the definite
description refers is only a logical fiction); (37)
belongs to a logically perfect language and contains in
the argument-places a cluster of variables standing for
authentic objects, that is, atomic constituents which are
designated by logically proper names. As to proposition
(36), it has a peculiar status. On the one hand, (36) is
the analyzed form of (34) and thus reveals that 'the book
of verses', although in the subject-position, is an
unauthentic referring expression. On the other hand, (36)
may be further analyzed into (37), and this reveals that
(36) contains in the argument-places a cluster of
variables which still stand for an unauthentic object,
that is, a logical fiction (a determinate book of verses
that has a red cover).
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As a result, (36) seems to belong to an
intermediate level of language. But this entails two
important consequences concerning the relationships
between (34), (36) and (37). The first consequence is that
although (36) reveals the misleading form of (34), (37)
reveals that (36) itself is still misleading. For the
variable 'x' in (36) stands for an unauthentic object to
which we cannot genuinely refer. The second consequence is
that the full analysis of (34) and (36) would be the
detailed form of (37), although the latter is only
postulated (in fact, Russell never offered an example of
a complete analysis, in terms of logically proper names,
of a sentence like (34)). Thus, the gap between sentences
like (34) and (37) is so big that it might be filled in a
different way.
Third, consider the following alternative way of
filling the gap between ordinary language and a perfect
language containing logically proper names. By contrast
with Russell, suppose that definite descriptions in the
subject-position of declarative sentences are taken as
authentic referring expressions.
In this case, the description 'The book of
verses' would occupy the argument place of the predicate
'is red' in (34) and the sentence would be analyzed as
follows:
(38) 'Is red (The book of verses)'.
But the description would refer only if the following
sentence is true:
(39) 'There is exactly one book of verses'.
Thus, we may say that the statement made with (34) (or its
equivalent made with (38)) semantically presupposes the
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statement made with (39) in the sense of the general
concept. For if (38) is true, then (39) is also true; if
the negation of (38) is true, then (39) is also true; if
(39) is true, both (38) and its negation have a truth-
value; if (39) is false, both (38) and its negation are
truth-valueless.
Now the problem is how to explain all these
sentences in terms of logically proper names and
simultaneously preserve the relation of semantic
presupposition. This may be made as follows.
If we assume that (34) contains an authentic
referring expression and take its analysis further, we may
suppose that we shall obtain the following fully-analyzed
generic form for the intermediate sentence (38):
(40) ■ J?{xj... xn}[\Xj... xnS{Xj... xn}] ' .
Here, ' J?{Xj. . . xn> [ ]' and ' \x,. . . xpS{Xj... xp} '
respectively stand for a special function and a special
argument that may be defined as follows: i) ' i?{Xj. . . xn} '
and ' B{x,... xp} ' are functions similar to the ones
presented in (37); ii) ' I?{X]. . . xn> [ ]' stands for another
kind of function of which the arguments may be any cluster
of 'n' atomic constituents, and that is satisfied by the
unique cluster of 'n' atomic constituents satisfying a
certain description, say the description 'The book of
verses'; iii) ' \x,. . . xnB{x.. . . xn} ' stands for an argument
of the function ' i?{x, . . . xp} [ ] ' in a way such that if the
cluster of atomic constituents represented by the
variables ' x.(. . . xp' uniquely satisfy the cluster of
predicates 'B{Xj... xp} ' , then they may occupy the
argument-places in ' J?{xj. . . xp} ' and otherwise not. In the
current case, ' B{xj. . . xp} ' stands for the cluster of
predicates that are satisfied by the cluster of arguments
'Xj... xp' in a way such that the predicates and arguments
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uniquely characterize the complex designated by the
description 'The book of verses'; ' i?{xj. . . xn> ' stands for
the cluster of arguments and predicates such that they
exhaustively characterize the predicate 'is red'. (40)
would not be further analyzable, thus confirming ' \x.. . .
xnJ5{xj. . . xn} ' as an authentic referring expression
occupying the argument-place of the above function ' i?{x,. . .
xn> [ ]'. The ' \Xj. . . xn' operator in (40) is an adaptation
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of Frege's function '\x' as defined in "Grundgesetze .
As for (39), its final analysis would yield the
generic form
(41) ' (Exj) . . . (Exn) [B{Xj. . . xn>] ' ,
where, as in Russell's case, the cluster of variables
1
Xj... xn' represent the atomic constituents which are
designated by logically proper names; ' J9{Xj. . . xn} ' is an
abbreviation for the cluster of predicates that are
satisfied by the cluster of arguments ' x, . . . xn' in a way
such that the predicates and arguments uniquely
characterize the complex designated by 'The book of
verses'.
The truth-conditions of the newly defined
function (40) may be characterized as follows. Two
alternatives are possible. First, the arguments of (40)
may be logically proper names. In this case, (40) will be
true or false depending on the adequacy of the cluster of
predicates defined by ' J?{Xj. . . xa} ' to the cluster of
logically proper names that occupy the argument-places of
such predicates. Second, the argument of (40) may be a
definite description of which the complete analysis would
yield an expression of the form ' \x,. . . xrB{x, ... xn) ' . In
this case, the fact that the argument of (40) has a
reference will depend on the truth of (41). Thus, if (41)
is true, the description in (40) has a referent and (40)
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will be either true or false; if (41) is false, the
description in (40) has no referent and (40) will be
truth-valueless. As a result, we may say that, in the
current case: i) if (40) is true, then (41) is also true;
ii) if the negation of (40) is true, then (41) is also
true; iii) if (41) is true, then both (40) and its
negation have a truth-value; iv) otherwise, both (40) and
its negation are truth-valueless. The analysis is such
that the fully-analyzed form of (38) semantical ly
presupposes the fully-analyzed form of (39). In this way,
the relation of semantic presupposition holding between
(38) and (39) is preserved. This would yield the striking
result that, although (40) and (41) are fully-analyzed
sentences containing variables representing logically
proper names, (40) will semantically presuppose (41) in
the sense of the general concept. Of course, the function
expressed by (40) might be accused of artificialism. But
the point I am trying to make depends on consistency, and
not on artificial ism.
If this is correct, it would be possible to
construct a formal system in which all propositions are
ultimately analyzable into atomic propositions containing
either atomic constituents, or variables for atomic
constituents, and definite descriptions are authentic
referring expressions which generate semantic
presuppositions in the sense of the general concept. But
in order to avoid referential failure and the awkward
truth-valueless propositions, the system might adopt the
Fregean procedure of providing a conventional denotation,
say, the null class, for the functions of the form of the
argument in (40) when their corresponding existential
functions are false. The system suggested might be such
that: i) if (41) is true, then the argument ' \x,. . .
xn£{xj. . . xn} ' in (40) will have as its denotation the
cluster of logically proper names that satisfy the cluster
function ' B{x,... xn} ' ; ii) if (41) is false, then the
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argument ' \Xj. . . xnS{Xj. . . xn> ' in (40) will have the null
class as its denotation. In this way, if Russell's
paraphrase represented by (37) is true, its corresponding
sentences (40) and (41) in the system suggested will be
also true. But then the sentence '(Exj) . . . (Ex )[(S{Xj. . .
xn} & 2?{Xj. . . xn)} ] ' will be also true in such a system. If
the internal negation of the Russellian paraphrase is
true, the conjunction of (41) and the negation of (40)
will be also true. But then the sentence '(Exj)...
(Exn) [(JB{Xj. . . xfl> & -J?{Xj. . . xn)}] ' will be also true in the
new system. If the external negation of the Russellian
paraphrase is true, the negation of the conjunction of
(40) and (41) will be also true. But then the sentence
'-(EXj)... (Exn) [ (B{Xj. . . xn> & J?{Xj. . . xn) } ] ' will be also
true in the system suggested. Thus, it is the conjunction
of the truth-conditions of the propositions of the form of
(40) and (41) that will yield the complete list of truth-
conditions for (34) and (39) in the system suggested.
Russell blames the Fregean procedure for being artificial,
but he simultaneously acknowledges that it may not lead to
actual logical error (Russell 1905: 484). I see no reason
to disagree with him, even though the procedure is
extended to a system involving logically proper names.
If this is correct, then Strawson's criticism of
the Theory of Descriptions is not itself without problems.
For he suggests that the basis of Russell's Theory is
somehow the doctrine of logically proper names. He argues
that the Theory seems to imply that: i) a sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position is
grammatically of the subject-predicate form; ii) if the
grammatical subject does not refer to anything, then
either the sentence in question is not logically of the
subject-predicate form or it is meaningless (Strawson
1950: 322). But he also thinks that this in its turn seems
to imply that: iii) if there are sentences which are
genuinely of the subject-predicate form, then the fact
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that they have a meaning guarantees that the logical (and
grammatical) subject has a referent; iv) there are
sentences which are logically of the subject-predicate
form (1950: 323). In order to show that Russell's Theory
seems not only to imply (i)-(iv), but that he accepted at
least (i)-(ii), Strawson invokes the two principles of the
doctrine of logically proper names: (1) they are the only
candidates to occupy the subject-position in sentences
which are logically of the subject-predicate form; (2) the
meaning of a logically proper name is its bearer.
According to Strawson, anyone who believes in (1) — (2)
would deny that a sentence containing a description in
subject-position is logically of the subject-predicate
form (1950: 323). But Strawson omits two important facts
here.
The first is that, historically, the doctrine of
logically proper names was formulated several years after
the Theory of Descriptions. It is very difficult to
imagine that the former might constitute the theoretical
basis for the latter. For this would entail that the 1918
doctrine of logically proper names was implicitly
contained in the 1905 Theory of Descriptions. In my
opinion, this is against all historical evidence and could
hardly be the case. In order to justify his claim,
Strawson would have to prove that Russell in fact accepted
(iii)-(iv) and (l)-(2) by the time he wrote "On Denoting".
But this is not what Strawson really does. Actually, he
only suggests this possibility by means of the weakened
expression 'seems to imply'. What is more, he is only
entitled to affirm that Russell accepted (i)-(ii).
In addition, the suggestion is contradicted by
the second fact omitted by Strawson: from the above
analysis of the relationship between logically proper
names and definite descriptions which generate semantic
presuppositions, we may infer that it is the Theory of
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Descriptions by itself that entails that definite
descriptions in subject-position are not referring
expressions; Russell's doctrine of logically proper names
only entails that descriptions are not logically proper
names, not that they cannot be referring expressions with
the help of logically proper names. Actually, logically
proper names are submitted to the Fregean semantic
principle and may be coupled with definite descriptions in
a way such that the latter may be taken as authentic
referring expressions which generate semantic
presuppositions when in subject-position. True, this would
not be in the spirit of Russell's philosophy. But the
conjunction of logically proper names and definite
descriptions as authentic referring expressions is a
consistent hypothesis. As a matter of fact, Frege's
account of simple proper names and definite descriptions
as referring expressions which involve different
referential mechanisms is an instance of this hypothesis.
Another instance would be a formal system containing both
the analysis of (39) and (40) in terms of atomic
constituents and the relation of semantic presupposition
for these propositions. Thus, Strawson's criticism,
although it deals with some genuine difficulties of
Russell's theory of logically proper names, misses its
real target, namely the Theory of Descriptions.
If the above argument concerning the
relationship between logically proper names, descriptions
as incomplete symbols and descriptions which generate
semantic presuppositions is correct, then an important
consequence follows. But this will be discussed in the
next section.
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VI - AN IMPORTANT CONSEQUENCE CONCERNING SEMANTIC
PRESUPPOSITIONS, DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS AND
LOGICALLY PROPER NAMES
The previous discussion allows the drawing of
the following important conclusion as regards the
referential function of definite descriptions in subject-
position: as far as the accounts discussed are concerned,
the controversy seems to be undecidable at the purely
semantic level. Two main reasons may be given for this: i)
the ambiguous referential status of definite descriptions
in subject-position in ordinary English; ii) the relative
independence between the accounts involved. I shall
comment them in what follows.
First, consider the status of definite
descriptions in subject-position in ordinary English.
Although this has not been mentioned before, we may
conclude from the discussion so far that descriptions
share some of the features of both predicate expressions
and referring expressions. For on the one hand the
predicate 'exists' may be ascribed to a certain
description, say 'the so-and-so', in
(42) 'The so-and-so exists',
whereas the same predicate cannot be ascribed to a proper
name like 'John' without further ado. This is a feature
belonging to predicates and suggests that descriptions in
subject-position are in fact concealed predicates. Some
authors even claim that 'exists' is a second order
predicate, that is, a predicate ascribable only to other
predicates (propositional functions). On the other hand,
other predicates like 'is bald' may be ascribed both to
definite descriptions in subject-position and proper
names. This is a feature belonging to referring
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expressions and suggests that descriptions in subject-
position do actually refer to the objects they describe
and are not concealed predicates. This fact gives definite
descriptions an ambiguous referential status and allows
the construction of radically different models for
explaining their referential role in language.
Another way of making the same point may be
found in C. Wright. As he puts it,
"Consider any equivalence of the type: 'G[,D(a)
iff F..a' . What the intuition requires is that if the
two nalves of this biconditional really are
equivalent, as they were set up to be, then any
reference to an object effected by one is also
effected by the other, and vice versa. But the
question is: which form of expression has priority?
No doubt that the right-hand side has epistemological
priority, for it was by reference to it that the
meaning of the left-hand side was explained. But
which side has ontological priority? (...)
"That is: if we are prepared to say that an
apparent singular term (by Fregean criteria) need not
really be so, so that the grammatical form of the
sentences in which it occurs is potentially
misleading, then why should it not be possible for
the grammatical form of a sentence to be potentially
misleading the other way round, so to speak? Why
should it not be possible for a sentence containing
no isolatable part which refers to a particular
object nevertheless to achieve, as a whole, a
reference to that object — as is attested by the
fact that it is equivalent to a sentence in which
such a reference is explicit?" (1983: 31-2).
Wright's expression 'G..D(a) iff F. a' is a general formula
that contains Russell's equivalence
(43) 'R{(ix)Bx> <==> (Ex)(Bx & (y)(By —> y=x) & Rx)'
as one of its instances. Wright argues that if the
equivalence holds, there are no criteria for deciding
which of its sides is a more perspicuous description of
reality-. This is an important point, for it reveals the
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ambiguous referential status of definite descriptions from
a different perspective.
I would add that both the above arguments
illustrate the fact that English speaking people seem to
have no direct linguistic intuitions for deciding the
Russel1/Strawson controversy (cf. Kripke 1979: 20).
Second, consider the relationships between the
account of descriptions as referring expressions which
generate semantic presuppositions (Frege, Strawson), the
account of descriptions as incomplete symbols (Russell)
and an account of simple proper names as referring
expressions which have their own referential mechanisms.
Although stemming from different basic motivations, both
the Theory of Presuppositions and the Theory of
Descriptions allow the following — and striking —
phenomenon: one may adopt any of them without necessarily
committing oneself to the specific theory of proper names
which is historically connected to the adopted Theory. For
example, one may adopt the Theory of Descriptions and
commit oneself to a theory of logically proper names, as
Russell does; but one may also adopt the Theory of
Descriptions without committing oneself to logically
proper names, as Quine does. Alternatively, one may adopt
the Theory of Presuppositions and a theory of simple
proper names as referring expressions which do not involve
semantic presuppositions like definite descriptions, as
Frege does; but one may also adopt the Theory and commit
oneself to a theory of proper names as semantically
presupposing clusters of descriptions, as Strawson does in
"Individuals" (1959: 191-2); one may also adopt both the
Theory of Presuppositions and the doctrine of logically
proper names, as it has been shown in the previous
section. Thus, both accounts of definite descriptions seem
to be compatible with divergent theories of proper names.
As a result, these Theories, although stemming from
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different motivations, deal with a subject which is
sufficiently restricted so as to allow them, within
certain limits, to be compatible with divergent theories
of proper names. I shall call this the 'relative
independence' of both accounts as regards the
corresponding theory of proper names.
Therefore, Russell's Theory of Descriptions and
his doctrine of logically proper names are relatively
independent of each other, and this relative independence
allows the construction of a formal system in which both
logically proper names and definite descriptions are
referring expressions. In fact, Russell's doctrine of
logically proper names does not impede descriptions of
being referring expressions and semantically presupposing
in the sense of the general concept as defined in the
previous chapter. In "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
Russell distinguishes descriptions and ordinary proper
names from logically proper names by means of his analysis
of the question of existence. He thinks the question can
only arise with respect to definite descriptions. For the
meaning of a logically proper name is the object it
denotes: if a description were an authentic name, the
question of existence of the object denoted by the
description could not arise. Since the question can arise,
descriptions are not names. As to ordinary proper names,
once they also admit the question of existence, they too
are concealed descriptions. Nevertheless, this amounts to
affirming that, descriptions and ordinary proper names are
not logically proper names. Actually, nothing obstructs
the choice of Frege's proposal that the question of
existence arises in the analysis of descriptions precisely
because thoughts containing them in subject-position
semantically presuppose a uniquely existential thought.
True, Frege would not interpret the latter as ultimately
reducible to atomic thoughts containing logically proper
names. But the existential thought would constitute the
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end of the analysis in the case of thoughts containing
descriptions in subject-position. Thus, Russell's doctrine
of logically proper names does not in fact entail the
rejection of the general concept of semantic
presupposition for descriptions.
The only thing one may say is that postulating
logically proper names suggests that sentences containing
descriptions in subject-position might be better
interpreted as ultimately reducible to uniquely
existential sentences containing proper names. But this
does not mean that the only way to reduce descriptions to
logically proper names is Russell's paraphrase. In fact,
it has been shown above that the doctrine of logically
proper names is also compatible with the Fregean or the
Strawsonian view of descriptions as referring expressions.
Similarly, definite descriptions in
subject-position which generate semantic presuppositions
in the sense of the general concept do not impede simple
proper names of being referring expressions and being
submitted to some form of the Fregean semantic principle.
This may be inferred not only from the fact that Frege's
account admits this, but also from the fact that the
referential mechanisms involved by Fregean simple proper
or Russellian logically proper names and descriptions do
not clash. Actually, proper names and descriptions may be
taken as referring expressions which belong to different
categories and thus have different referential links. As
a result, it is the Russellian account of definite
descriptions as incomplete symbols, and not the Russellian
theory of logically proper names, that entails the
rejection of the general concept of semantic
presupposition generated by descriptions in subject-
position.
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If the above argument is correct, then one might
adapt the calculus of "Principia Mathematica" so that it
could contain definite descriptions as Fregean referring
expressions. Of course, this would be totally against the
Russellian spirit. But it would not be incorrect. In fact,
it would only require the view that descriptions in
ordinary language are referring expressions which
semantically presuppose in the sense suggested by Frege,
and that this is an imperfection to be avoided in the
formal system by means of special stipulations. Amazingly,
the adaptation of the calculus of "Principia" would
involve nothing but: i) the alteration of Russell's
remarks, in the 'Introduction' (1925: 30) and in Chapter
III (1925: 66 ff.), that descriptions are incomplete
symbols; ii) the special stipulation that a definite
description, say '(ix)Fx', can be introduced as a
referring expression only if the proposition stating the
existence and the uniqueness of the object referred to by
the description, that is/b'(Ex)(Fx & (y)(Fy => y=x))', is
true. Call the new system "F-Principia" . In it, even
though descriptions are considered referring expressions,
all Russellian equivalences involving '(ix)Fx' when
'(Ex)(Fx & (y)(Fy => y=x))' is true will hold. The system
will thus be equivalent to a subsystem of "Pr incipia"lG. As
a result, even Frege' s stipulation that an empty
description is to denote the null class would not be
necessary: the Russellian definitions expressed by
(44) 'E!(ix)(Fx) = (Ec)((x)(Fx <—> x=c)) Df'
(1925: 30; 174)
and
(45) ' f (( ix) (Fx)) = (Ec ) (x) ((Fx < —> x=c) & fc)
Df' (1925: 25)
would do the job properly.
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If so, one may object that the system "F-
Principia" vindicates the correctness of Russell's
paraphrase, and his claim that descriptions are incomplete
symbols. But things are not that simple. As already
mentioned, C. Wright has shown that none of the sides of
the equivalence expressed by (45) has ontological
priority. If this is correct, "F-Principia" adopts
Russell's paraphrase, but does not vindicate his claim
that definite descriptions are incomplete symbols. In
fact, "F-Principia" would be different from "Principia" in
that it includes definite descriptions as genuine
referring expressions. But it would still be logically
equivalent to "Principia". As to the Fregean relation of
semantic presupposition itself, it would not play any role
within the system. For it is only conceived as the "odd"
logical relation that guarantees the reference to definite
descriptions in ordinary language. In a formal system, the
"odd" features of the logical relation must be excluded to
the benefit of a logically perfect language1-1.
Therefore, the whole discussion seems to suggest
that, as far as the accounts discussed are concerned, the
question about the referring mechanism of definite
descriptions in subject-position is undecidable at the
purely semantic level. The inconclusiveness of the dispute
at the purely semantic level seems also to suggest that
further considerations, perhaps pragmatic ones, are to be
introduced in order to decide the issue.
VII - FINAL REMARKS
So far, the problem of semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position is
formulated; the pragmatic and semantic considerations
involved are made explicit; the relevant features of the
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Fregean-Strawsonian and Russellian views on the problem
are outlined; the inconclusive character of the
controversy at the purely semantic level is suggested. We
may now turn our attention to Wittgenstein. He has made
such an important contribution to the philosophical
thinking in our century that it is quite natural to ask
whether or not he has anything to say on this issue. Thus,
from now on my chief question will be this: what is
Wittgenstein's contribution to a possible solution of the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position? More specifically, what
is Wittgenstein's contribution to the problem in each main
period of the development of his philosophical thinking?
Given that we traditionally discern two different and
apparently opposed philosophies in the development of
Wittgenstein's thought, I shall consider one at a time.
For each Wittgensteinian philosophy, I shall locate his
possible view of presupposition and then try to discuss
how any such conception relates to the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions. The
expectation is a reasonable one, that the execution of
this whole task will reveal two radically different
solutions to the problem in question and that the
solutions will have the seal of Wittgenstein's
originality.
NOTES
1. At this point, it is worth making a comparison of
the German text and the translation involved. The German
passage runs:
"Nun haben die Sprachen den Mangel, dass in
ihnen Ausdriicke mogliche sind, whelche nach ihrer
grammatischen Form bestimmt erscheinen, einen
Gegenstand zu bezeichnen, diese ihre Bestimmung aber
in besonderen Fallen nicht erreichen, weil das von
der Wahrheit eines Satzes abhangt" (Frege 1969: 55).
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Geach and Black's translation runs:
"Now languages have the fault of containing
expressions which fail to designate an object
(although their grammatical form seems to qualify
them for that purpose) because the truth of some
sentence is a prerequisite" (Frege 1892a: 69; italics
mine) .
Now a more literal translation would run:
"Now the languages have the fault that within
them [languages] some expressions are possible which,
according to their [the expressions'] grammatical
form, determinately seem to designate an object, but
they [expressions] do not reach their determinateness
in certain cases, for this depends on the truth of
some sentence".
Of course, Geach and Black's translation is
stylistically better than my literal translation. But
their improving the style of this particular passage
involves a qualification. Although Geach and Black seem to
preserve the sense of Frege's thought in their
translation, they introduce the term 'prerequisite' which
is not in the German text. Now this suggests that Frege
held the view that there is a semantic relation involved
and that the relation may be expressed by means of a
concept which might be called a 'semantic prerequisite'.
This is not misleading only because there is in fact such
a relation in Frege' s text. For this reason, I see no
problem in adopting the term for defining the semantic
relation involved.
2. I shall skip the analysis of conditional clauses.
It would be too complex and unnecessary, since the
previous analysis of noun clauses and adjective clauses
already reveals that definite descriptions in subject-
position do in fact generate semantic prerequisites in
Frege's view.
3. Atlas makes some cuts in the Fregean passage.
Since the cuts might endanger the correct understanding of
Frege's thought, I have reproduced the passage in full.
4. Atlas correctly notes that in the analysis of the
simple proper name 'Kepler' Frege puts forward his view
that the presupposition of a sentence and of its negation
is the same (Frege 1892a: 69; Atlas 1975: 71).
5. But this fact reveals at the same time an
important difference as regards the nature of the
presupposed thought in Frege' s view. For in the case of
adverbial clauses, the presupposed thought is a factual
one, like, for example, (19) ['Schleswig-Ho1 stein was once
separated from Denmark'], whereas in the case of other
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subordinate clauses it is an existential one, like, for
example, (6) ['There was someone who discovered the
elliptic form of the planetary orbits']. This difference
suggests that the relation of semantic presupposition
might involve unexpected individuating features. But Frege
does not explicitly discuss this fact and I am only
concerned with the case of presupposed existential
thoughts.
6. As already mentioned, Atlas distinguishes three
different Fregean concepts of presupposition in his paper.
Besides the 'semantic' and the 'pragmatic' concepts of
presupposition, Atlas spots an 'assertoric presupposition'
which is defined as a relation between an i11ocutionary
act of a speaker and propositions (1979: 29; 31-4). But
the analysis of the latter goes beyond the purpose of my
work.
7. Once again, instead of following Atlas' quotation
which involves a cut, I reproduce the Fregean text in
full .
8. In "The Basic Laws of Arithmetic", Frege
introduces the function '\x' which is defined as follows:
i) if to the argument there corresponds an object a such
that the argument is 'y(a = y), then let the value of the
function ' \x' be a itself; ii) if to the argument there
does not correspond an object a such that the argument is
"y(a = ), then let the value of the function be the
argument itself. As a result, '\x(a = x) = a' refers to
the True, and '\xFx' denotes the object falling under the
concept 'F(x)' if 'F(x)' is a concept under which falls
one and only one object; '\xF(x)' denotes the same as
'xF(x) ' in all other cases. The function '\x' is the
Fregean substitute for the definite article in ordinary
language. In virtue of Frege's definition, the danger of
introducing definite descriptions which are devoid of
denotation is excluded. For the function '\xF(x)' will
always have a denotation in all possible cases, namely
whether the function '\xF(x)' be either a concept under
which fall exactly one object, or under which falls no
object or more than one, or not a concept at all (see
Frege 1893: 48-51).
9. Wright claims that this idea was formerly
introduced by Alston (1958).
10. This is related to Russell's distinction between
primary and secondary occurrences of the description and
the ambiguity of negation. Both the distinction and the
ambiguity would not hold in ' F-Principia' . This may be
inferred from Russell's discussion of the two different
interpretations of '(ix)Fx'. As he puts it:
"When '(ix)Fx' exists, the two interpretations
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[primary and secondary occurrence of the description]
of the ambiguity give equivalent results; but when
'(ix)Fx' does not exist, one interpretation is true
and one is false" (Russell 1925: 69).
Since the special stipulation in (ii) is such that
'(ix)Fx' always exists, there would be neither the two
interpretations nor the ambiguity of negation in the
system 'F-Principia'.
11. But then it would be also possible to adapt, say,
the Fregean system of "The Basic Laws of Arithmetic" in a
way such that it may include definite descriptions as
Russellian incomplete symbols.
The Fregean function ' \x' may be replaced by an
alternative one, in Russellian terms. In a footnote to his
translation of Frege's "On Concept and Object", Geach
makes the following suggestion:
"When Russell says that expressions like 'The
King of France' are not names but incomplete symbols,
he is saying what would be put thus in Frege' s
terminology: 'In 'the King of France is bald', 'the
King of France' is not a name of an object; what it
stands for is something incomplete, ungesattigt — a
second level concept, within which the concept bald
is falsely asserted to fall. This second-level
concept is one within which a concept falls if and
only if there falls under it someone who is a King of
France and apart from whom nobody is a King of
France; no first-level concept does fall within this,
because nobody is a King of France'.
"It should, however, be emphasized that Frege
himself gives an entirely different account of
definite descriptions." (Geach & Black 1966: 51).
Geach's final remark is very significant. He prudently
informs the reader that Frege's account of definite
descriptions is different from the one just mentioned, but
at the same time he implies that a Russellian account
would be entirely possible within the Fregean framework.
Geach seems to be right. As a matter of fact, his
definition of definite descriptions in Fregean terminology
has the following features: i) a view on definite
descriptions that do not function as referring expressions
like proper names is perfectly possible within the Fregean
system; ii) according to this Russellian view within the
Fregean system, a definite description does not function
like a proper name; instead, it is a second-level concept
within which a first-level concept falls iff there falls
under the first-level concept a unique object. This is
possible because Frege's distinction of concept and object
is complemented by his distinction of a relation of an
object to a first-level concept and a relation of a first-
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level concept to a second-level one: the object falls
under the first-level concept, whereas the first-level
concept falls within the second-level one (Frege 1891: 50-
1). If Geach is right, then the adaptation is possible and
we might construct an alternative formal system, call it
"R-Grundgesetze", such that definite descriptions are not
referring expressions and may be replaced by the
Russellian paraphrase. For reasons of space, I shall not
consider the question whether or not the system "R-





THE "TRACTATUS" AND SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS
GENERATED BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
IN SUBJECT-POSITION
I - PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In this chapter, I shall present and analyze the
Tractarian solution to the problem of semantic
presupposition of definite descriptions in subject-
position. In the first section, I shall argue not only
that the early Wittgenstein's solution to the problem is
the Russellian Theory of Descriptions, but also that he
imposes some modifications on the Theory. This raises the
question whether or not the modifications give rise to a
different theory. In the second section, I shall analyze
the modifications imposed by Wittgenstein on the
Russellian account of descriptions, in order to answer to
this question. Now the problem of the relationships
between the general concept of semantic presupposition and
the Tractarian system is still open. Thus, in the third
section, I shall analyze the relationships between the
general concept and a sub-system of the "Tractatus",
containing the Picture Theory and the doctrine of simple
signs. In the fourth section, I shall analyze the
relationship between the general concept of semantic
presupposition and another sub-system of the "Tractatus",
now containing only the requirement of primitive simple
signs. In the fifth and final section, I shall summarize
the Tractarian solution to the problem of semantic
presupposition generated by definite descriptions in
subj ect-position.
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II - THE TRACTARIAN THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS
The early Wittgenstein's solution to the problem
of presupposition of definite descriptions in subject-
position is the Theory of Descriptions. It is well known
that Wittgenstein admired Russell's approach by the time
the Tractarian philosophy was fermenting in his mind.
Wittgenstein's admiration was so great that he adopted the
Theory in the Tractarian system. But he also seems to have
modified the Russellian account. This may be confirmed by
the considerations below.
First, there is an important remark in a letter
Wittgenstein wrote to Russell in 1913:
"... The only other thing I want to say is that
your Theory of Descriptions is quite undoubtedly
right, even if the individual primitive signs in it
are quite different from what you believe" (Von
Wright 1974: 128; Wittgenstein's italics).
The above passage clearly shows that in 1913 Wittgenstein
adopted the Russellian Theory of Descriptions, although he
thought the Theory was in need of some qualification.
Second, it may be shown that the principle of
analysis of the Theory of Descriptions persisted in
Wittgenstein's mind by the time he wrote the "Tractatus".
This may be confirmed by aphorism 4.0031:
"(...) It was Russell who performed the service
of showing that the apparent logical form of a
proposition need not be its real one" (1922b).
Third and finally, the adoption of the Theory by
the Tractarian philosophy may be also shown. Early in the
"Tractatus", Wittgenstein claims:
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"Every statement about complexes can be resolved
into a statement about their constituents and into
the propositions that describe the complex
completely" (1922b: 2.0201).
Of course, the class of statements about complexes
includes the sub-class of statements containing in
subject-position a certain expression standing for the
complex. What is more, the expression standing for the
complex is a description, for a complex can be given only
by its description (1922b: 3.24). Thus, the class of
Wittgenstein's 'statements about complexes' seems to
include the sub-class of statements containing a
description in subject-position. If this is correct, then
the Wittgensteinian 'Theory of Descriptions' in the
"Tractatus" may be pointed out on the basis of the
analysis of statements about complexes.
According to aphorism 2.0201, every proposition
about complexes can be resolved into the logical
articulation of the two following sorts of propositions1:
i) a proposition about the constituents of the complex;
ii) propositions that describe the complex completely. But
what does each of the above expressions mean? And what is
the logical connective that articulates these
propositions? I believe the answers may be given as
fo11ows.
First, it is worth noticing that when a
propositional element signifies a complex, there is an
indeterminateness in the propositions containing the
element (1922b: 3.24). But the indeterminateness can be
eliminated by contracting the expression for the complex
into a simple symbol. This is made by means of a
definition (id.). And the definition is obtained by the
complete analysis of the proposition. A proposition admits
one and only one complete analysis (1922b: 3.25). Thus,
the 'proposition about the constituents of the complex' is
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a proposition such that: i) the former expression for the
complex is replaced by as many simple symbols as required
by the analysis; ii) every simple symbol obtained is a
primitive sign (name), that is, a sign that cannot be
dissected any further by means of a definition (1922b:
3.26); iii) the proposition about the complex stands in an
internal relation to any proposition containing a
corresponding primitive sign (1922b: 3.24). The primitive
signs must be possible so that the sense of a proposition
be determinate (1922b: 3.23). Thus, if the complex does
not exist, the proposition containing it will not be
nonsensical, but simply false (1922b: 3.24; 5.4733).
Second, although the "Tractatus" is pretty
unclear about the meaning of 'propositions that describe
the complex completely', it is reasonable to assume that
these propositions correspond to the conjunction of the
existence clause and the uniqueness clause of the
Russe11ian paraphrase. Against this, one might object that
Wittgenstein's analysis is different from Russell's, as it
may be inferred from the following remark in the "Notes on
Logic":
"To repeat: every proposition which seems to be
about a complex can be analyzed into a proposition
about its constituents and about the proposition
which describes the complex perfectly; i.e. that
proposition which is equivalent to saying the complex
exists" (1913b: 99).
The expression used here is 'proposition which describes
the complex perfectly', and this is different from the one
in question. But earlier in the same paragraph,
Wittgenstein uses 'proposition which describes the complex
completely' . Thus, as he is now repeating a previous
statement, there is enough ground for assuming that both
expressions are synonymous. If so, the proposition which
describes the complex completely seems to be equivalent to
a proposition affirming that the complex exists, but not
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that it is unique. Consequently, the Wittgensteinian
paraphrase would, be different from the Russellian one.
In my opinion, this interpretation would be
quite misleading. For if the uniqueness clause is not
included, the proposition describing the complex
completely would not do its job properly. True, the above
passage suggests that the "proposition about the
proposition which describes the complex completely" is a
"proposition about the proposition which is equivalent to
saying the complex exists". The passage is rather obscure,
but it may be interpreted as stating that the "proposition
which is equivalent to saying that the complex exists"
corresponds to the usual Russellian analysis involving
existence and uniqueness, and paraphrases the ordinary
language proposition which affirms the complex exists. In
support of this claim, I may recall the previously
mentioned 1913 letter to Russell, in which the correctness
of the Theory of Descriptions is clearly stated. Here, the
divergence between Wittgenstein and Russell concerns the
nature of the primitive signs, and not the adequacy of the
Russellian paraphrase. Consequently, it seems reasonable
to infer that, in the "Tractatus" the proposition which
describes the complex completely involves the conjunction
of an existence clause and a uniqueness clause .
Thirdly, and finally, another passage from the
paragraph above quoted clarifies the issue of the logical
connective involved in the analysis of the proposition
containing the complex in subject-position:
"Every statement about complexes can be resolved
into the logical product of a statement about the
constituents and a statement about the proposition
which describes the complex completely" (1913b: 99;
italics mine).
Thus, the proposition in question is analyzed into the
usual Russellian paraphrase.
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So far, if one excludes the remark about
individual primitive signs in the 1913 letter, one may
affirm that Wittgenstein's analysis is very similar to
Russell's. But the 1913 remark cannot be left aside in the
proper analysis of the Tractarian 'Theory of
Descriptions'. In fact, the remark suggests that
Wittgenstein not only adopted the Theory of Descriptions,
but also modified it in the "Tractatus". What is more, the
remark seems to express, though obscurely, the essentials
of the modification. By this I mean that the 1913
reference to primitive simple signs suggests that most of
the modifications are connected with an alteration of the
general framework within which the Theory is to be viewed.
And given that the theory of primitive simple signs is a
cornerstone in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, the
altered form of the Theory of Descriptions announced in
1913 is likely to have persisted in the "Tractatus". Now
what is the meaning of the 1913 remark?
According to the Tractarian view, any
descriptive language requires the existence of a fully
analyzed language. The latter is a transcendental
condition of possibility of the former. The fully analyzed
language is composed of elementary propositions which are
combinations of primitive simple signs. It is a logically
perfect language. But the logical connectives belonging to
such a language are not Frege's and Russell's 'primitive
signs'. In fact, 'v', '==>', etc., are interdefinable, and
this is enough to show that they are not primitive signs
(1922b: 5.42). In addition, the logical form of the
elementary propositions is unknown, and it need not have
the slightest similarity with the subject-predicate form
of ordinary language, or Frege's "Begriffsschrift", or
Russell's formal language of "Principia". We are unable to
give the composition of elementary propositions, although
we may have some concept of elementary propositions
independently of their logical form (1922b: 5.55; 5.555).
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It is the application of logic that decides what
elementary propositions there are (1922b: 5.557). The only
thing we are able to say is that the definiteness of sense
of any descriptive language transcendentally requires a
one to one correspondence between each proposition of the
descriptive language and a set of elementary propositions
belonging to the fully analyzed language. Thus, it is true
that the Russellian paraphrase shows the real logical
form of a proposition containing a definite description in
subject-position. But the paraphrase does not represent
the final stage in the Tractarian analysis. Actually, the
application of the latter would lead to the elementary
propositions of the logically perfect language. With some
minor alterations, Russell's formal language of
"Principia" would be only an intermediary stage of the
complete Wittgensteinian analysis.
The above seems to be a reasonable
interpretation of Wittgenstein's claim that the primitive
signs in the Theory of Descriptions are quite different
from what Russell believes them to be. But the result is
that not only Russell, but also Wittgenstein does not know
what are the primitive simple signs. Thus, Wittgenstein's
logically perfect language is only an implicit condition
of possibility of any descriptive language, whereas
Russell's formal language is clearly explicit in
"Principia". To put it more clearly, suppose a declarative
sentence containing a definite description in subject-
position. It is well-known that Russell's Theory of
Descriptions exhibits the full analysis of the sentence by
means of the formal language of "Principia". By contrast,
the Tractarian Theory assumes that the full analysis of
the sentence is a transcendental condition of possibility
of the sentence's making sense. In other words, the
Tractarian full analysis is only postulated, not
exhibited. And its result might be an articulation of
elementary propositions which would be completely
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different from the Russellian paraphrase. This is an
important difference between the two Theories.
But the above is not the only modification
Wittgenstein imposed on the Russellian framework. There
are other alterations which also seem to have an effect on
the Theory of Descriptions. The most important of the
Tractarian alterations are: i) the account of descriptions
in terms of two-place or even n-place predicates; ii) the
rejection of the identity sign; iii) the dissociation of
generality from truth-functions; iv) the refusal of the
axiomatic method. In what follows, I shall discuss these
alterations one by one.
Firstly, there is the fact that, unlike Russell,
Wittgenstein was particularly interested in analyzing
descriptions into propositional functions involving two-
place predicates. This is suggested by Kenny (1980: 80
ff.). Along the same line of argument, Kenny previously
discussed the example:
(1) 'Austria-Hungary is allied to Russia' (1980: 39).
Of course, 'Austria-Hungary' may be paraphrased as
'Austria is united to Hungary' and thus symbolized as
'aRb', namely an instance of the two-place predicate
'xRy'. Furthermore, 'x is allied to Russia' may be
symbolized as 'Gx'. Kenny appeals to a pattern laid down
in the "Notebooks", according to which (1) would be
equivalent to
(2) 'Austria is allied to Russia,
and
Hungary is allied to Russia,
and
Austria is united to Hungary',
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or, in symbols,
(3) 'Ga & Gb & aRb'
which is equivalent to the Wittgensteinian analysis
(4) 'G[aRb]' (1914-6: 4).
Kenny also remarks that the later Wittgenstein's criticism
of the "Tractatus" confirms the pattern. For the example
criticised by Wittgenstein in the "Philosophical
Investigations" is the Tractarian analysis of 'my broom is
in the corner'. This sentence is taken as equivalent to
'my broomstick is in the corner, and my brush is in the
corner, and the broomstick is fitted in the brush'
(Wittgenstein 1953 I: 39; 60; Kenny 1980: 39; 80).
Thus, Kenny continues, in the case of
(5) 'The King of France is bald',
'x is king of France' is an instance of 'x is king of z'
and may be symbolised as ' xRa' , where 'a' stands for
'France'. Consequently, the Tractarian analysis of the
existence and uniqueness clauses yields 'there is an x
such that xRa, and it is not the case that there is an x
and an y such that xRa and yRa' . And Kenny thinks that
this pattern of analysis can be applied to all possible
combinations of names or descriptions taken as the terms
of a relation. Thus, the pattern can be applied to
expressions of the forms: i) description-relation-name
(ex.: 'the man who rules France'); ii) description
-relation-description (ex.: the man in the moon); iii)
name-relation-name (ex.: 'Austria-Hungary') (1980: 79).
Kenny's suggestion seems to be very well in harmony with
the Tractarian system. Now this reveals a possible point
of divergence between the Tractarian Theory of
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Descriptions and the Russellian one.
Second, Wittgenstein rejects the sign of
identity in the Tractarian system. He considers identity
as a mere representational device (1922b: 4.242). In fact,
an identity is a rule for the interchangeabi 1 ity of signs.
As a result, neither expressions of the form 'a = a' nor
those derived from them have sense at all (1922b: 4.243).
And as the same proper name cannot appear on both sides of
the identity-sign, it follows that identity is not a
relation between objects. A proposition like ' (x) (fx
==> x=a)' says that only 'a' satisfies the function 'fx',
and not that only objects which are identical with 'a'
satisfy the function 'fx' (1922b: 5.5301). In fact, to say
of two things that they are identical with each other is
nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical
with itself is to say nothing whatsoever (1922b: 5.5303).
Wittgenstein replaces Russell's ' (x) (fx ==> x=a)', by
' (Ex) (fx ==> fa) & - (Ex, y) (fx & fy) » (1922b: 5.5321).
Thus, suppose the sentence to be analyzed is
(6) 'f((ix)(Fx))'.
The Russellian analysis yields
(7) 'f((ix)(Fx)) = (Ex)(y)((Fy <==> y=x) & fx) Df',
whereas the Wittgensteinian analysis yields
(8) ' f ( ( ix) (Fx) ) = (Ex) (Fx & - (Ex) (Ey) (Fx&Fy) & fx)
Df ' .
In (8), '(Ex)(Fx & -(Ex)(Ey)(Fx&Fy)' means that only one
'x' satisfies the function 'Fx' (1922b: 5.5321), and 'fx'
means that the 'x' in question satisfies the function
'fx'. The possibility of this replacement shows that the
identity-sign is not an essential constituent of
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conceptual notation (1922b: 5.533). This may be another
possible point of divergence between the Tractarian system
and the one of "Principia". In fact, Wittgenstein's views
on identity seem to yield the most important modification
imposed on the Russellian Theory of Descriptions.
Third, Wittgenstein gives an account of
generality in the "Tractatus" which seems to be very
different from Russell's. And this is complicated by the
obscurity of the Tractarian account. The general
propositions seem to be related to elementary propositions
in a peculiar and obscure way.
On the one hand, Wittgenstein argues that a
proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions
(1922b: 5). As a result, general propositions must be
truth-functions of elementary propositions. In conformity
with this, Wittgenstein seems to define general
propositions in terms of conjunctions and disjunctions.
For example, if all the values of a function 'fx' for all
values of 'x' are the values of Wittgenstein's function
'$', then N(f) = - (Ex) fx (1922b: 5.52). Hence, N($) =
(x)-fx. This means that both '(Ex)' and '(x)' are defined
in terms of conjunctions of negations of propositions (Cf.
1922b: 5.502; 5.51). Since conjunction and disjunction are
interdefinable by means of De Morgan's law, both
quantifiers may also be defined in terms of disjunctions
of negations of propositions. Thus, general propositions
can be seen as truth-functions of conjunctions or
disjunctions of elementary propositions. In other words,
general propositions are introduced in connexion with
logical sum and logical product.
On the other hand, Wittgenstein strikingly
claims that the concept all is to be dissociated from
truth-functions (1922b: 5.521). He argues that Frege and
Russell introduced generality in connexion with logical
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sum or logical product. True, both ideas are involved by
the propositions '(x)fx' and '(Ex)fx', but introducing
generality in connexion with them makes it difficult to
understand such propositions (id.). In order to justify
this point, Wittgenstein obscurely claims that general
propositions are like logical prototypes which give
prominence to constants (1922b: 5.522). The generality-
sign occurs as an argument (1922b: 5.523). Besides, if
some elementary propositions are given, then at the same
time all elementary propositions will be given (1922b:
5.524). And we can describe the world completely by using
only general propositions (1922b: 5.526). It is not easy
to understand Wittgenstein's point about generality in
5.521-5.5262, but he seems to suggest that the general
proposition is a prototype which shows the logical form
which is common to all its instances. If this is correct,
then 5.521-5.5262 seems to square ill both with 5.52 and
aphorism 5, on which the passage is a comment. The
universal and the existential quantifier seem to be able
to specify the truth operation of the propositions which
are their instances without necessarily recurring to
truth-operations. This looks like a contradiction.
Now suppose there is no contradiction at all and
that Wittgenstein is in fact offering a valid alternative
to the alleged Russellian association of generality with
logical product or logical sum. In this case, he would be
altering the way generality plays a role in the
construction of the fully analyzed language. Since the
Theory of Descriptions involves recourse to generality, it
might happen that Wittgenstein's modification also
involves an alteration of a basic feature of the Theory.
Fourth, there is Wittgenstein's refusal of the
axiomatic method in the "Tractatus". For the method has to
establish a number of primitive propositions from which
the others are derived. This expedient is misleading,
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because in logic there is no proposition which is
essentially primitive or essentially derived. All
propositions of logic have the same status (1922b: 6.127).
Thus, the number of primitive propositions in the system
of "Principia Mathematica", for example, is completely
arbitrary (1922b: 6.1271). What is more, it is always
possible to construct a logic in a way such that every
proposition is its own proof (1922b: 6.1265).
Wittgenstein's method of truth-tables may be viewed as an
attempt of this sort (1922b: 6.1203). Thus, on
Wittgenstein's account, declarative sentences containing
descriptions in subject-position are not to be derived
from others. If necessary, one can just check whether the
sentence in question is a tautology or not by means of the
method of truth-tables. Once again, this is another point
of possible divergence with Russell's Theory of
Descriptions.
The above list shows the most important
alterations Wittgenstein imposes on the general framework
of Russell's formal language of "Principia". Now the
question is how far these alterations go from a purely
logical standpoint. In other words, do the modifications
discussed yield a Tractarian Theory of Descriptions which
is logically different from the Russellian one? The answer
to this question will be given in the next section.
Ill - THE TRACTARIAN THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS
SEEMS TO COMPARE WITH RUSSELL'S
In this section, I shall discuss the logical
consequences of each of the modifications above listed. If
the consequences are such that they yield results which
are logically different from the system of "Principia",
then we may speak of a Tractarian Theory of Descriptions
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as an original alternative to the Russellian one. However,
if the consequences are such that they yield the same
logical results as the ones yielded by "Principia", then
we must admit that the Tractarian Theory of Descriptions
is not an alternative to the Russellian one. The
forthcoming analysis will decide which of the above
alternatives is true. For the sake of clearness, I shall
analyze the consequences of each Wittgensteinian
modification in the same order as they were presented in
the previous section.
Initially, there is the fact that, in conformity
with the 1913 remark, the Tractarian primitive simple
signs are not the Russellian ones. Let us call the
Tractarian fully analyzed language 'W-language' and
Russell's formal language in "Principia" 'R-language'. The
former does not seem to correspond to the latter. The R-
language is explicitly elaborated, whereas the W-language
is only postulated and constitutes the transcendental
condition of possibility of any descriptive language.
The R-language was obtained by analyzing
ordinary language and is intended to give the correct
logical form of the propositions of ordinary language. But
then the R-language may be seen either as an intermediary
stage in the analysis going from ordinary language to the
W-language or as a descriptive language of which the W-
language is the transcendental condition of possibility.
Now if both the R- and W-language had the same expressive
power and were logically equivalent, one might paraphrase
Wittgenstein's aphorism 5.5563 and say: "In fact, all the
propositions of our R-language, just as they stand, are in
perfect logical order". Thus, no adaptations would have to
be made in "Principia" in order to make valid its
correspondence with the W-language. If this were possible,
the fact that the primitive simple signs of the W-language
are not the ones belonging to the R-language does not
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clash with the basic correctness of the logical order of
the R-language. And here we would be back to
Wittgenstein's 1913 remark, which tells us that, although
the primitive simple signs are not what Russell believes
them to be, the Theory of Descriptions is quite
undoubtedly right.
As it will be shown in what follows, the R- and
the W-language have the same expressive power and there is
at least one interpretation under which both languages may
be proved to be logically equivalent. If this is correct,
then the 1913 remark may be interpreted in a way such that
although the W-language involves an alteration of the
general framework of the R-language, the logical results
of both languages are the same and the Tractarian Theory
of Descriptions is logically equivalent to the Russellian
one. This may be proved by the discussion of the other
alterations Wittgenstein imposes to the logical framework
of the R-language. This is what I shall do in the sequel.
First, there is the question concerning
Wittgenstein's account of descriptions in terms of two-
place or even n-place predicates. This is clearly
equivalent to the Russellian account as long as it is
possible to analyze the expressions involved as two-place
or even n-place predicates. Now this is only a matter of
convenience, and does not involve any essential
difference. As a result, the first Wittgensteinian
modification does not yield logical results which are
different from the ones yielded by "Principia".
Second, there is the problem of Wittgenstein's
rejection of the identity sign in his analysis of
descriptions in subject-position. Now this modification
does not make the Tractarian system something radically
different from the Russellian system of "Principia". As a
matter of fact, even Wittgenstein's treatment of identity
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in the "Tractatus" may yield a system which is logically
equivalent to "Principia". But this can be made only with
some qualifications, because the account of (8) according
to the methods and processes established by "Principia
Mathematica" would yield disappointing results. For
example, a contradiction may be derived from (8) in the
following way:
1. (Ex)(Fx & -(Ex)(Ey)(Fx & Fy) & Bx) [(3) taken
as a premise] .
2. Fa & -(Ex)(Ey)(Fx & Fy) & Ba [1, existential
instantiation].
3. Fa & (x)(y)-(Fx & Fy) & Ba [2, equivalence].
4. Fa & (y)-(Fa & Fy) & Ba [3, universal
instantiation].
5. Fa & -(Fa & Fa) & Ba [4, universal
instantiation].
6. Fa & -Fa & Ba [5, equivalence].
7. Fa & -Fa [6, simplification].
Thus, if treated according to Russellian patterns, the
Wittgensteinian analysis of definite descriptions in
subject-position seems to collapse into contradiction.
Could it be that, contrary to Wittgenstein's thought in
the "Tractatus", identity is such an essential sign in
logic that we cannot dispense with it?
Fortunately for Wittgenstein's account, this
does not seem to be so. In fact, in an interesting 1956
paper, "Identity, Variables and Impredicative
Definitions", Hintikka follows the Tractarian suggestion
and succeeds in constructing a logic without identity.
Hintikka's main point is that variables can be used in a
twofold way. First, we may use them in a way such that
coincidences of the values of different variables are not
excluded. This is what Hintikka calls the inclusive
interpretation of variables (1956: 226). Second, we may
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use them in a way such that coincidences of the values of
different variables are excluded. This is what Hintikka
calls the exclusive interpretation of variables (id.). The
latter may be either weakly or strongly exclusive (1956:
230) .
Now Hintikka suggests that Wittgenstein adopts
the weakly exclusive interpretation of variables in the
"Tractatus" (1956: 228; 230). In support of his claim,
Hintikka quotes the aphorisms 5.53-5.5352, where
Wittgenstein is mainly discussing identity. Hintikka also
proves that everything expressible by the inclusive
quantifiers plus identity may be expressed by the weakly
exclusive quantifiers without a sign for identity (1956:
235). Thus, he thinks the Tractarian claim that identity
is not an essential constituent of logical notation is
correct (id.). But he adds an important proviso: although
the inclusive interpretation is to be preferred in
English, it is clear that, without recourse to context,
there is no intuition definite enough to allow deciding
which interpretation is appropriate for an English
sentence involving quantifiers (1956: 227).
I think Hintikka is undoubtedly correct in his
claim. In fact, most of the Tractarian discussion on
identity supports a weakly exclusive interpretation of
variables. What is more, there is another important
passage that may be quoted in support of Wittgenstein's
weakly exclusive interpretation of variables. It is in the
"Notebooks". Here, he writes:
"I believe that it would be possible wholly to
exclude the sign of identity from our notation and
always to indicate identity merely by the identity of
the signs (in certain circumstances). In that case,
of course, F(a,a) would not be a special case of
(x, y) . F(x, y), and Fa would not be a special case of
(Ex, y) . Fx. Fy. But then instead of Fx.Fy —>x,y x=y
one could simply write -(Ex,y).Fx.Fy" (1914-6: 34;
italics mine).
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If for example 'Faa1 is not an instance of '(x)(y)Fxy',
this is because Wittgenstein's use of variables is
undoubtedly exclusive. But then it is possible to lay down
a rule for transforming an expression belonging to the W-
language into an expression belonging to the R-language
and vice versa. For example, suppose 1(EEx)' and '(UEx)'
stand for a weakly exclusive interpretation respectively
of the existentially and the universally quantified
variables. In this case, the Tractarian expression
'(UEx)(UEy)Fxy' would involve the requirement that 'x'
should be different from 'y'. Thus, the mere addition of
the clause 'x^y' transforms the Tractarian expression into
a Russellian one: '(UEx)(UEy)Fxy' is equivalent to
'(x)(y)(Fxy & x*y)', or, with existential quantifiers, to
'-(Ex)(Ey)(x=y v -Fxy)'.
The above procedure is generalized by Hintikka.
He formulates translation rules by means of which the
exclusive quantifiers may be paraphrased in terms of
'(Ex)' and '(x)' (1956: 231). Hintikka's transformation
rules seem to provide an adequate method for translating
Tractarian expressions into Russellian ones and vice
versa . If this is correct, (8) should be expressed by
weakly exclusive variables, thus yielding:
(9) '(EEx)(Fx & Bx & -(EEx)(EEy)(Fx & Fy))'.
If one now applies Hintikka's transformation rules to (9),
one obtains
(10) '(Ex)(Fx & Bx & -(Ex)(Ey)(x*y & (Fx & Fy))'.
Although not with the help of explicit Wittgensteinian
rules for dealing with truth-tables involving
quantification, it may be easily proved that (10) is
equivalent to the Russellian paraphrase, namely
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(11)' (Ex) (Fx & (y) (Fy ==> y=x) & Bx),(|.
Therefore, the Russellian account of (8) is inadequate,
because it misleadingly assumes that the Wittgensteinian
variable is to be interpreted in the same way as the
variables of "Principia Mathematica". Thus, the
disappointing results are not the true ones. Besides, the
equivalences obtained within Hintikka's composite formal
system in fact confirm Wittgenstein's claim that the
identity-sign is not an essential constituent of logical
notation (Hintikka 1956: 230, fn. 11; 235). The main
result of the above discussion is that the Tractarian
system has the same expressive power of "Principia". And
this fact increases the possibility that both systems are
logically equivalent. Therefore, as far as identity is
concerned, the Wittgensteinian modification of the general
framework of the Theory of Descriptions does not alter its
basic logical aspects. And an alleged divergence between
the Tractarian Theory of Descriptions and the Russellian
one reveals to be a possible source for the logical
equivalence between the two Theories.
Third, there is the difficult question of
Wittgenstein's obscure and apparently contradictory
account of generality in the "Tractatus". As already
mentioned, generality seems to have a twofold character in
the Tractarian system. The general propositions seem to be
at the same time logical prototypes and truth-functions of
elementary propositions. In what follows, I shall argue
that, despite the appearance of contradiction, this may be
explained in a coherent way. In addition, I believe one
may propose at least one interpretation of the generalised
propositions in a way such that the Tractarian system may
be proved equivalent to the system of "Principia". The
interpretation is based on the one found in Russell's
"Introduction" to the "Tractatus".
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The fact that a general proposition is a logical
prototype may be explained, in the following way. We know
that: i) an 'expression' is any part of a proposition that
characterizes its sense (1922b: 3.31); ii) a proposition
is an expression (id.). Given these definitions, suppose
we turn a constituent of a proposition into a variable.
For example, suppose we turn the argument 'John' in the
proposition 'John sleeps' into the variable 'x', thus
obtaining 'x sleeps'. Wittgenstein calls this a 'variable
proposition' (cf. 3.315), but according to aphorism 3.314,
'x sleeps' may be also interpreted as a propositional
variable. In this case, 'x sleeps' specifies a class of
propositions all of which are its values. But here the
class specified depends on the conventional meaning of the
expression 'sleeps'. If we now turn the latter into an
adequate variable, say 'Yx', we shall still obtain a
propositional variable which determines a class of
propositions of the same kind as the above mentioned. The
class determined by 'Yx' does not depend on any
conventional meaning, but solely on the nature of the
proposition formerly expressed by 'John sleeps' (cf.
1922b: 3.315). In this case, 'Yx' corresponds to a logical
prototype (id.).
Now the proposition 'John sleeps' also allows
the construction of quantified propositional variables,
such as '(Ex)Yx', '(x)Yx' and so on. These propositional
variables also correspond to logical prototypes. The
peculiarity of the generalized propositions is that they
both indicate logical prototypes and give prominence to
constants (1922b: 5.522). In the above examples, the
logical form is the constant to which prominence is given.
If this is correct, then the construction of
generalized propositions through the procedure of
replacing expressions by variables does not involve the
appeal to truth-functions. This coheres with the
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Tractarian claim that propositions comprise all that
follows from the totality of all elementary propositions
(1922b: 4.52). For the construction of logical prototypes
follows from the totality of all elementary propositions.
That is why Wittgenstein also claims that, in a certain
sense, all propositions may be taken as generalizations of
elementary propositions (id.).
The above interpretation explains Wittgenstein's
claim that he dissociates the concept 'all' from truth-
functions. But the fact that generalized propositions are
al so truth-functions of e1ementary propositions remains to
be explained. This is connected with the Tractarian claim
that the logical product and logical sum are notions
embedded in the propositions '(x)fx' and '(Ex)fx' (1922b:
5.521). Wittgenstein claims that the analysis of a
proposition must bring us to elementary propositions
(1922b: 4221) and that a proposition is a truth-function
of elementary propositions (1922b: 5). What is more,
elementary propositions themselves contain all logical
operations (1922b: 5.47), and this includes the
quantifiers. These principles are general enough to be
applied to generalized propositions. But then these
propositions will also reveal themselves to be truth-
functions of elementary propositions. Thus, although a
generalized proposition may be constructed independently
of truth-functions, the valuation of the generalized
proposition will have to take us back to truth-functions.
Now the question is: in what sense? The answer to this may
be given as follows:
i) Once one obtains a logical prototype through
the procedure of replacing expressions in a proposition by
the corresponding variables, one stipulates the
propositions which are the values of the propositional
variable expressed by the logical prototype. The
stipulation is made by means of the common logical form of
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the propositions stipulated. This is a purely syntactic
procedure and constitutes the basis for establishing a
logical equivalence between the prototype and a logical
articulation of the propositions specified by the
prototype (1922b: 3.316-7). This seems to be similar to
Russell's interpretation in his "Introduction" to the
"Tractatus" (1922b: xv). A similar interpretation is found
in Fogelin (1976: 57).
ii) Once the stipulation is made, the truth-
value of the logical prototype will be calculated by means
of the truth-values of the propositions which are the
values of the propositional variable expressed by the
prototype. This coheres with the Tractarian claim that
"If we are given a proposition, then with it we
are also given the results of all truth-operations
that have it as their base" (1922b: 5.442).
Thus, in the case of a proposition involving, say, the
universal quantifier, the logical prototype obtained will
be true if and only if all the propositions belonging to
the set specified by the prototype are true (cf. 1922b:
5.52). Therefore, the proposition '(x)fx' will be
equivalent to the logical product of the propositions
belonging to the set specified by the prototype. As for a
proposition involving the existential quantifier, the
logical prototype obtained will be true if and only if at
least one of the propositions belonging to the set
specified by the prototype is true. Therefore, the
proposition '(Ex)fx' will be equivalent to the logical sum
of the propositions belonging to the set specified by the
prototype. This situation takes us from the prototype to
truth-functions. For the generalized propositions,
although constructed on the basis of the symbolism alone
and independently of truth-functions, are ultimately
equivalent to logical conjunctions or disjunctions of the
propositions belonging to the sets specified by the
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prototypes obtained. The propositions belonging to the
sets specified by the prototypes may in turn be fully
analyzed into elementary propositions. In this way, a
generalized proposition may be fully analyzed in a way
such that it specifies a set of elementary propositions
and is a truth-function of a logical sum or a logical
product of the elementary propositions involved. This
would explain Wittgenstein's claim that the logical
product and the logical sum are embedded in generality
(1922b: 5521). Simultaneously, this would reveal that
Russell's suggestion that Wittgenstein derives general
propositions from conjunctions and disjunctions (1922b:
xvi) is not entirely correct. Actually, Wittgenstein needs
conjunctions or disjunctions in order to assign a truth-
value to a general proposition, not to construct it: the
logical prototype is obtained by merely introducing the
adequate variables.
Against the above interpretation, one might
argue in the following way. As a logical prototype, the
generalized proposition contains variables. But then its
final analysis will still contain variables. Thus, it will
always leave something undetermined (1922b: 3.24). In
other words, the analysis of the generalized proposition
will not take us directly to articulations of elementary
propositions containing primitive simple signs, but only
to articulations of propositional variables containing
variables which stand for primitive simple signs.
Therefore, the indeterminateness of the generalized
proposition would make it impossible for the proposition
to be a truth-function of elementary propositions.
I would reply to this as follows. The
indeterminateness notwithstanding, the generalized
proposition clearly specifies a set of propositions and is
a truth-function of the propositions belonging to the set.
True, the final stage of the analysis of the generalized
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proposition would take us to propositional variables which
would contain variables for simple signs. But the
resulting propositional variables would still specify sets
of elementary propositions. Thus, the generalized
proposition may be also seen as a truth-function of
elementary propositions. What is more, this squares with
the Tractarian general principle that a proposition is a
truth-function of elementary propositions (1922b: 5). As
a result, the generalized proposition reveals to be
perfectly capable of describing the world.
This may also be inferred from aphorism 5.526,
where Wittgenstein states that we can describe the world
completely by means of fully generalized propositions. For
a non-fully generalized proposition is simply a stage in
the construction of a fully generalized one. Thus, a
proposition like '(Ex)(EY)Yx' differs from '(Ex)fx' in
that the set of propositions specified by the former is
wider- than the one specified by the latter. But the latter
also describes a situation and as such may be compared
with reality. As for indeterminateness, compare a
proposition like '(Ex)fx' with '(Ex)fx & x=a'. The former
is more indeterminate than the latter. Despite this, the
former describes the world (in the Tractarian sense) as
accurately as the latter if both are true. As a matter of
fact, if '(Ex)fx' is a true Tractarian description of the
world, it depicts an existing state of affairs and shows
the logical structure of the state of affairs within the
logical space, thus mirroring the essence of the world; if
'(Ex)fx & x=a' is true, it adds to this an extra piece of
information, that is 'x=a', which is a matter of detail
and does not add anything relevant to the Tractarian
description of the world made by '(Ex)fx'. The essence of
the world is logic. In order to describe the world in the
Tractarian way, we only need to know that there are
objects in the world, not which objects there are. Thus,
although our customary mode of expression is rather made
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by means of '(Ex)fx & x=a', there is nothing wrong with
the indeterminateness of '(Ex)fx' from the standpoint of
a true Tractarian description of the world.
If the above interpretation is correct, we now
have to see how generality works in propositions
containing definite descriptions in subject-position. This
is connected with the Tractarian analysis of propositions
containing a sign for a complex (1922b: 3.24-3.261). In
this respect, Wittgenstein makes the following claims.
i) The analysis of a proposition containing the
sign for a complex is not arbitrary. In fact,
"A proposition has one and only one complete
analysis" (1922b: 3.25).
This is reinforced by another aphorism:
"Nor does analysis resolve the sign for a
complex in an arbitrary way: for instance, it would
not have a different resolution every time that it
was incorporated in a different proposition" (1922b:
3.3442).
The above principle may be applied to propositions
containing definite descriptions in subject-position. For
the description is a sign for a complex. As a result, a
proposition containing a definite description in subject-
position will have one and only one complete analysis.
ii) The complete analysis of a proposition
containing the sign for a complex will involve
propositions about constituents of the complex and
propositions that describe the complex completely (1922b:
2.201). This seems to be confirmed by the following
aphorism:
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"A proposition about a complex stands in an
internal relation to a proposition about a
constituent of the complex" (1922b: 3.24).
Although the aphorism is obscure, I shall argue that it
reinforces 2.201. In order to justify my claim, I shall
offer the following reasons: iia) the relation between the
proposition about a complex and the proposition about the
constituent of the complex is internal, and this means
that the analysis of the former would take us necessarily
to the latter; ii^) the symbol for a complex is dissected
into a simple symbol by means of a definition, thus
signifying via the signs that serve to define it (the
definitions point the way) (1922b: 3.24; 3.261); ii) as
already mentioned, Wittgenstein explicitly adhered to the
Theory of Descriptions in the Tractarian period, and this
entails that he would assume that the analysis of a
proposition containing the sign for a complex would
involve a proposition about a constituent of the complex;
i ic) my interpretation coheres with the Tractarian claim
that the proposition about the complex will not be
nonsensical, but simply false if there is no set of
constituents linked in a way such that they satisfy the
description of the complex (1922b: 3.24). Now given that
a complex can be given only by its description (id.), the
above principle clearly applies to propositions containing
definite descriptions in subject-position.
My interpretation also coheres with
Wittgenstein's claim that the proposition containing the
sign for a complex leaves something undetermined, just
like it occurs with the generality sign (id.). But this
does not entail that the proposition containing the sign
for a complex will not be a truth-function of elementary
propositions. In fact, the analysis of the proposition
about the complex will involve generalized propositions
and so the former will be a truth-function of elementary
propositions in the same sense as the latter.
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As a result, the Tractarian account of a
proposition containing a definite description in subject-
position, say 'the F is P' may be summarized as follows.
The analysis of 'The F is P' will involve propositions
about the constituents of 'The F' and propositions that
describe 'The F' completely. These propositions are
generalized, thus involving some indeterminateness. But
this does not impede such propositions of being truth-
functions of elementary propositions. In fact, the final
analysis of 'The F is P' will be such that it will involve
at least one generalized proposition of the form 'there is
an x such that. . . ' . The latter will specify a set of
elementary propositions and will be a truth-function of
the elementary propositions belonging to the set. If 'The
F' does not exist, all the elementary propositions
belonging to the set specified will be false. Thus, 'The
F is P' will be false if 'The F' does not exist. In turn,
if 'the F' does exist, then 'The F is P' will be either
true or false depending on the adequacy of the predicate
'is P' to the complex involved. Thus, 'The F is P' is an
authentic proposition that contains everything which is
relevant for an accurate Tractarian description of the
world.
If this is correct, then the Tractarian general
propositions would be logically equivalent to the ones
belonging to the classical first order predicate calculus
with bound variables. So, as far as generality is
concerned, Wittgenstein's TLP- and W-language are
logically equivalent to Russell's R-language.
Fourth, we have to consider Wittgenstein's
rejection of Russell's axiomatic method in "Principia".
The fact is that, although Wittgenstein accuses the
axiomatic method of being misleading, the Tractarian
system seems to be logically equivalent to the system of
"Principia". In fact, we already know that both systems
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have the same expressive power. This means that we can
make a correspondence between the true propositions of
both systems in a way such that: i) to every true
proposition of the Tractarian system there corresponds one
true proposition of the system of "Principia"; ii) to
every true proposition of the R-language there corresponds
one true proposition of the W-language.
Now this suggests that the above systems may be
logically equivalent. Consider the propositional calculus
involved by both systems. It is a well-known fact that
every axiom and every theorem of the propositional
calculus is a tautology and that every tautology is either
an axiom or a theorem of the propositional calculus
(Chauvineau 1962: 100-6). Ultimately, this means that: i)
if a proposition of the propositional calculus is an axiom
or theorem in the R-language, then it is a tautology in
the TLP-language; ii) if a proposition of the
propositional calculus is a tautology in the TLP-language,
then it is an axiom or a theorem in the R-language. In
other words, the R-language contains the propositional
calculus in its axiomatic version, whereas the TLP-
language contains the same calculus in its tautological
version. Therefore, a proposition of the propositional
calculus is an axiom or a theorem in the R-language if and
only if it is a tautology in the TLP-language. Now
consider the predicate calculus involved by both the above
systems. As already mentioned, the Tractarian general
propositions seem to be logically equivalent to the ones
belonging to the classical first order predicate calculus
with bound variables.
Although the conjunction of these facts is not
enough to prove that the TLP-language is logically
equivalent to the R-language, it clearly suggests that
both languages contain significant domains which are
logically equivalent. This fact makes the claim that both
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languages may be logically equivalent a good conjecture.
Given that the TLP-language is logically equivalent to the
W-language, the Tractarian system would reveal itself to
be logically equivalent to the system of "Principia". Even
though the systems were not equivalent, their similarities
seem to surmount greatly their discrepancies. The
modifications imposed by Wittgenstein do not seem to alter
the basic logical results obtained by Russell and the
Tractarian Theory of Descriptions seems to be logically
equivalent to the Russellian.
As a whole, the analysis of the Wittgensteinian
modifications shows that the Tractarian system would not
probably entail any radical alteration of the Russellian
Theory of Descriptions. This result puts a significant
part of the Tractarian system on a par with the first
order predicate calculus with bound variables of
"Principia". Of course, the decision of using one of these
systems rather than the other is determined by practical
reasons. And the preference given to the system of
"Principia" speaks for itself.
In short, the early Wittgenstein's solution to
the problem of semantic presuppositions generated by
definite descriptions in subject-position seems to be
ultimately equivalent to Russell's, although the general
formal framework to which the solution belongs is
different. But this is true under the following
qualifications: i) the equivalence mentioned occurs
basically within the domain of propositional calculus and
first-order predicate calculus; ii) although correct, the
Tractarian claim that identity is dispensable is
dogmatically stated, not proved; iii) the possibility of
constructing truth-tables for expressions involving
quantifiers is also dogmatically stated, not proved. But
the more important aspect of Wittgenstein's solution is
that the basic result of Russell's Theory is preserved: a
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proposition containing an empty description in
subject-position is not nonsensical, but simply false
(1922b: 3.24; 5.473).
The above is a disappointing result. But this is
not the end of the matter. For we still must know what is
the place the general concept of semantic presupposition
as defined in the previous chapter may have within the
Tractarian framework. In other words, Russell's theory of
logically proper names is compatible with the view that
descriptions are referring expressions which semantically
presuppose in the sense of the general concept. Now what
about the Tractarian system: is it compatible with the
general concept of semantic presupposition or not? The
answer to this question will require the analysis of how
compatible with the general concept of semantic
presupposition are some relevant parts of the Tractarian
system. This task belongs to the next section.
IV - THE TRACTARIAN SYSTEM, THE SUB-SYSTEM W1
AND THE CONCEPT OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION
In this section, I shall try to show in which
way the Tractarian system may be compatible with the
logical relation of semantic presupposition. This will
involve not only the analysis of the relationships between
the general concept of semantic presupposition and the
Tractarian system as a whole, but also the relationships
between the concept in question and some relevant parts of
the Tractarian system, such as the principle of strict
bivalence and the Picture Theory. The expected result is
a clarification of the various degrees in which some parts
of the Tractarian system may be said to oppose the general
concept of semantic presupposition.
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First, consider the Tractarian system as a whole
and its relations with the general concept of semantic
presupposition. From this standpoint, the Tractarian
system is undoubtedly incompatible with the relation of
semantic presupposition. Of course, the mere adoption in
the "Tractatus" of a modified version of Russell's Theory
of Descriptions automatically excludes semantic
presupposition as an explanation of the referential role
of definite descriptions in subject-position.
Second, consider the system which results by
eliminating the Theory of Descriptions from the Tractarian
system. Let us call such an incomplete system 'Wl'. In the
W1 system, the referential role of definite descriptions
in subject-position remains to be explained. Now suppose
one adopts the general concept of semantic presupposition
in order to explain how definite descriptions refer. This
would lead to contradiction, for the Wl system contains
another relevant part of the Tractarian system which is
incompatible with the general concept of semantic
presupposition. As already mentioned, one of the basic
features of the general concept of semantic presupposition
is the claim that the presupposing proposition is
truth-value 1 ess if the presupposed one is false. This
contradicts the principle of strict bivalence which states
that a proposition may be either true or false, but never
truth-valueless. Now it is well-known that Wittgenstein
adhered to the principle in question by the time he wrote
the "Tractatus" (1913b: 94; 1914-6: 53; 56; 1922b: 2.21-
2.223). Consequently, the Wl system is bound to oppose the
general concept of presupposition, because this relation
involves the existence of truth-valueless propositions.
And this result may be extended to propositions containing
definite descriptions in subject-position. Thus, the
Theory of Descriptions would fit better the Wl system as
a supplementary explanation of the referential role of
definite descriptions in subject-position5.
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But the relation of semantic presupposition may-
have another reading to be tested against the ¥1 system.
For example, we may say that, if the presupposed
proposition is false, then the presupposing utterance is
no proposition at all. This is connected with one of the
possible interpretations of Strawson's concept of semantic
presupposition, but it may be used in order to construct
a concept which is expressible within the ¥1 system. In
this case, we would say that whenever there is a
presuppositional failure, the presupposing declarative
utterance is nonsensical. The reading I am suggesting may
involve a problematic semantics, but I am not interested
in the merits of such a semantics. ¥hat interests me is
the fact that my reading involves an alternative relation
of semantic presupposition that does not affect the
Tractarian principle of bivalence. For a proposition with
a sense would always be either true or false; only
nonsensical sequences of signs would be truth-valueless.
Now this raises the following question: given that, in the
"Tractatus", ¥ittgenstein admits the existence of
nonsensical utterances, would it not be the case that the
¥1 system admits the above version of semantic
presupposition in order to explain the referential
mechanism involved by definite descriptions in subject-
position? Once again, the answer is no. In what follows,
I shall try to show that the appeal to a relationship
which is simultaneously an instance of the general concept
of semantic presupposition and expressible within the ¥1
system would be incompatible with such a system.
In order to make my point, I shall consider the
following consecutive Tractarian aphorisms:
"2.0201 Every statement about complexes can be
resolved into a statement about their constituents
and into the propositions that describe the complexes
completely.
"2.021 Objects make up the substance of the
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world. That is why they cannot be composite.
"2.0211 If the world had no substance, then
whether a proposition had sense would depend on
whether another proposition was true.
"2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any
picture of the world (true or false)".
The above argument purports to show the necessity of
simple signs. It also involves definite descriptions in
subject-position by means of the appeal to statements
about complexes. But the interpretation of the argument is
not a simple matter.
Black, for example, paraphrases the argument in
the following way. If there were no simple objects, i.e.
if the world had no substance, then the analysis of a
statement involving a complex would have no end. For
suppose Sj is a statement involving a complex; the sense of
Sj would depend on the truth of another sentence, say S?,
affirming the existence of the complex contained in Sj,- but
then the sense of S2 would depend on the truth of another
statement, say S,, and so on. We would be facing a vicious
regress ad infinitum, and we could never grasp the sense
of Sj without previously knowing an infinity of other
propositions to be true. Thus, unless there are simple
signs in direct connexion with simple objects in the
world, there can be no signs in indirect connexion either
(1964: 60).
Fogelin, in turn, thinks that 2.0201 lays down
a criterion of sense according to which a statement about
a complex can be resolved into a set of statements about
the complex's constituents and describing the complex
completely. And he interprets Wittgenstein's argument as
concluding that we cannot deny the existence of simples.
For if a statement containing a complex is resolved by
analysis into another statement containing another
complex, the latter would still require analysis; if
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further analysis still yields a statement containing a
complex, more analysis will be required. But if we never
could reach a statement containing no complex at all,
analysis would never end and the criterion of sense would
never be fulfilled. In this case, we could not sketch a
picture of the world (1976: 12-3). But Fogelin thinks his
reading of the above argument squares ill with the
following part of the aphorism 3.24:
"(...) A proposition that mentions a complex
will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not
exist, but simply false. (...)".
Here it seems that it is the truth and not the meaning of
a proposition that depends upon the existence of simples.
For this reason, Fogelin confesses he does not know how to
square the argument in 2.0201-2.0212 with 3.24 (1976: 13).
Now I think it is possible to offer a different
reading of the above argument. And this reading would
involve both the theory of primitive simple signs and an
instance of the general concept of semantic
presupposition. The latter is necessary in order to
construct a "presuppositional" relation which would be
expressible in Tractarian terminology. In other words, I
think it is possible to interpret Wittgenstein's argument
as rejecting the relation of semantic presupposition on
the basis of the requirements both of the Picture Theory
and the requirement of primitive simple signs. In order to
achieve this, some preliminary remarks must be made.
First, it seems clear that 2.0201 expresses, in
Wittgenstein's own terminology, his adherence to the
Theory of Descriptions.
Second, the argument to be discussed is
expressed only by 2.0211-2.0212 ('hypothetical
syllogism'). The remaining aphorisms in the passage
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2.0201-2.0212, although they give some important
additional information, do not belong to the argument
itself.
Third, 2.0211 may be interpreted as laying down
the following version of the relationship of semantic
presupposition: a proposition, say 'P', semantically
presupposes another proposition, say 'Q', if and only if
'P' has a sense when 'Q* is true. As a result, if 'Q* is
false, then both 'P' and its negation are nonsensical.
This seems to be an instance of the relationship of
semantic presupposition expressed by the general concept.
For if 'P' is nonsensical, 'P' has no truth-value. Thus,
the relation laid down by 2.0211 may be defined as
follows. 'P' semantically presupposes 'Q' if and only if:
i) if 'P' is true or false, then 'Q * is true; ii) if 'not
P' is false or true, then *Q' is true; iii) if both 'P'
and 'not P' have no truth-values, then 'Q' is false. True,
the presupposing utterance still has a sense in both
Strawson's and Frege's case. But this feature does not
belong to the definition of the general concept of
semantic presupposition. Thus, the fact that both 'P' and
'not P' are nonsensical when 'Q' is false does not affect
the definition suggested by 2.0211 and makes such a
definition an instance of the general concept.
Wittgenstein seems to offer, within his own system and
using his own terminology, a principle which would explain
the possibility of a presuppositional relation in the
hypothetical case the world had no substance.
Fourth, any existential proposition of the form
'(Ex)(Fx & -(Ex)(Ey)(Fx & Fy))' in the TLP-language is
essentially bivalent. In other words, although some
utterances are defined as nonsensical by the W1 system,
this does not affect the existential propositions, for
they always have a truth-value, even when the description
involved is empty (in that case the proposition would be
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false, and never nonsensical). If this is true, then a
well-formed existential proposition always has a
truth-value and never depends on the truth of another
proposition for having a sense. This principle coheres
with the Tractarian system in general and with the W1
system in particular.
Fifth, the argument expressed by 2.0211-2.0212
expresses a reductio ad absurdum, whereas 3.24 expresses
the truth-conditions for a proposition about a complex. As
a matter of fact, 2.0211-2.0212 assumes the hypothesis
that the world has no substance in order to prove that
this very hypothesis is absurd. 3.24, in turn, assumes the
opposite hypothesis, namely that the world has a
substance. Thus, 3.24 assumes that the proposition
mentioning a complex has a sense which is clarified by the
Russellian paraphrase and that the proposition will not be
nonsensical, but simply false if the complex does not
exist. We may say that 2.0211-2.0212 expresses the
consequences of an "abnormal" situation, whereas 3.24
expresses the consequences of a "normal" situation. True,
the consequences of these situations clash with each
other, but only because they are derived from
contradictory hypotheses. Both the Tractarian and the W1
system clearly assume only one of these hypotheses and
dismiss the other.
If we keep the above remarks in mind, we may now
turn our attention to Wittgenstein's argument contained in
2.0201-2.0212. As already mentioned, 2.0201 states the
Wittgensteinian principle of analysis which is cast in a
Russellian mould: every proposition about a complex can be
dissected into a proposition containing both the
constituents of the complex and the complete description
of the complex. But we cannot overlook the fact that
2.0201 does not properly belong to the set 2.0201-2.0212.
Actually, it is a development of 2.02, which states that
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the objects are simple. Thus, 2.0201 states that even
propositions containing complexes can be reduced to
propositions containing either simple signs designating
simple objects or variables for simple signs. Hence,
Black's and Fogelin's suggestion of a vicious infinite
chain of propositions has its place precisely here: if the
analysis of a proposition containing a complex yields
another proposition containing another complex, then
further analysis is necessary. Of course, if the result of
every further analysis were always a proposition
containing a complex, we would have to face the following
awkward situation: a single proposition containing a
complex would be replaceable by an infinite chain of
propositions each of which would contain a different
complex. However, the analysis of the original proposition
must come to an end. And the end will be reached only if
either simple signs designating simple objects or
variables for simple signs are found.
So far, simple objects are described as the
necessary outcome of the analysis of propositions. As to
2.021, it only adds an extra piece of information to the
above picture. For it gives the reason why the objects
must be simple: they make up the substance of the world.
But nothing else is said about the substance itself. Thus,
we really do not know why the objects must be simple at
this point. We are left with the mere equivalence simple
objects/substance, but of course Wittgenstein must be
taking this to be enough for the purposes of the argument
which follows. And we may say that the role played by
2.021 in 2.0201-2.0212 is merely definitional.
Now 2.0211-2.0212 is the argument to be
analyzed. 2.0211 states the hypothesis which has to be
disproved. Suppose the world had no substance. This
amounts to supposing the world had no simple objects in
it. But then what happens to a proposition about a
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complex? In other words, how is it possible to guarantee
the referential role of the sign for a complex? Two
alternatives are open here.
On the one hand, there is the equivalence
yielded by the application of the principle of analysis in
the Russellian way. A proposition about a complex is
equivalent to another proposition about the constituents
of the complex and the complete description of the
complex. In this case, the non-existence of simple signs
would entail that whether a proposition had sense would
depend on whether another proposition was true. As already
mentioned, an infinite chain of propositions would be
required in order to guarantee the referential role of the
sign for the complex. This result is bad enough to be
excluded.
On the other hand, the principle of analysis
might be applied according to the presuppositional
alternative. As already mentioned, the adherents of the
general concept appeal to the presuppositional relation in
order to explain the referential behaviour of a sign for
a complex: a proposition containing a complex presupposes
an existential proposition affirming the existence and
uniqueness of the complex. In doing so, one is able to
guarantee the referential role of the sign for a complex
without appealing to infinite chains of propositions. But
the presuppositional alternative would have to be properly
introduced into the W1 system.
The first thing to do would be to define a
relation of 'W-presupposition' for sentences containing
definite descriptions in subject-position. Suppose two
propositions belonging to the TLP-language, say 'P' and
'Q', in W1. 'P' contains a definite description in
subject-position. The description is defined by, say, the
predicate 'Dx'. ' Q' is an existential proposition of the
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form ' (Ex) (Dx & -(Ex) (Ey) (Dx & Dy) ) ' . In this case, 'P'
may be said to W-presuppose * Q' in W1 when the following
conditions are satisfied: i) if both 'P' and its negation
•-p' have a sense in Wl, then ' Q' is true in Wl; ii) if
' Q1 is false in Wl, both 'P' and '-P' are nonsensical in
Wl. This is an instance of the relationship expressed by
the definition in 2.0211. That Wittgenstein may have
considered this alternative by the time the Tractarian
system was germinating in his mind is suggested by a
passage from the "Notes Dictated to Moore":
"The question whether a proposition has sense
(Sinn) can never depend on the truth of another
proposition about a constituent of the first. E.g.,
the question whether (x) x=x has meaning (Sinn) can't
depend on the question whether (Ex) x=x is true. It
doesn't describe reality at all, and deals therefore
solely with symbols; and it says that they must
symbolize, but not what they symbolize" (116).
Of course, Wittgenstein's example involves logical
propositions and is very special. But two points may be
made here: i) the principle that the sense of a
proposition cannot depend on the truth of another
proposition is formulated in general terms and seems to
apply to any kind of proposition; ii) the example itself
suggests that the sense of a proposition might depend on
the truth of an existential proposition about one of its
constituents. In this case, there would be a
W-presuppositional relation which would be expressible in
Tractarian terminology and which would involve no
hypothesis of an infinite chain of propositions. If this
is correct, we now have to prove that even this relation
is excluded by the Wl system.
In order to do so, let us return to
Wittgenstein's argument in 2.0211-2.0212. As already
mentioned, 2.0211 simultaneously states the hypothesis
that the world has no substance and draws the unpalatable
conclusion that, in this case, whether a proposition has
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a sense would depend on whether another proposition is
true. But this is only enough to prove that the
equivalence yielded by the application of the principle of
analysis would involve an infinite regress if there are no
simple signs. It is not enough to prove that an
alternative referential model, given by the
W-presuppositional relation, is also to be excluded. This
task is done by 2.0212. For the latter draws another
undesired conclusion from the original hypothesis by means
of the argument, form known as 'hypothetical syllogism'.
The whole argument may be summed up as follows. We know
from 2.0211 that if the world had no substance, then we
would have to face the following choice: either there
would be an infinite regress of propositions or a
W-presuppositional relationship (probably suggested by
Wittgenstein's awareness of Frege's hypothesis) would be
necessary. The infinite regress is rejected by the
application of the principle of analysis. As to the
W-presuppositional relation, it is contested by 2.0212.
For, according to this aphorism, if the W-presuppositional
relation held, we could not sketch any true or false
picture of the world. As we do make true or false pictures
of the world, the Fregean-like hypothesis must be false.
As a whole, the argument is obscure. At the
point the last conclusion is drawn, one only knows,
without been given the grounds for it, that if sense
depends on truth, then there cannot be any true or false
picture of the world. But one thing is certain: if the
argument is correct, then sense must be connected with a
picture in a way such that the truth or falsity of the
picture must be posterior to its having a sense. And this
is confirmed later on in the "Tractatus". Actually, in 2.1
we learn that we picture facts to ourselves. And in
2.221-2.222 we learn that a picture presents its sense,
and it is the agreement or disagreement of its sense with
reality that constitutes the picture's truth or falsity.
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In other words, it is the sense of the picture that leads
to the truth or falsity of the picture, not the reverse.
The sense of a proposition is logically prior to its
having a truth-value.
The reductio expounded in 2.0211-2.0212 may
still be confirmed by another passage from the
"Tractatus", although following a different line of
argument. As a matter of fact, the Picture Theory requires
that there be a common pictorial form between the picture
and what the picture depicts (1922b: 2.15-2.151). It also
requires the existence of the pictorial relationship which
connects the elements of the picture with the elements of
what the picture depicts (1922b: 2.1513-2.1515).
Consequently, a proposition about a complex cannot
presuppose another proposition stating the existence and
uniqueness of the complex. For in that case the pictorial
form of the proposition containing the complex and the
fact it depicts would not be the same: there would be
nothing in the fact which might possibly correspond to the
existential proposition presupposed, and the pictorial
relationship would collapse. And the whole discussion
confirms my claim, namely that, on the basis of the
requirements of the Picture Theory, the W1 system opposes
a W-presuppositional relation (probably inspired by
Frege's concept).
A corollary of my interpretation of the
argument is the confirmation of my claim that, contrarily
to Fogelin's view, 2.0211-2.0212 does not square ill with
3.24. In fact, 2.0211-2.0212 only makes the hypothesis
that the world has no substance and refutes it by reductio
ad absurdum, whereas 3.24 assumes that the proposition to
be analyzed already has a sense and that the world has a
substance.
It is worth stressing that Wittgenstein's
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argument in 2.0211-2.0212 remains obscure. The above
interpretation reveals that the obscurity does not lie in
any inherent uninte11igibi1ity on the part of the
argument. The problem is, rather, that no justification is
given for one of its conclusions, viz. 2.0212. If this is
correct, then some secondary conclusions may be drawn.
First, both Black and Fogelin are mistaken in thinking
that 2.0211-2.0212 only involves a vicious infinite chain
of propositions. Second, in contrast with Fogelin's
interpretation, mine squares the argument in favour of
simple objects with 3.24.
At this point, it is worth asking about another
system which would result by eliminating not only the
Theory of Descriptions from the "Tractatus", but also the
Picture Theory. Let us call such an incomplete system
'W2'. The relation between the W2 system and the general
concept of semantic presupposition will be made clear in
the next section.
V - THE TRACTARIAN SUB-SYSTEM W2
AND THE CONCEPT OF SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITION
The W2 system is so simplified that it could
hardly be compared to the Tractarian system as a whole.
Even so, the W2 system would contain some of the basic
principles of the "Tractatus". Of course, one of them is
the requirement of primitive simple signs for a
proposition's making sense. Thus, the W2 system contains
the Tractarian claim that the analysis of language has an
end which is expressed by the W-language. As already
mentioned, the latter is not given, but only postulated.
Now the question is whether the W2 system opposes or not
the general concept of semantic presupposition as applied
to definite descriptions in subject-position.
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I
In order to give an answer to such a question I
shall firstly argue that the Tractarian primitive simple
signs and the Russellian logically proper names have
similar referential mechanisms. True, the two accounts of
proper names are different from each other. For we can
exhibit at least one instance of logically proper names,
like, for example the word 'this', whereas the
Wittgensteinian primitive simple signs only correspond to
a transcendental postulate of the definiteness of sense
and cannot be exhibited a priori. However, Russell was
under the influence of Wittgenstein by the time he wrote
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (1918: 175). Thus, it
is very likely that Russell got the inspiration for his
theory of logically proper names from Wittgenstein's
theory of primitive simple signs. In fact, there are
similarities between the accounts involved. In the
"Tractatus", Wittgenstein argues that
"In a proposition a thought can be expressed in
such a way that elements of the propositional sign
correspond to the objects of the thought.
"I call such elements 'simple signs', and such
a proposition 'completely analyzed1." (1922b: 3.2-
3.201).
Thus, in a completely analyzed proposition there are
correlations of the constituents of the proposition with
the constituents of reality. Actually, the constituents
function like feelers, connecting the proposition to
reality (1922b: 2.1514-2.1515). And the constituents are
what may be called Wittgensteinian logically proper names.
The simple sign is the representative of an object, and
the object is its meaning (1922b: 3.203; 3.22). Hence, it
is a primitive sign and cannot be dissected by means of
definitions (1922b: 3.16; 3.261). Of course, the meaning
of a Wittgensteinian proper name can be explained by means
of elucidations. But any elucidation would have to contain
the name of which it is an elucidation. Therefore, the
elucidation postulates the very meaning it intends to
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elucidate (1922b: 3.263). But this circularity is not
problematic, because what the name fails to express, its
application shows clearly (1922b: 3.262). As one may
infer, the Wittgensteinian name has all the features
required for relating to its denotation in the way a
Russellian logically proper name does. In fact, if 'a'
stands for a Wittgensteinian simple sign, then the
following is true: i) 'a' has a simple object as its
meaning (1922b: 3.203) and thus would a mere noise if it
had no meaning; iii) 'a' has no sense ( cfr. 1922b: 3.3);
iv) 'a exists' would be nonsensical (cfr. 1922b: 3.221;
3.263). Now this allows drawing the conclusion that
Russellian logically proper names and Wittgensteinian
primitive simple signs have similar referential
mechanisms. Given that Russellian logically proper names
are submitted to the Fregean semantic principle, it
follows that the Tractarian primitive simple signs are
also submitted to the same principle. This makes the
primitive simple signs, under the appropriate
circumstances, compatible with definite descriptions which
generate semantic presuppositions when in subject-
position.
Now consider the relationship between the W2
system and the general concept of semantic presupposition
for definite descriptions in subject-position. I shall
argue that, by itself, Wittgenstein's theory of primitive
simple signs is compatible with the general concept of
semantic presupposition. In fact, the requirement of
simple signs only tells us that any fully analyzed
proposition must be reducible to elementary propositions
containing primitive simple signs. But the requirement
does not tell us how this occurs in each particular case.
And this leaves open the question of how to analyze a
sentence containing a definite description in subject-
position. There may be at least two different
possibilities here.
148
First, the definite description may be
interpreted as an incomplete symbol which vanishes after
analysis. In this case, the sentence containing the
description in subject-position would be explained by the
Tractarian equivalent of the Russellian paraphrase. Of
course, the Tractarian fully analyzed sentence contains
the authentic primitive signs and goes further than the
Russellian one which does not yet contain the primitive
signs and may be said to correspond only to an
intermediary stage in the complete analysis. This is
Wittgenstein's solution in the "Tractatus", but it does
not belong to the W2 system.
Second, the description may be interpreted as an
authentic referring expression, but one which refers in an
indirect way. In this case, the sentence containing the
description in subject-position would be analyzed by
appealing to the logical relation of semantic W-
presupposition. Let us call the sentence in question 'S'
and suppose it contains a definite description which is
paraphrased by the predicate 'Dx' in the TLP-language.
Accordingly, ' S ' semantically W-presupposes an existential
sentence of the form '(Ex)(Dx & -(Ex)(Ey)(Dx & Dy))', say
'E'. Now the analysis of 'E' might be such that its truth-
conditions were given in a fully analyzed existential
sentence belonging to the TLP-language and containing only
variables for primitive simple signs. Thus, the full
analysis of * S' would run as follows: 'S' semantically W-
presupposes 'E' which in turn is dissected into a set of
elementary propositions containing only variables for
primitive simple signs. If this is possible, then the full
analysis of ' S' would also lead to the primitive simple
signs, although in a different way from the Tractarian
paraphrase. In other words, although semantically W-
presupposing in the sense of the general concept, ' S *
would still be reducible to the primitive simple signs of
the postulated Wittgensteinian logically perfect language.
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Of course, this is not Wittgenstein's solution to the
problem in the "Tractatus", but it may be thought of as an
adequate solution in the W2 system. As a result, the
theory of primitive simple signs by itself is not enough
in the "Tractatus" for rejecting the application of a
presuppositional analysis to definite descriptions in
subject-position. As a matter of fact, the theory must be
supplemented by another aspect of the Tractarian system,
such as the Picture Theory, in order to become
incompatible with the general concept of semantic
presupposition for definite descriptions in subject-
position.
The above result is not surprising, for the
Fregean account of proper names allows the conjunction of
the concept of semantic presupposition (for compound
proper names, that is, definite descriptions) and the
semantic principle (for simple proper names). Now the
Tractarian primitive simple signs are submitted to the
Fregean principle. In addition, it has already been shown
that Russell's logically proper names are also compatible
with the general concept of semantic presupposition^.
V - FINAL REMARKS
I expect it is now clearly established that the
early Wittgenstein's solution to the problem of semantic
presupposition of definite descriptions in subject-
position is as follows.
First, the "Tractatus" adopts the Russellian
Theory of Descriptions, but introduces the following
modifications: i) the primitive signs in "Principia" are
not the genuine ones required for the definiteness of
sense of our propositions; ii) unlike Russell's use of
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one-place predicates, the "Tractatus" seems to emphasise
the use'n-place predicates; iii) the sign for identity is
excluded from the Tractarian system; iv) the Tractarian
account of generality involves not only truth-operations,
but also logical prototypes; iv) the axiomatic method in
"Principia" is replaced by the method of truth-tables in
the "Tractatus". Even so, the resulting system is
logically equivalent to the predicate calculus with bound
variables in the formal system of "Principia Mathematica".
Second, it is not only the Theory of
Descriptions that opposes the general concept of semantic
presupposition in the Tractarian system. In fact, the
Picture Theory also opposes the concept in question.
According to the Picture Theory, the relation of semantic
W-presupposition is incompatible with the Tractarian
system.
Third, the Tractarian primitive simple signs do
not oppose the general concept of semantic presupposition.
This is so because, as in the case of Russellian logically
proper names, the Tractarian system adopts for the
primitive simple signs a referential mechanism in which
the Fregean semantic principle still plays the main role.
Now the Fregean simple proper names are submitted to the
same semantic principle and are compatible with the
concept of semantic presupposition (Frege's account is not
inconsistent from this standpoint). Thus, the
Wittgensteinian primitive simple signs are also compatible
with the general concept of semantic presupposition.
The Tractarian solution, as long as it is
logically equivalent to the predicate calculus with bound
variables of "Principia Mathematica", is disappointing.
But the analysis of the parts of the Tractarian system
which oppose the general concept of semantic
presupposition throws a new light both in the logical
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relationships involved and the architecture of the
"Tractatus". The relation of semantic presupposition can
be introduced only if the Tractarian system is reduced to
the minimal W2 system in which only the requirement of
primitive simple signs is present. This fact shows how
articulate and how consistent are the various parts of the
Tractarian system.
NOTES
1. Here, I am taking the word 'statement' as
synonymous with 'proposition'.
2. A similar interpretation, although lacking any
justification, may be found in Black (1964: 61).
3. As to an expression like ' (x) (x = x) ' , it
contains what has to be eliminated by means of Hintikka's
transformation rules. The problem is solved by recalling
that, in Russell's system, any well-formed formula, say
'A', is equivalent to the conjunction 'A & T', where 'T'
may stand for a tautology in which the identity-sign is
absent. Thus, '(x)(x = x)' may be replaced by its
equivalent '(x)((x = x) & T)'. In turn, the latter may be
replaced by its Tractarian equivalent, namely '(UEx)T. As
a result, all the usual tautologies involving the
identity-sign would be replaced by tautologies in which
this sign would be absent. Although this procedure does
not involve any logical error, it looks rather clumsy.
Hintikka's rules may be supplemented by the
Wittgensteinian rules for dealing with expressions
involving constants. Thus, 'F(a,a)' (Tractarian and
Russellian expression) may be rendered as 'F(a,b) & a=b'
(Russellian expression only); 'F(a,b)' (Tractarian and
Russellian) may be rendered as 'F(a,b) & a*b' (Russellian
only). See Wittgenstein 1922b: 5.531.
4. For example, a proof that (10) entails (11) would
run:
1. (Ex) (Fx & Bx & -(Ex) (Ey) (x*y & (Fx & Fy) ) )
[premise]
2. Fa & Ba & -(Ex)(Ey)(x^y & (Fx & Fy)) [1, EI]
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3 . Fa [2, Simp]
4. Ba [2, Simp]
5 . -(Ex)(Ey)(x*y & (Fx & Fy) [2, Simp]
6 . (x)(y)-(x*y & (Fx & Fy)) [5, Equiv]
7 . (x)(y)(Fx => (Fy => y=x)) [6, Equiv]
8 . Fx => (Fy => y=x) [7, UI]
9. Fa => (Fy => y=a) [8, EI]
10. Fy => y=a [3, 9, MP]
11 . (y)(Fy => y=a) [10, UG]
12 . Fa & Ba & (y)(Fy => y=a) [3, 4, 11 Conj]
13 . (Ex)(Fx & Bx & (y)(Fy => y=a)) [12, EG]
14. (10) => (Ex)(Fx & Bx & (y)(Fy => y=a)) [1-13, CP]
Here, 'EI' and 'EG' stand for 'existential
instantiation' and 'existential generalization'
respectively; 'UI' and 'UG' for 'universal instantiation'
and 'universal generalization' respectively; 'Simp',
'Equiv', 'MP', 'Conj', and CP stand for 'simplification',
'logical equivalence', 'modus ponens', 'conjunction', and
'conditional proof' respectively. That the converse
implication also holds may be proved along the line of a
reductio ad absurdum.
5. Of course, there is also the alternative of
constructing another system, say W3, by eliminating both
the Theory of Descriptions and the principle of bivalence
from the "Tractatus". This would involve the acceptance of
truth-valueless statements within the new system and
obviously reinforce the possibility of appealing to a
relation of semantic presupposition in order to explain
the referential role of definite descriptions in subject-
position. But this case would be less interesting than the
ones I am considering here.




AND SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS GENERATED
BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
I - PRELIMINARY REMARKS
In the analysis of the Tractarian solution to
the problem of semantic presuppositions of definite
descriptions in subject-position, our research question
was formulated in a way such that it might obtain an
adequate answer from the Wittgensteinian view. But the
"Investigations" drastically alters the conceptual
framework of the "Tractatus". This raises the problem of
checking whether our research question is still adequate
as regards the new Wittgensteinian approach. Another
problem is raised by the fact that the later Wittgenstein
does not offer any clear hint about the semantic features
involved in our question. Thus, in order to get as close
as possible to the later Wittgenstein's account of the
referring role of definite descriptions in subject-
position, I shall do as follows in the current chapter.
First, I shall discuss the question as formulated in
chapter 1 in connexion with the conceptual framework of
the "Investigations". Second, I shall formulate an
alternative specific pragmatic question about the
referring use of definite descriptions in subject-position
concerning the particular language-game of reporting an
event and argue that the answer to such a question will be
the closest I can get to an adequate answer to the problem
of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position as formulated in chapter
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1. Third, although drawing inspiration from the
development of the Russe11/Strawson controversy and mainly
from Donnellan's "Reference and Definite Descriptions"
(1966) and Kripke's "Speaker's Reference and Semantic
Reference" (1979), I shall restrict the discussion to the
language-game of reporting an event and consider all the
possible cases concerning the referring use of definite
descriptions in this particular language-game. This will
lead to a distinction between the coincidental and the
non-coincidental referring use of definite descriptions in
the language-game considered. Fourth, I shall attempt to
make explicit what may be called an account, in the spirit
of the "Investigations", of the coincidental referring use
of definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting
an event. Fifth, I shall also attempt to make explicit
what may be called an account, in the spirit of the
"Investigations", of the non-coincidental referring use of
definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting an
event. Sixth and finally, I shall analyze further the
referential mechanism involved and shall try to extract
the lessons we may learn from the whole analysis of the
language-game of reporting an event with respect to the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position. I shall argue that not
only the account made explicit is very likely the later
Wittgenstein's account of the referential role of definite
descriptions in the particular language-game of reporting
an event, but also that the account only allows a very
restricted generalization for certain analogous language-
games. In addition, the later Wittgenstein's view of
language allows some language-games in which certain
relationships that are analogous to the one of semantic
presupposition would hold for some expressions.
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II - THE QUESTION ABOUT SEMANTIC PRESUPPOSITIONS
GENERATED BY DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
IN SUBJECT-POSITION AND THE NEW
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS"
It is a well-known fact that the
"Investigations" tries to explain the meaning of our words
in a radically new way. The later Wittgenstein's basic
view is that the meaning of a word is its use in language
(1953 I: 30; 43; 120; 138; 197; 247; 454; 532; 556-7; 561;
II: 147; 175-6; 190; 220). But the principle is to be
taken as chiefly programmatic. And Wittgenstein's programm
seems to be an attempt to replace the traditional
essentialist question 'what is ( ) ' by the alternative
one 'how is the word ( ) used?', where the blanks are to
be filled by the usual philosophical concepts, such as
'truth', 'substance', 'beauty' and so on. Of course, if
the attempt is successful, the philosophical search for
the 'essence' would be nothing but the search for a
phantom. The philosophical puzzles would have been created
by deviating our words from their ordinary use. And the
correct method in philosophy would be to bring the
philosophical words back to their ordinary use.
But this raises a twofold difficulty in the task
of finding out the later Wittgenstein's answer to the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position.
On the one hand, the question we are pursuing
has been formulated in semantic terms in Chapter 1. The
question fitted the analysis of the Tractarian system
because the early Wittgenstein's main concern was to make
explicit the transcendental semantics which underlies any
descriptive language. But the later Wittgenstein's main
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concern is the use of our words, and this points towards
pragmatic considerations. Thus, we must check whether or
not the question we are pursuing can be formulated, or has
an equivalent pragmatic alternative, within the new
philosophical framework of the "Investigations". A
negative result might mean that the "Investigations"
alters so radically the philosophical framework of the
"Tractatus" that the question I am pursuing here turns out
to be empty. But suppose it is possible to formulate,
within the framework of the "Investigations", a question
which is analogous to the one I am pursuing. It seems
clear that the application of the later Wittgenstein's
programmatic principle yields the fact that a semantic
feature (meaning) is explained by a pragmatic one (use).
Thus, as far as the problem of semantic presuppositions of
statements containing definite descriptions in subject-
position is concerned, it also seems clear that the same
mechanism, that is, a semantic feature (presupposition —
if any) is to be explained by a pragmatic one (use). But
this procedure would take us to the borderline between
semantics and pragmatics, and the risk of blurring
concepts in this unstable domain is great.
On the other hand, although the above procedure
of explaining a semantic feature by a pragmatic one would
be in the spirit of the "Investigations", the fact is that
the later Wittgenstein does not deal explicitly with such
a problem. Therefore, if there is any Wittgensteinian
account of the semantic presuppositions of statements
containing definite descriptions in subject-position in
the philosophy expounded by the "Investigations", the
account has to be inferred from the text. But this means
the danger of either misinterpreting or extrapolating the
later philosophy. Thus, we shall have to be extremely
careful in order to avoid any of these dangers.
Keeping the above considerations in mind,
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consider our question as formulated in chapter 1: 'does
the assertion made by means of a definite description in
the subject-position of a declarative sentence yield a
statement which semantically presupposes the existence and
uniqueness of the object to which the description
refers?'. If we follow the spirit of the "Investigations",
it seems we should not ask this. The above question should
be replaced by one concerning the uses of the words
involved. For example, we should ask about the uses of the
expressions 'assertion', 'definite description',
'declarative sentence', 'statement', 'semantically
presupposes', 'existence', 'uniqueness', 'object', and
'refers' . In doing so, we should obtain a perspicuous view
of the functioning of language in the domain considered
and would be able to solve — or dissolve — the problem.
Let us check the validity of such a procedure as regards
our question by examining some of these cases.
For example, consider the use of the expression
'definite description'. Although Wittgenstein does not
deal explicitly with this problem, I think it is possible
to undertake the task in the spirit of his later
philosophy. In the first place, it is worth noticing that
a 'definite description' is a kind of 'description', and
Wittgenstein thinks the latter word has multifarious uses:
"What we call 'descriptions' are instruments for
particular uses. Think of a machine drawing, a
cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which
an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description
as a word-picture of the facts has something
misleading about it: one tends to think only of such
pictures as hang on our wall: which seem simply to
portray how a thing looks, what it is like. (These
pictures are as it were idle.)" (1953 I: 291).
As a result, one may conclude that the word 'description'
expresses a family resemblance concept in the
"Investigations". As such, the word in fact has many uses,
but this does not mean that the various things we call
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descriptions have a basic feature which is shared by them
all. There is not an "essence" of description, let alone
in the Tractarian sense of the 'essence of the world'.
As to definite descriptions, they constitute a
sub-domain of the things we usually call 'descriptions' in
ordinary language. They have no privileged status at all.
But they also have multifarious uses. For example, we may
have definite descriptions of: i) real persons (e.g. 'the
president of the United States'); ii) physical facts (e.g.
'the Doppler effect'); iii) historical facts (e.g. 'the
Second World War'); iv) physical objects (e.g. 'the
table'); v) animals (e.g. 'the tiger'); vi) kinds of stuff
(e.g. 'the water'); vii) fictitious persons (e.g. 'the
King of France'); viii) fictitious facts (e.g. 'the death
of the King of France'); ix) psychological states (e.g.
'the pain John had yesterday'); x) historical characters
(e.g. 'the pupil of Plato'); xi) idealised persons (e.g.
'the Prime Minister Britain needs'); and so on. Of course,
these descriptions may be used in different language-games
with quite different purposes. As a result, the criteria
for using such a diversified set of expressions must also
be diversified. This fact suggests that, in Wittgenstein's
later philosophy, definite descriptions in subject-
position may be used in many different ways and are not
necessarily connected with yielding statements that have
semantic presuppositions. In reality, the later
Wittgenstein seems to point towards a family resemblance
view of definite descriptions.
Now consider, as another example, the analysis
of the use of the word 'presupposition' in the later
philosophy. Although the word in question occurs many
times in the later Wittgenstein1, he does not make an
extensive analysis of its use. As a matter of fact, there
is only one passage in the "Investigations" in which he
discusses the use of the word 'presupposition' :
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"Should we ever really express ourselves like
this: "Naturally I am presupposing that "? — Or
do we not do so only because the other person already
knows that?
Doesn't a presupposition imply a doubt? And
doubt may be entirely lacking. Doubting has an end."
(1953 II: 180; italics mine).
This is almost everything the "Investigations" says about
the use of the word 'presupposition' and its cognates in
ordinary language. But the above passage clearly indicates
that the word has a use basically as a means to suggest,
or imply, that the speaker has made an unjustified
assumption. The suggestion introduces some doubt about the
speaker's discourse and serves as a means of rejecting the
grounds for his argumentation. But of course the
assumption may be understood either as a supposition, e.g.
a premise involved by the argument, or as a prerequisite
of the premise or the argument itself. In each case the
logical relationship is different, and the word
'presupposition' may only be used by analogy.
If this is true, then Wittgenstein's later
philosophy may be taken as suggesting a family resemblance
view of presupposition'. I would suggest that this happens
in the following way. The word and its cognates may at
first be applied to a certain set of cases of a
determinate kind. But as we notice analogies between these
cases and others, we also apply the word to the new cases,
thus "extending" the concept. If the "extension" is
repeated a certain number of times, we obtain a complex
network of simi1ilarities which overlap and criss-cross.
This would characterize a family resemblance concept.
Therefore, there would obviously be no point in searching
for a common characteristic belonging to all cases of
presupposition.
According to Cooper, the family resemblance view
gives an adequate picture of the ordinary use of the word
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and its cognates (1974: 25). But the view in question also
suggests that we should greatly mistrust the technical use
of the word. As a matter of fact, Cooper claims that the
view forbids treating presupposition as a useful
theoretical concept to be employed within a theory of
language (id.). I would agree with this, for the technical
use postulates the existence of a mythological "common
characteristic" which is to be shared by all, or at least
most, cases of presupposition.
What is more, if the task of the Wittgensteinian
philosophy is to bring words back from their metaphysical
to their ordinary use (1953 I: 115), then the technical
use of 'presupposition' and its cognates, the use that
leads to philosophical problems, is clearly a misleading
deviation from ordinary language. Bringing 'presupposes'
and its cognates back to their ordinary use frees the fly
from the fly-bottle in this particular case.
As a result, we may say that the later
Wittgenstein would reject the relation of semantic
presupposition as a general explanation of the referential
mechanism involved by definite descriptions in subject-
position. But the questions about the uses of expressions
like 'definite description' and 'presupposition', although
they lead to the above family resemblance views, they do
not yield a complete answer to the problem I am pursuing.
In fact, the obtaining of a network of inter-related uses
is only a generic answer to my question. It is true that
the family resemblance view concerns all the possible uses
of the expressions 'definite description' and
'presupposition' as well as the possible connexions
between such uses. But one may ask whether the later
Wittgenstein would admit that there is at least one
specific use of definite descriptions in subject-position
that would generate semantic presuppositions. In other
words, the network of overlapping and criss-crossing
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similarities that characterizes the family resemblance
concept 'presupposition' might be such that it would allow
the existence of at least one case involving semantic
presuppositions. Although in a very limited number; there
are language-games in ordinary language in which we do use
assertorically definite descriptions in subject-position
in order to refer to things in the world. Thus, one may
specifically ask whether there is a particular language-
game involving both the referring use of definite
descriptions in the subject-position of declarative
sentences and the relation of semantic presupposition as
expressed by the general concept. True, giving an answer
to such a specific question would require an analysis
which would be restricted to a particular language-game.
Besides, the application of the results of the restricted
analysis would be very limited. Even so, this would be the
only way to obtain something which is closer to a complete
answer to the problem I am pursuing.
The analysis of a particular language-game
coheres with Wittgenstein's basic motivation in the
"Investigations": to concentrate on particular cases in
order to avoid the philosophical phantom of the "common
characteristic". Besides, the unveiling of the existence
of semantic presuppositions in the particular case of a
language-game involving statements containing definite
descriptions in subject-position might be consistent with
the above mentioned family resemblance view of
presupposition. Thus, although the later Wittgenstein
would not make the broader claim that in every language-
game involving definite descriptions in subject-position
there are semantic presuppositions, he might allow the
narrower claim that there is at least one language-game in
which definite descriptions are assertorically used in the
subject-position of declarative sentences and yield
statements which have semantic presuppositions. The
semantic presuppositions of statements containing definite
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descriptions in subject-position might constitute one of
the contributing features within the network of criss¬
crossing and overlapping similarities belonging to the
family resemblance account of presupposition in our
language.
As a result, our concern is not void within the
framework of the later philosophy. Rather, it has to be
given a precise location inside that framework. This may
be done in the following way. It is a well known fact that
the "Investigations" analyzes the multifarious language-
games as domains of language which are somehow independent
of each other. Among them, we might find a very limited
number which would involve definite descriptions in
subject-position in a way such that the referential role
of the descriptions may be essential for successfully
playing these games. There are no criteria to find all
these language-games in the broader domain of our
language, and the analysis of only one of them does not
allow the application of the results to the others. But
the consideration of a particular language-game might
provide some hints which would allow at least a reasonable
conjecture concerning the later Wittgenstein's main
tendency in the analysis of some kinds of referring use of
descriptions.
Of course, we would hardly find in the
"Investigations" an analysis of a language-game in which
the referring use is the issue. The later Wittgenstein's
concern was rather to dissolve some of the philosophical
puzzles involving the so-called referential function. But
this does not mean that the consideration of the
referential role of definite descriptions in a specific
language-game would be unimportant in all possible cases.
As a matter of fact, in some cases the consideration might
throw some light in the mechanisms involved by the
specific language-game. What is more, the later
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Wittgenstein himself imagined some language-games in which
referring is the most important part. Consider for example
both the primitive language between a builder A and his
assistant B and the later expansion of such a language
(Wittgenstein 1953: 2; 15). A asks for a specific
building-stone and B brings it. Of course, the words
'block', 'pillar', 'slab' and 'beam' in this primitive
language have a referring use. True, the status of a call
like 'block!' in this primitive language is very difficult
to determine: is it a mere word or a complete sentence?
(Wittgenstein 1953: 19). Even so, each sentence/word
refers to a specific type of building-stone and the
successful reference by means of the word is a condition
of possibility for playing the language-game. In addition,
an interesting case of referential failure in the expanded
language (15) is analyzed (Wittgenstein 1953: 41). True,
(2) was imagined by Wittgenstein in order to illustrate
how simplistic can be the Augustinian model of language by
exaggerating the importance of the so-called referential
function of the words. But this does not mean that the
limited consideration of particular referring mechanisms
in some language-games is to be definitely excluded from
our investigations. There remains the fact that the
consideration of the referring use of definite
descriptions in subject-position may be an essential
prerequisite in the analysis of a certain language-game.
The above considerations also reveal that the
application of the Wittgensteinian programmatic principle,
although it belongs to a pragmatic framework, may
sometimes include questions which are closely related to
problems in the domain of semantics. As already mentioned,
Wittgenstein's purpose in constructing (2) was to
illustrate the fact that referring, although it is an
essential part in certain language-games, is not adequate
for explaining the functioning of all our language. But
his very line of argumentation allows us to infer that
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referring may be an essential part of some language-games.
Consequently, in order to obtain something
closer to a complete answer to the question I am pursuing,
the general question about the use of our words has to be
replaced by another, more specific, question concerning
the referring use of definite descriptions in subject-
position in a certain language-game.
The main conclusion from the above
considerations is that the question about semantic
presuppositions of definite-descriptions in subject-
position as formulated in chapter 1 is misplaced in the
"Investigations" conceptual framework. Even so,
Wittgenstein's later philosophy is consistent with, and
sometimes may even require, the consideration of the
referring use in a particular language-game. Now if the
language-game is such that it involves the referring use
of definite descriptions in subject-position, then the
analysis of the language-game will provide the necessary
information for deciding whether or not the statements
yielded semantically presuppose the existence and
uniqueness of the objects to which the descriptions refer.
Although the result of the analysis will be limited, it
may give us some hints concerning the later Wittgenstein's
tendency in the analysis of some language-games involving
the referring use of definite descriptions in subject-
position. Thus, although appealing to a different
question, the analysis of the referring use in a specific
language-game shares some common characteristics with the
semantic analysis which we are developing so far. We may
now pass on to the next section, in which I shall try to
formulate and analyze a pragmatic question such that it
is: i) closely related to the semantic question I am
pursuing in my work; ii) consistent with the framework of
the philosophy expounded in the "Investigations".
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Ill - FORMULATION AND ANALYSIS OF A PRAGMATIC
QUESTION IN THE SPIRIT OF THE "INVESTIGATIONS"
AND CLOSELY RELATED TO OUR SEMANTIC PROBLEM
It is a well-known fact that Strawson succeeds
in obtaining a concept of semantic presupposition by means
of a pragmatic question concerning the 'referring use'.
So, our problem is now to find a way of formulating, in
the later Wittgensteinian framework, a specific pragmatic
question concerning a particular language-game in a way
such that the question is related to the problem of
semantic presuppositions of statements containing definite
descriptions in subject-position. In doing so, we will be
able to check whether or not the "Investigations" involves
any account of a particular language-game which would
yield results that are similar to Strawson's, although in
a very limited domain. The problem will be solved in two
stages. First, I shall try to formulate adequately, and in
the spirit of the "Investigations", a specific pragmatic
question to which the answer will give us the possible
semantic features concerning a determinate referring use
of definite descriptions in subject-position in a
particular language-game. Second, I shall check whether or
not the pragmatic question thus formulated is consistent
with the philosophy expounded in the "Investigations".
Let us start with the problem of formulating
adequately a specific question in the spirit of the
"Investigations". In order to do this, select the
language-game of reporting an event from the list in
paragraph 23 of the "Investigations". The language-game is
complex and may be played in many different ways. For
example, one may: i) truly and objectively report an event
with the unique purpose of conveying adequate information;
ii) ironically report an event with the purpose of
166
criticizing something; iii) comically report a distorted
event with the purpose of making someone laugh; and so on.
Although all the above cases correspond to adequate ways
of playing the language-game, our analysis will be
restricted to case 'i', for the latter involves a certain
regularity in the referring use of definite descriptions
that may be connected with semantic presuppositions. From
now on, I shall use the expression 'language-game of
reporting an event' as an abbreviation of the way we play
the language-game in case 'i'. Thus, the language-game of
reporting an event will be restricted to the language-game
that is played by at least two persons such that: i) one
of them, call him or her the reporter, knows that
something has happened and sincerely intends to tell to
the other how it truly happened; ii) the other person,
call him or her the hearer, knows that the reporter has a
certain information concerning what happened and sincerely
intends to extract the adequate information from the
reporter. The initial move of the language-game may be
made by means of a question like 'do you know what
happened?'. The question may be asked either by the
reporter or by the hearer. The next move is usually the
reporting of the event. Now an event may sometimes be
described as 'the so-and-so' or may involve someone or
something that may be described by a description of the
form 'the so-and-so'. Thus, playing this particular
language-game may involve the use of declarative sentences
containing definite descriptions in subject-position with
the purpose of conveying information about the objects
referred to by the descriptions. As a result, whenever the
above sentences are involved, the language-game of
reporting an event essentially depends on the referential
role of definite descriptions in order to be played
adequately.
Now suppose the general question about the use
of the expression 'definite description' we have analyzed
167
in the spirit of the "Investigations" is replaced by the
following more specific one: 'how do we use assertorically
definite descriptions in the subject-position of
declarative sentences in the language-game of reporting an
event?'. Of course, the two questions are not equivalent.
For the former is concerned with all the possible ways we
may use the expression 'definite description' in all kinds
of sentences in ordinary English, whereas the latter is
specifically concerned with the way definite descriptions
refer when used assertorically in subject-position of
declarative sentences in the language-game of reporting an
event. The latter question is more specific than the
former and leads us directly to our main subject. As
already mentioned, if we appeal to the former question
concerning the general use of the expression 'definite
description' in our language, we would not obtain a
complete answer to our problem.
But the above question is still too general. It
may be improved in order to become more specific. For
example, we may ask: 'in the language-game of reporting an
event, do we use assertorically definite descriptions in
the subject-position of declarative sentences in order to
refer to objects in the world in a way such that we may
say that the statements yielded semantically presuppose
the existence and uniqueness of the objects referred to by
the descriptions?' Here, the broader question concerning
the referring use of definite descriptions is replaced by
the narrower question concerning semantic presuppositions
yielded by the referring use of definite descriptions in
the language-game of reporting an event.
But we can make the question still closer to the
spirit of the "Investigations". Given that both in
ordinary English and the language-game of reporting an
event the logical relation of semantic presupposition with
which we are concerned involves specific uses of the words
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'statement', 'true' and 'false', we may now ask: 'in the
language-game of reporting an event, do we use the words
'statement', 'true' and 'false' in a way such that a
statement containing a definite description in subject-
position semantically presupposes another statement about
the existence and uniqueness of the object referred to by
the description?' Here, we nearly have a Wittgensteinian
question about specific uses of words in the language-game
concerned. Now if we take into consideration the fact that
in the problem we are considering in this work the use of
definite descriptions in subject-position is connected to,
and is interchangeable with, a specific use of the words
'statement', 'true' and 'false', the above question may
become more specifically Wittgensteinian. As a matter of
fact, in order to avoid the technical term 'semantic
presupposition' in our question, we may define such a
relationship by means of the words 'true' and 'false',
thus obtaining an authentic question in the spirit of the
"Investigations".
Initially, let us define a specific use of the
above words which is involved by my semantic concern as
defined in chapter 1.-Suppose 'P' stands for a declarative
sentence in the language-game of reporting an event.
Roughly, I believe we may say we use the word 'statement'
in the language-game in a way such that whenever we
assertorically use 'P' in order to convey information we
obtain a statement"; we use the words 'true' and
'statement' in a way such that the statement that P is the
case is true if and only if P is in fact the case; and we
use the words 'false' and 'statement' in the language-game
in a way such that the statement that P is the case is
false if and only if P is not the case". There are many
other uses of the words 'statement', 'true' and 'false' in
ordinary English, but I am only concerned with this
particular one, because the others may be excluded from
the language-game of reporting an event as described
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ear1ier.
We may now advance the more specific pragmatic
question concerning the use of the words 'statement',
'true' and 'false' in connexion with a possible logical
relation of semantic presupposition in the language-game.
The question may be formulated as follows: do we use the
words 'the', 'statement', 'true' and 'false' in the
language-game of reporting an event in a way such that the
assertoric use of a declarative sentence containing a
definite description in subject-position yields: i) a true
or false statement depending on the adequacy of the
predicate to the object referred to by the description
only if another statement about the existence and
uniqueness of the object described is true; ii) an
utterance which is discarded as an incorrect move only if
the statement about the existence and uniqueness of the
object referred to by the description is false? This is
the specific pragmatic question of which the answer
involves the consideration of aspects that are closely
related to semantic ones. It is worth noticing that a
positive answer to the above question would involve a
relation of semantic presupposition which would be an
instance of the general concept. As a matter of fact, the
features belonging to part 'i' of the above definition
comply with the corresponding features of the general
concept; as for the feature belonging to part 'ii' of the
definition, we may say that if the utterance is discarded
as an incorrect move, then it is truth-valueless and thus
also complies with the corresponding feature of the
general concept. Since the relation expressed by the above
definition is related to the language-game of reporting an
event, call it the relation of semantic E-presupposition.
In this particular case, the utterance which is discarded
as an incorrect move has a sense even though its semantic
E-presupposition is false. What is more, the sense of the
semantically E-presupposing sentence does not include the
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sense of the semantically E-presupposed sentence.
Let us pass to the second stage in the solution
of our problem of formulating, in the terms of
Wittgenstein's later philosophy, an adequate pragmatic
question in order to get an answer to our semantic
enquiry. I shall now check whether or not the specific
pragmatic question above formulated is consistent with the
philosophy expounded in the "Investigations". So far, it
has been shown that the analysis of the words 'true',
•false' and 'statement' concerning the referring use of
definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting an
event provides an answer, although restricted, to our
question as formulated in chapter 1.
Now I believe that, as far as Wittgenstein's
later philosophy is concerned, the specific pragmatic
question here formulated is consistent with the
"Investigations". For we are considering a particular
language-game in which we do use assertorically definite
descriptions in subject-position in order to refer to
things in the world; the adequate referring use of
descriptions is a prerequisite for being successful in the
language-game. In fact, the analysis of this particular
case of referring use of definite descriptions in subject-
position is required in order to reach a perspicuous view
of the language-game of reporting an event. What is more,
in the spirit of the "Investigations", the analysis of
this particular language-game will only yield a restricted
answer to our semantic problem. The phantom of the "common
characteristic" will be avoided. Even so, our analysis
lies at the point where the semantic considerations
belonging to the traditional philosophy get in touch with
the pragmatic considerations proposed by the new
conceptual framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy.
Now consider the framework involved by the
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specific pragmatic question. Although the question is
formulated in a more restricted way, it is connected with
Strawson's general analysis of the 'referring use' of
definite descriptions in his famous 1950 paper "On
Referring" and the controversy that followed. The
Strawsonian expression is worth noticing. On the one hand,
it is the analysis of the referring use, and this stresses
the Strawsonian concern with a semantic feature, that is,
the referential role of definite descriptions. On the
other hand, it is the analysis of the referring use, and
this stresses the Strawsonian concern with a pragmatic
feature, that is, the way we use definite descriptions in
ordinary language. As a result, we may say that the
Strawsonian question about the referring use requires a
kind of answer that will explain a semantic feature by
means of a pragmatic one. This is completely different
from the Fregean purely semantic question, in which a
semantic feature is explained by another semantic one.
Thus, the Fregean question has not an adequate place in
the current analysis.
By contrast, Strawson's concern is somehow
closer to my concern as formulated in the spirit of the
"Investigations". True, Strawson's account might be
accused of being far too general by the philosophy of the
"Investigations". Even so, Strawson claims that we do use
assertorically definite descriptions in the subject-
position of declarative sentences in order to refer to
objects in the world in a way such that we may say the
statements yielded semantically presuppose the existence
and uniqueness of the objects referred to by the
descriptions. Thus, if conveniently restricted to the
language-game of reporting an event, Strawson's general
account of the referring use of definite descriptions in
subject-position would provide an adequate answer to our
specific pragmatic question involving this particular
language-game. But whether or not the later Wittgenstein
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would agree with Strawson's answer in this particular case
remains to be seen.
The comparison with Strawson's account may be
taken further. In fact, the detailed formulation of our
question concerning the language-game of reporting an
event involves a specific referring use of expressions of
a certain kind, that is, definite descriptions, which is
closely related to another specific use of the words
'statement', 'true' and 'false'. Now Strawson's account
originates from an analogous, although more general,
concern. Therefore, both our specific pragmatic question
and Strawson's general question about the referring use
seem to have something in common.
As a result, the framework originated by the
Strawsonian question is connected with the framework
originated by our pragmatic question. Thus, the
consideration of the general framework originated by
Strawson's question will be useful for finding the
particular framework with which we are interested. In
addition, it seems clear that Strawson's question and its
corresponding framework apply to the language-game of
reporting an event.
We already know that the Strawsonian general
question about the referring use is situated at the
borderline which separates the domain of semantics from
the one of pragmatics. As a matter of fact, Strawson seems
to be indeterminate as between a semantic characterisation
of presupposition and a pragmatic one in "On Referring"
(see Kempson 1975: 49-50). It is no wonder that Sellars'
paper "Mr. Strawson On Referring" (1954) takes Strawson's
account as being pragmatic. Thus, the Strawsonian analysis
in "On Referring" was somehow incomplete, and this is
illustrated by the qualifications he was forced to make in
his original account in order to reply to Sellars (see
173
Strawson 1954: 225-7). The evolution of the controversy-
inaugurated by Strawson leads us directly to Donnellan's
analysis of the referential use of definite descriptions
in subject-position in his famous paper "Reference and
Definite Descriptions" (1966). Here, Donnellan seems to
make an exhaustive analysis of all the alternatives
involved in the referring use of definite descriptions in
subject-position. But Donnellan's framework was later
complemented by some important qualifications made by
Kripke. This means that the analysis of all the possible
alternatives concerning the referring use of definite
descriptions seems to involve the appeal to the Kripkean
notions of semantic referent and speaker's referent
(Kripke 1979: 13-4).
According to Kripke, the semantic referent is
given by the speaker's general intention to refer to a
certain object, whereas the speaker's referent is given by
the speaker's specific intention to refer to a certain
object (Kripke 1979: 14-5). Kripke claims that these
notions are general and applicable to all languages (1979:
21) .
In addition, although Donnellan distinguishes
between the attributive and the referential use of
definite descriptions, Kripke argues that the former is
rather a referential use in which the semantic referent of
the expression and the speaker's referent are the same.
Kripke calls this the simple case (1979: 15). As to
Donnellan's referential use, it corresponds to Kripke's
complex case in which the semantic referent may coincide
or not with the speaker's referent (id.). In this respect,
the appeal to the Kripkean notions seems to be the best we
can get in the analysis of the referential mechanisms of
definite descriptions so far.
Although the later Wittgenstein would hardly
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make so many universal claims as Kripke does, it seems
reasonable to assume that he might make a good use of the
Kripkean notions in the restricted analysis of the
referential mechanism of definite descriptions in the
language-game of reporting an event. The reasons in favour
of assuming the Kripkean notions in our restricted
analysis are as follows. First, at least as far as the
restricted version of the language-game of reporting an
event is concerned, Wittgenstein's interest in the
referential mechanisms involved by definite descriptions
would be analogous to Kripke's. Second, the language-game
of reporting an event is such that the reporter may
mistakenly use a definite description. Now this is a
situation in which the distinction between the semantic
referent of a definite description and the reporter's
referent is important. Third, there seems to be nothing in
the philosophy expounded by the "Investigations" that
would oppose the appeal to the Kripkean notions in the
analysis of the way definite descriptions refer in the
restricted version of the language-game of reporting an
event. Thus, the appeal to the Kripkean notions seems not
only to cohere with our specific pragmatic question but
also to provide a useful framework for the restricted
analysis. But it is worth noticing that, although the
notions are useful tools for understanding some of the
referential mechanisms involved, neither the reporter nor
the hearer have these notions before their minds when they
are effectively playing the language-game. What is more,
the Kripkean notions do not apply properly to other
versions of the language-game of reporting an event, such
as, for example, the ones expressed by the above cases
'ii' and 'iii ' . The application of these notions is very
limited and they would not allow making generalizations
without more ado.
If the appeal to the Kripkean notions is
correct, then we have obtained an important criterion for
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evaluating the answers to the above question. Although the
question is formulated in pragmatic terms, a favourable
answer concerning the logical relation of semantic
presupposition in the language-game of reporting an event
will have to depend solely on considerations about the
semantic referents of the expressions involved. In other
words, the answer has to be decided by means of
considerations involving exclusively the semantic
referents of the definite descriptions in subject-
position. The speaker's referents cannot affect the
explanation of the referential mechanism of the
descriptions. For if pragmatic considerations are
involved, the presuppositional relation — if any —
cannot be characterized as purely 'semantic'. And we shall
not be facing a semantic concept, but something different.
Now consider the general framework of Strawson's
question as made explicit by Donnellan's analysis and
Kripke's. According to the framework, every statement is
made by means of a sentence containing a description in
subject-position and a predicate which is attributed to
the description. From the standpoint of the predicate, the
statement will be true or false depending on whether the
description succeeds in referring to something. From the
standpoint of the description, an exhaustive application
of the Kripkean analysis reveals that its referring use
will involve the following cases: i) the semantic referent
of the description coincides with the speaker's referent,
thus originating two sub-cases: ia) the semantic referent
and the speaker's referent correspond to an object in the
world; ij,) the semantic referent and the speaker's referent
are both empty; ii) the semantic referent of the
description does not coincide with the speaker's referent,
thus originating three sub-cases: ii ) the semantic
referent and the speaker's referent correspond to
different objects in the world; ii^) the semantic referent
is empty, whereas the speaker's referent corresponds to an
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object in the world; iic) the semantic referent corresponds
to an object in the world, whereas the speaker's referent
is empty. Since the above classification is based upon the
coincidence or not between the semantic and the speaker's
referent, I shall call case ' i' and its sub-cases the
coincidental referring use of the definite descriptions in
subject-position; case 'ii' and its sub-cases will be the
non-coincidental referring use of the descriptions.
Given that the general framework originated by
the controversy around Strawson's question ultimately
involves the analysis of the above two cases and their
corresponding sub-cases, the restricted question
concerning the referring use of definite descriptions in
subject-position in the language-game of reporting an
event will also ultimately involve the analysis of the
same cases and sub-cases. As already mentioned, the
language-game of reporting an event involves situations
that are better explained by the appeal to the distinction
between the reporter's referent and the description's
semantic referent.
The above considerations reveal that the somehow
hybrid question about the referring use of definite
descriptions in subject-position in the language-game of
reporting an event is the closest we can get to the
semantic question about the semantic presuppositions of
definite descriptions in subject-position as formulated in
chapter 1. The considerations also reveal that sometimes,
that is, in the analysis of a specific language-game, the
question about the referring use of definite descriptions
in subject-position, although not explicitly asked by the
later Wittgenstein, may be taken as relevant in the
"Investigations". In addition, the discussion in this
section reveals that the newly formulated pragmatic
question is entirely consistent with the philosophy
expounded in the "Investigations". We may now pass on to
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the next section, in which I shall start the analysis of
the five different sub-cases of referring use in the
spirit of the "Investigations".
IV - ANALYSIS OF THE COINCIDENTAL REFERRING USE
OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
IN THE LANGUAGE-GAME OF REPORTING AN EVENT
Once the pragmatic question is formulated and
its framework is made explicit in consistency with the
philosophy expounded by the "Investigations", I shall
start the analysis by initially trying to make explicit
what would be the later Wittgenstein's analysis of the
occurrence, in the language-game of reporting an event, of
the coincidental referring use of a definite description
in subject-position. As already mentioned, in the
coincidental referring use the semantic referent of the
definite description in subject-position and the speaker's
referent are the same. But there are two sub-cases to be
considered.
First, consider sub-case 'i ' . Suppose the
language-game of reporting an event involves a context
such that both the reporter and the hearer may identify an
object as the reporter's referent. For example, both the
reporter and the hearer are talking about Mr. Bush; the
reporter is telling the hearer what happened to Mr. Bush
and the hearer is familiar with the circumstances in a way
such that he is able to pick out Mr. Bush as the man to
whom the reporter is referring. Suppose the reporter uses
the true description 'the President of USA' in order to
refer to Mr. Bush. In the current sub-case, the language-
game is such that the speaker's referent is a man
identifiable by means of the context and the semantic
referent of the description coincides with that man. This
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might be called a completely successful referring use of
the definite description in subject-position. Although the
analysis is restricted to the language-game of reporting
an eventj this coincides with Donnellan's alleged
attributive use which is actually Kripke's simple case
(1979: 15). In this sub-case, the language-game would be
such that the statement about the existence and uniqueness
of the semantic referent is true, for both the semantic
referent of the description and the speaker's referent
correspond to an authentic object in the world. And we
shall have either a true or a false statement, depending
on whether or not the predicate fits the object referred
to by the description.
We may now ask the specific pragmatic question
as formulated in the previous section in order to find out
whether or not a statement made with 'the President of USA
is flying to Japan' in the language-game of reporting an
event semantically E-presupposes that there is exactly one
president of USA. Given that the current case involves
only referential success, we may leave part ' ii' of the
pragmatic question aside and only consider part 'i': do we
use the words 'statement', 'true' and 'false' in the
language-game of reporting something that happened with
the president of USA in a way such that the assertoric use
of a declarative sentence containing the description 'the
President of USA' in subject-position yields a true or
false statement depending on the adequacy of the predicate
to the man referred to by the description only if another
statement about the existence and uniqueness of the man
described is true? In this case, the requirement of
existence and uniqueness of the man referred to by the
description is satisfied and a statement like 'the
President of USA is flying to Japan' will be true or false
depending on whether the predicate 'is flying to Japan'
fits or not the man in question. All the above features
may be obtained even though we abstract from the speaker's
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referent. So far, so good, as long as the semantic E-
presupposition is concerned.
But the above features are valid both for the
presuppositional account and Russell's. In fact, both
Strawson and Russell would claim that if the statement (or
proposition) made with 'the President of USA is flying to
Japan' is true, then the statement (or proposition) that
there is exactly one President of USA is also true.
As a result, the analysis of sub-case 'ia' is
insufficient for obtaining an adequate answer to the
pragmatic question as formulated in the previous section.
We shall have to analyze the remaining cases in order to
get the desired answer.
Second, consider sub-case 'i^'. Here, the
language-game of reporting an event may be such that the
semantic referent of the description and the speaker's
referent coincide in both being empty. This might be
called the completely unsuccessful referring use of the
definite description in subject-position. Suppose the
speaker is reporting an event and appeals to a definite
description in a way such that the requirement of
existence and uniqueness of the object to which the
description refers is not fulfilled. In addition, suppose
there is no person or object such that the hearer might
spot as that to which the speaker is trying, although
mistakenly, to refer. Under these circumstances, suppose
the speaker's report requires uttering the sentence
(1) 'The King of USA is flying to Japan'.
From the discussion of sub-case 'ia' , it is clear that (1)
may be taken as a meaningful sentence even though the
United States is not a monarchy. This fact immediately
raises the question: does (1) semantically E-presuppose
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(2) 'There is one and only one King of USA'?
As it can be inferred from the analysis of sub¬
case ' i ', if the reporter sincerely utters (1) and it is
true that the United States is a monarchy governed by King
Bush II, then the hearer will agree or not with what has
been said depending on whether or not King Bush II is
flying to Japan. By contrast, sub-case ' i^' is such that if
the reporter sincerely utters (1) and it is not true, as
in fact it is not, that the United States is a monarchy
governed by King Bush II, then the hearer may be aware of
this fact and presume that the reporter is mistaken and
reply in the following way:
(3) 'I am afraid you are mistaken. You are
presupposing that there is a King of the United States,
but this is not the case'.
Although the reply is somehow unusual, it would be a
correct move in the language-game of reporting an event.
Besides, there are other replies which may be equivalent
to (3). But the main point in all of them is that the
circumstances are such that, once (3) or any equivalent
one is uttered, both the hearer and the reporter would
drop sentence (1) as inadequate for the reporter's move in
the language-game. They would try to find out to whom was
the reporter intending to refer a.nd replace the
description in (1) by a more adequate one. But there would
hardly be a debate about the truth-value of (1). For the
language-game of reporting an event does not include the
discussion about the truth-value of a token sentence
uttered in the same circumstances as (1). There are no
explicit rules about the status of (1) in the language-
game, because they are unnecessary. The language-game of
reporting an event is such that the truth-value game can
be played with a sentence like (1) only if the object
referred to by the description in fact exists uniquely.
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Thus, if (2) is false, (1) is simply dropped as irrelevant
for the language-game. Although (1) still has a sense, (1)
becomes an incorrect move in the language-game of
c
reporting an event .
If we now apply part ' ii' of the pragmatic
question to this particular case, the answer seems to be
that the statement yielded in fact semantically E-
presupposes the existence and uniqueness of the object
referred to by the description. This would mean that the
relation of semantic E-presupposition in fact holds in
sub-case 'ib' in the language-game of reporting an event.
But such a favourable answer to the above
question would be valid only if considerations about the
speaker's referent did not affect the decision to leave
(1) aside. Unfortunately, this was not the case. For
although the hearer was able to grasp what the semantic
referent of the description was, he spotted the mistake
because he was not able to identify the reporter's
referent. The decision to leave (1) aside was made with
the help of pragmatic considerations. This is not
surprising. As a matter of fact, it may be inferred from
Kripke's discussion of Donnellan's paper that not only
semantic, but also pragmatic considerations are involved
in the analysis of the referring use of definite
descriptions in subject-position (Kripke 1979: 15-22).
Although such a universal claim is not in the spirit of
the "Investigations", it seems that the claim may be
restricted in order to be applied to the specific case we
are considering. Following this line of argument, we may
infer that (1) was left aside as irrelevant only because
there was no person or object which might be picked out by
the hearer as the speaker's intended referent. In the
analysis of the language-game of reporting an event, this
fact may be overlooked because, despite the importance of
the speaker's referent in the referential mechanism
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involved, we tend to pay attention to it only when it is
different from the semantic referent of the description
and a non-coincidental referring use occurs.
As a result, in the language-game of reporting
an event, the analysis of the completely unsuccessful
referring use when there is no person or object to which
the reporter may be trying, although unsuccessfully, to
refer reveals that (1) does not semantically E-presuppose
(2) .
Thus, the above considerations reveal that what
would be the later Wittgenstein's analysis of the
coincidental referring use of definite descriptions in
subject-position in the language-game of reporting an
event leads to the rejection of the semantic concept of E-
presupposition.
Let us now pass to the analysis of the non-
coincidental referring use and its sub-cases in the
language-game considered.
V - ANALYSIS OF THE NON-COINCIDENTAL REFERRING USE
OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS IN SUBJECT-POSITION
IN THE LANGUAGE-GAME OF REPORTING AN EVENT
Let us now consider case ' ii' . Sometimes, when
reporting an event, the reporter may refer to an object in
the world by means of an inadequate description. Here, the
semantic referent and the reporter's referent, are not the
same. This corresponds to an application of Kripke's
complex case (1979: 15) to the language-game in question
and originates the three sub-cases above mentioned.
First, consider sub-case 'ii.' : the reporting of
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an event might be such that the description used in
subject-position has a semantic referent which is
different from a context-identifiable object that the
hearer picks out as the reporter's referent. Suppose, for
example, that the reporter wants to refer to President
Bush but mistakenly describes him as 'the President of
France' and utters
(4) 'The President of France is drinking champagne'.
Now the context may be such that the hearer is able to
pick out Mr. Bush as the reporter's referent in (4). This
may be called the successful, although incorrect,
referring use of the description in subject-position in
the language-game of reporting an event. In this case, the
hearer's reply might be something like
(5) 'You mean the President of USA is drinking
champagne'.
In this situation, the status of (4) is undetermined in
the language-game. On the one hand, (4) contains a
definite description which has a semantic referent, that
is, Mr. Miterrand. From this point of view, (4) is a
statement which says something true or false about him. On
the other hand, the reporter's intended referent was Mr.
Bush. From this point of view, although (4) would hardly
be called a 'statement', it also says something true or
false about Mr. Bush.
Now according to the presuppositional account
previously defined, the above assertoric use of (4) would
yield a statement that semantically E-presupposes
(6) 'There is exactly one President of France'.
If we ask the specific pragmatic question in this sub-
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case, we shall find out that the answer is: 'only if we
abstract from the context, of use' . For, as long as the
semantic referent of 'the President of France' is
concerned, we may use the words 'statement', 'true' and
'false' in accordance with the logical relation of
semantic E-presupposition. But as long as the reporter's
referent is concerned, we do not use these words in
accordance with such a relation. Thus, we may say that (4)
semantically E-presupposes (6) only if we abstract from
the context of use. Since we are analyzing the referring
use of the description in subject-position, we cannot make
such an abstraction. Otherwise, we would be excluding the
more important aspect in the utterance of (4), that is,
the fact that, although incorrectly, the reporter succeeds
in referring to a context-identifiable object and says
something true or false about it. And this is based on the
assumption made by the hearer — after the utterance of
(4) — that the reporter truly believes that the semantic
referent of the description used is identical with the
reporter's referent. As a result, if the logical relation
of semantic E-presupposition explains only partially the
referential mechanisms involved by the utterance of (4),
we must conclude that the complete analysis of the
referring use in sub-case 'iia' leads to a rejection of the
semantic concept of E-presupposition.
Second, consider sub-case ' i it,' : the language-
game of reporting an event allows a move in which the
reporter appeals to a description which fails to have a
semantic referent; even so, there is a context-
identifiable object that the hearer picks out as the
reporter's referent. Suppose, for example, the reporter
believes the United States to be a monarchy and intends to
refer to Mr. Bush. He then utters
(7) 'The King of USA is drinking champagne'.
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Suppose also that the definite description used in (7),
although it is empty, somehow succeeds in making it clear
for the hearer what the reporter's intended referent is.
We would obtain an effect analogous to the one analyzed in
the previous sub-case. Once again, we might call it a
successful, although incorrect, referring use of the
description in subject-position in the language-game of
reporting an event. What is specific in this sub-case is
that the reporter is saying something either true or false
about the context-identifiable object, that is, Mr. Bush,
although we would hardly say that, in the language-game,
the reporter's use of the description in subject-position
yields what we call a 'statement'.
From the standpoint of the referential, although
improper, success, (7) is usually taken by the hearer as
true or false of the reporter's referent. This means that
the hearer was able to pick out the reporter's intended
referent, although it does not correspond to the semantic
referent of the description used in subject-position. In
this case, the hearer believes that, once the reporter is
informed of his referential mistake, both might replace
the inadequate definite description by a correct one. For
example, the hearer might use (5) ['You mean the President
of USA is drinking champagne'] in reply to the reporter's
utterance of (7). The amended statement will now be true
or false of President Bush.
But from the standpoint of the inadequateness of
the definite description as regards the object to which
the reporter intends to refer, (7) might also be dropped
by the hearer as an incorrect move in the language-game.
This would depend on a decision to be taken by the hearer
in conformity with the circumstances involving the
utterance of (7) by the reporter. But then this would
correspond to the case of completely unsuccessful
referring use of the description which was analyzed in the
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previous section.
Now we may ask the specific pragmatic question
in order to find out whether or not, in the language-game
of reporting an event, (7) semantically E-presupposes
(8) 'There is exactly one King of USA'
in the case we are considering. Once again, the answer
will be: 'only if we abstract from the context of use'.
For the assertoric use of the empty description in the
language-game of reporting an event yields a very peculiar
type of assertion which still succeeds in saying something
true or false of a context-identifiable object. Thus, we
can only say that the assertoric use of (7) yields a
statement that semantically E-presupposes (8) if we
abstract from the context in which (7) is used. Even so,
this claim would be controversial, for Russell would claim
that (7) false, whereas Strawson would claim that it is
truth-valueless. But given that we cannot exclude the
context in the consideration of the referring use, we may
say that the circumstances under which (7) is uttered in
the language-game are such that the hearer may assume that
the reporter truly intends to talk about a determinate
object, although the description used is inadequate and
empty. Thus, we may conclude that the analysis of sub-case
'iijj' in the language-game of reporting an event also leads
to the rejection of the concept of semantic E-
presupposition.
Third and finally, consider sub-case ' ii ' : the
language-game might involve a situation in which the
description used by the reporter has a semantic referent,
but the hearer fails to pick out a context-identifiable
object as the reporter's referent. Suppose, for example,
that the reporter uses the description 'The Socialist
Leader' in order to refer to Mr. Miterrand and that the
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hearer does not know that the President of France is a
socialist leader. The reporter might assert
(9) 'The Socialist Leader is drinking champagne',
but although the hearer would easily understand what is
the semantic reference of the description in (9), the
context might be such that the hearer would be unable to
identify anyone as the reporter's referent. Thus, although
the description used has a semantic referent, the reporter
failed in determining his intended referent and the hearer
could not pick out a context-identifiable object. In order
to proceed with the language-game, the hearer would have
to ask to whom the reporter is referring. But as soon as
both the reporter and the hearer agree that the
description 'The Socialist Leader' refers to Mr.
Miterrand, the problem would be solved and the reporting
of the event would continue. In this case, although an
utterance of (9) may yield a true or false statement about
Mr. Miterrand, such a statement has to wait in a state of
limbo till the reporter's referent is made explicit.
If we now ask whether the statement made with
(9) semantically E-presupposes
(10) 'There is exactly one Socialist Leader',
the answer to such a specific pragmatic question seems to
be that, in the language-game considered, (9) does not
semantically E-presuppose (10), for the decision to admit
(9) as a true or false statement belonging to the
language-game is taken in function of considerations
concerning the reporter's referent. What is more, the
hearer would be provisorily keeping in limbo a statement
with no referential failure. Here, if we abstract from
considerations about context, we will be unable to explain
this awkward situation. This seems to be an interesting
188
counter-example to Strawson's account. As for what would
be the later Wittgenstein's account of the language-game
of reporting an event, we are once again rejecting the
semantic concept of E-presupposition.
Thus, our analysis reveals that what would be,
in the spirit of the later Wittgenstein, a complete
analysis of the non-coincidental referring use of definite
descriptions in the language-game of reporting an event
leads to the rejection of the semantic concept of E-
presupposition.
The outcome of the whole analysis is that in all
five cases considered the semantic concept of E-
presupposition is to be excluded from the explanation of
the referring use of definite descriptions in the
language-game of reporting an event.
But this is not the end of the matter. The next
question would be about the referential mechanisms
effectively involved by the language-game. The answer to
this question will require the consideration of other
aspects of the account of language in the
"Investigations". This shall be done in the next section.
VI - THE REFERENTIAL MECHANISM EFFECTIVELY INVOLVED
BY THE LANGUAGE-GAME OF REPORTING AN EVENT AND
SOME RELATED ASPECTS OF THE ACCOUNT OF LANGUAGE
IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS"
We already know that the philosophy expounded by
the "Investigations" leads to the rejection of the concept
of semantic E-presupposition in the language-game of
reporting an event.
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If this is correct, the next question would be
whether there is any pragmatic presupposition involved by
the language-game. We might appeal to a variant of
pragmatic presupposition, say the concept of pragmatic E-
presupposition, which would be defined as follows: in the
language-game of reporting an event, whenever a speaker
sincerely uses in the referential way a definite
description in subject-position, the hearer assumes that
the speaker truly believes the description has a
reference; if there is a referential failure, the
utterance involved reveals to be an incorrect move and is
dropped both by the speaker and the hearer. It is worth
noticing that the pragmatic E-presupposition is such that
only in the particular circumstances determined by the
language-game considered there occurs a truth-value gap.
It would be misleading to extend the above concepts to a
general explanation of all language-games. What is more,
expressions like 'truth-valueless' and 'truth-value gap'
may give to the words 'true' and 'false' an importance and
comprehensiveness which goes far beyond what ordinary use
allows. The same reasoning would apply to Strawson's
expression 'spurious use' in order to refer to our use of
words in fiction (Strawson 1950: 331): he is giving to the
'referring use' a privileged status which in fact does not
exist in ordinary language.
Now the question is: given that, say, (1) ['The
King of USA is flying to japan'] does not semantically E-
presuppose (2) ['There is exactly one King of USA'], would
it not be the case that the reporter uses the definite
description 'The King of USA' in subject-position in a way
such that he pragmatically E-presupposes the truth of (2)
when he utters (1)? Here, the answer would seem to be
favourable in all the five cases considered. For in all of
them the reporter sincerely utters a declarative sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position in
order to convey information. But there is an interesting
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passage from the "Brown Book" in which Wittgenstein seems
to reject the pragmatic E-presupposition:
"If I had said "When I told him that the train
was leaving at 3.30, believing that it did, nothing
happened than that I just uttered the sentence", and
if someone contradicted me, saying "Surely this
couldn't have been all, as you might 'just say a
sentence' without believing it", — my answer should
be "I didn't wish to say that there was no difference
between speaking, believing what you say, and
speaking, not believing what you say£ but the pair
'be1ieving'/'not believing' refers to various
different cases (differences forming a family), not
to one difference, that between the presence and the
absence of a certain mental state" (1934-6: 152;
italics mine).
As a matter of fact, the concept of pragmatic E-presup¬
position is based on the distinction between the asserted,
namely (1), and the presupposed, namely (2), in a way such
that the reporter simultaneously utters (1) and believes
the truth of (2). But in the above passage Wittgenstein is
suggesting that when the reporter sincerely utters (A), he
would merely be uttering (£.) without having before his
mind any "mental process" of believing that (2) is true.
Thus, the mythological "mental process" of 'believing the
truth of (Z) ' does not accompany the sincere utterance of
($*) . As a result, we may conclude that, in all sub-cases
considered, the referring use of definite descriptions in
the language-game of reporting an event would not involve
the concept of pragmatic E-presupposition either.
Furthermore, given that most of the explanations stemming
from the Pragmatic Theories of Presupposition listed in
chapter 1 would be based on similar assumptions, it seems
that the later Wittgenstein would tend to reject all of
them in the analysis of the referring use of definite
descriptions in the language-game of reporting an event.
Thus, although the
referring use in the language
appeals to the consideration
analysis of all cases of
-game of reporting an event
of pragmatic features, it
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seems to reject not only the concept of pragmatic E-
presupposition, but also most of the variants of the
Pragmatic Theories of Presupposition.
If we take the analysis further, we may say
that, in conformity with the philosophy expounded by the
"Investigations", the Theory of Descriptions does not seem
to be an adequate explanation of the referring use of
definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting an
event either. In fact, whenever the reporter utters (4)
['The President of France is drinking champagne'] or (7)
['The King of USA is drinking champagne'], he is not
saying respectively that
(11) 'There is exactly one President of France and he
is drinking champagne'
or that
(12) 'There is exactly one King of USA and he is
drinking champagne'.
In the language-game of reporting an event, (4) and ($)
are used differently and thus have different meanings.
True, the truth-conditions of (4) and ($) are the same,
but the later Wittgenstein does not define 'meaning' in
terms of truth-conditions. As a result, the reporter would
not find it necessary to utter ($) in order to mean (4)
and the hearer would find it very odd if the reporter did
so. The reporter would utter (fl) under different
circumstances, such as, for example, if the hearer
introduces into the language-game any doubt concerning
either the existence or the uniqueness of the President of
France, the description's semantic referent. The same
reasoning applies to the pair (7)-(l&). Thus, Russell's
account would not constitute an adequate explanation of
the referring use of definite descriptions in the
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language-game of reporting an event. But the Theory of
Descriptions may still have an application, as it in fact
has, in the languages of logic and mathematics.
What would then be the actual referential
mechanism involved by the referring use of definite
descriptions in the language-game of reporting an event?
It seems that the mechanism does not coincide with any of
the mechanisms proposed by the alternative models listed
in chapter 1. Roughly, all the models seem to assume,
although with some differences of degree, that the
referential mechanism is to be explained by means of some
sort of hidden mental process. Now the later Wittgenstein
firmly opposes such an idea. In his words:
"As part of the system of language, one may say,
the sentence has life. But one is tempted to imagine
that which gives the sentence life as something in an
occult sphere, accompanying the sentence. But
whatever accompanied it would for us just be another
sign" (1934-6: 5).
Thus, it seems that the referring use of definite
descriptions in the language-game of reporting an event
would involve nothing but the referring use itself. In
other words, the referring use of a definite description
in the language-game considered is not something co¬
existing with the description, something that accompanies
the description in an occult sphere. In the calculus of
language, the referring use has no autonomous existence
and involves no "mental process". Paraphrasing the later
Wittgenstein, one might say that we refer because we refer
(Cf. Wittgenstein 1956: VII, 23). As simple as that.
The analysis so far reveals that, according to
the "Investigations" and as far as the language-game of
reporting an event is concerned, both the concept of
semantic and pragmatic presupposition are dispensable in
order to explain the referring use of definite
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descriptions in subject-position. The same applies to the
Theory of Descriptions. In this way; the Russel1/Strawson
semantic controversy reveals itself to be misleading,
because it does not take into consideration the pragmatic
components involved by the referring use of definite
descriptions in subject-position. What is more, both
authors assume the existence of a misleading common
characteristic in the so-called referential function of
definite descriptions, thus deviating our attention from
the specific mechanisms of meaning that are involved in
each particular case. The stubbornness of the successors
of these authors in dealing with the idle semantic
question concerning the referential status of definite
descriptions only means that they are still lost inside
the fly-bottle.
As already mentioned, the above analysis of the
referring use of definite descriptions in subject-position
is only valid for that particular way of playing the
language-game of reporting an event. Nevertheless, I
believe that we may extract from the analysis some hints
concerning the main tendencies of the later Wittgenstein's
way of thinking. For example, it seems that the analysis
of some language-games which are related to the one of
reporting an event would yield, mutatis mutandis,
analogous results. Some of these related language-games
would be, for example: other ways of reporting an event,
many ways of speculating about an event, many ways of
presenting the results of an experiment in tables and
diagrams, etc. All of them seem to include, with minor
restrictions, the consideration of the referring use of
definite descriptions in subject-position by means of the
Kripkean notions of semantic referent and speaker's
referent. But in all cases the results would have to be
restricted by the following qualifications: i) the general
semantic question as formulated in chapter 1 is to be
replaced by a particular pragmatic question concerning the
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specific language-game under consideration; ii) there is
no general answer to the semantic question, but particular
answers to particular pragmatic questions concerning
specific language-games. Although the later Wittgenstein
provides us with no general answer to the semantic
question, it seems that the particular answers obtained by
the analysis of particular language-games strengthens the
conjecture that he would tend to reject variants of both
the concept of semantic and pragmatic presupposition for
most of the language-games involving referring uses of
definite descriptions in subject-position. In fact, most
of the variants of the concept of semantic presupposition
would tend to ignore the pragmatic considerations involved
by the speaker's referent, whereas most of the variants of
the concept of pragmatic presupposition would tend to
appeal to "mental processes" involved by the speaker's
beliefs, knowledge or linguistic background in uttering a
sentence. Even so, the above features would apply to a
very limited domain of our language.
The above conjecture is to be complemented by
the following considerations. One of the basic features of
Wittgenstein's view of language in the "Investigations" is
the fact that it involves no general model of the
functioning of language. In conformity with the
"Investigations", every language is connected to a
corresponding form of life (1953 I: 19; 23; II: 226). As
a result, there will be as many different languages as
there are different forms of life. Thus, as far as the
referring use in some specific language-games is
concerned, ordinary English does not contain or entail any
general pattern to be followed by other language-games.
This leaves open the possibility of constructing language-
games in which the referring use of some expressions
yields some relationships which are analogous to semantic
presupposition.
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For example, in the "Investigations" there are
two possible ways by means of which a name may correspond
to an object. In Wittgenstein's words:
"In a sense, however, this man is surely what
corresponds to his name. But he is destructible, and
his name does not lose its meaning when the bearer is
destroyed. — An example of something corresponding
to the name, and without which it would have no
meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with
the name in the language-game" (1953 I: 55).
On the one hand, a name may be connected to its
bearer in a way such that it does not lose its meaning
when the bearer is destroyed. As an example, Wittgenstein
points to the fact that a man undoubtedly corresponds to
his name, although the man himself is destructible. And if
the man is destroyed, his name does not lose its meaning.
On the other hand, we may imagine a language-
game in which a name corresponds to something and would be
meaningless without it. This occurs when the name is
connected to a paradigm in the language-game. As an
example, I may quote the language-game described in
paragraph 15 of the "Investigations". Here, the builder
'A' and his assistant 'B' are building a house; the tools
involved bear certain marks; A orders different types of
tools by showing his assistant one such mark; B brings the
tool which bears that mark. Now if A calls out for a tool
'T' which is broken, nothing has been previously settled
about this in the language-game. As a result, B's reaction
would be to stand at a loss, or to show A the pieces. In
this situation, one might say that 'T' has become
meaningless, and this would amount to saying that the sign
' T' no longer has a use in language-game (15) (1953 I:
41). Here the name 'T' is associated with a mark which is
inscribed on the tool, and which is shown to B when A is
ordering this particular tool. Of course, the mark
functions as paradigm in the language-game. And 'T' loses
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its meaning whenever the object corresponding to the
paradigm no longer exists. Although the relation between
the tool and its mark is not the logical relation of
semantic presupposition, the former has some analogies
with the latter. For the association of the mark with the
corresponding tool depends on the fact that the tool
exists as such and is not broken or disappeared.
As another example of an analogous relation, I
may quote language-game (48) which correlates the words
'R', 'G', "W, and 'B' to red, green, white, and black
squares. Thus, combinations of the words describe
combinations of the coloured squares. According to
Wittgenstein, there is a variety of cases in which we may
say that a word in the game is the name of a square of
such-and-such a colour (1953 I: 53). Among these cases, he
considers the hypothesis that some people use these signs
in a way such that there is a table correlating each sign
to a different coloured sample. The table is used in
teaching the language-game and functions as a court of
appeal in certain disputed cases. We can also imagine that
the table is a tool for playing the language-game. Here
the speaker who is describing a particular combination of
coloured squares has the table with him and utters a
certain sequence of words after comparing each coloured
square with the samples in the table and passing from the
sample to the corresponding sign. In turn, the hearer is
able to grasp the particular combination of coloured
squares described by comparing each word in the sequence
uttered with its corresponding sample in the table and
passing from the word to the sample. Now if the table gets
lost, or if there is no sample corresponding to a
particular sign, then the table could no longer be used as
a tool in the language-game. And the word or words with no
corresponding sample would become meaningless. For the
samples in the table function as paradigms in the
language-game in question. So, the relation involved also
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bears some analogy with the relation of semantic
presupposition.
Actually, in language-game (48), a sentence like
'RRBBWGGWR' is true or false only if each word corresponds
to a sample in the table. And we may imagine an expansion
of (48) in a way such that the fact in question can be
expressed by a well-formed sentence in (48). Suppose that
the people who speak the language-game had the habit of
using a word after checking whether it actually
corresponds to a sample. Besides, these people would only
use the word after it had been checked and confirmed.
Suppose too that the language-game allows a sentence like
'RS', or 'BS', etc., which means that the sign represented
by 'R', or 'B', etc., has been checked and does
correspond to a coloured sample. In this case, the truth
or falsity of 'RRBBWGGWR1 would depend on the truth of
'RS', 'BS', 'WS', and 'GS'. Of course, a speaker of (48)
might utter 'RRBBWGGWR' without previously uttering any of
the confirming sentences 'RS', 'BS', 'WS', and 'GS'. For,
on the basis of the well-known habit of checking and
confirming each word in (48), the hearer might well take
for granted that the speaker has correctly done his job
and that each of these sentences is true. But this fact
would not make the truth-value of any sentence describing
a combination of coloured squares in (48) independent of
the truth of the corresponding confirming sentences. Thus,
Wittgenstein's later philosophy points to the fact that in
some language-games the truth or falsity of a sentence
depends upon the truth of another. And this is at least
analogous to the logical relation expressed by our general
concept of semantic presupposition^.
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VII - FINAL REMARKS
In short, the later Wittgenstein's account of
language shows that there is no general answer to the
general problem of semantic presuppositions of definite
descriptions in subject-position as formulated in chapter
1. The "Investigations" entails a family resemblance
account of both presupposition and definite descriptions.
Even so, we may formulate particular pragmatic questions
concerning the referring use of definite descriptions in
specific language-games. Our analysis of the language-game
of reporting an event reveals that in this specific
language-game we do not use assertorically definite
descriptions in the subject-position of declarative
sentences in a way such that the resulting statement
semantically E-presupposes the statement affirming the
existence and uniqueness of the object referred to by the
description. As a matter of fact, all the five cases
considered seem to involve pragmatic considerations
concerning the reporter's referent, whereas the concept of
semantic presupposition abstracts from such
considerations.
Although the analysis of the referring use of
definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting an
event includes pragmatic considerations, no pragmatic
concept is involved. In virtue of its appeal both to the
distinction between the asserted and the presupposed and
to the existence of hidden "mental processes" in the
speaker's mind, the concept of pragmatic E-presupposition
is rejected. By the same token, most of the variants of
the concept of pragmatic presupposition are rejected. As
for Russell's Theory of Descriptions, it does not seem to
offer an adequate explanation of the referring use of
definite descriptions in the language-game of reporting an
event either.
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From the analysis of the language-game of
reporting an event we may make the conjecture that the
analysis of related language-games involving the referring
use of definite descriptions would yield analogous
results, that is, the rejection of variants of both the
concept of semantic and pragmatic presupposition. Anyway,
the analysis of related language-games would not yield a
general explanation of the functioning of our language,
but only specific explanations of the specific functioning
of specific language-games.
In addition, the account of language in the
"Investigations" makes it possible to imagine some
language-games in which logical relations analogous to the
one of semantic presupposition are involved. Thus, the
above conjecture is to be complemented by the fact that,
although the analysis of language-games involving the
referring use of definite descriptions would tend to
entail the rejection of the relationship of semantic
presupposition, there are other language-games involving
logical relations which are at least analogous to the one
of semantic presupposition. This is the closest we can get.
to a complete answer to our question.
NOTES
1. Just to give an idea, see, for example, the later
Wittgenstein's use of 'presupposes' or its cognates in
"The Blue and Brown Books" (1934-6: 2; 51; 102; 111; 112),
"The Philosophical Investigations" (1953 I: 51; 257; 270;
631; II: 179; 180; 192), and the "Remarks on the
Foundations of Mathematics" (1956 I: 6; 86; App. I: 6;
III: 4; 54; 71; 81; V: 37; VI: 2; 11; 14; 17; 19; 21; 44;
49; VII: 25; 26; 47).
2. This interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's
view on presupposition is suggested by Cooper (1974: 24
ff. ) .
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3. More specifically, I believe we may say that when
we assertorically utter a declarative sentence like 'P',
we are using 'P' in order to convey information and making
a statement. This is a particular case of Strawson's
general account of 'type', 'use of type' and 'utterance of
type' in "On Referring" (1950: 325; 327). 'P* would be the
type involved. This does not mean I am taking Strawson's
account as being the later Wittgenstein's. On the
contrary: Strawson's distinction is too general to fit the
later Wittgenstein's purposes. What is more, the
distinction seems to originate from the passage concerning
the Fregean "assumption" in the "Investigations" (1953: p.
11), and Wittgenstein does not seem very keen on such a
concept (1953 I: 22). What I am suggesting is that
Wittgenstein's account seems consistent with the fact
that, by uttering a declarative sentence, we may use it in
order to make a statement, provided we do not take the
sentence as an 'assumption' to be supplemented by prefixes
or suffixes like 'it is asserted that...' or "... is the
case'. This is the only particular case of Strawson's
account that I am taking as valid for my analysis in the
language-game of reporting an event. Whether or not his
general distinction is valid in the "Investigations" will
not be my concern.
4. Of course, it would be possible to define a true
statement in the language-game in conformity with Tarski's
account, or by constructing an adequate formal semantics
for the language-game, but this would make it too
technical and far too distant from ordinary English. In
addition, these definitions would require greater
development and justification, and doing this would
deviate us from our main subject. Thus, I shall merely
assume that something like the Tarskian account of the
concept of truth holds for the language-game of reporting
an event in ordinary English.
5. Of course, the language-game of reporting an event
is such that the expression 'the King of USA' might be
used ironically or figuratively in order to refer to Mr.
Bush. Although this move would be correct in the adequate
circumstances, its analysis goes beyond my concern.
6. There are some other examples of language-games
involving what might be called a presupposing idea. For
example:
i) The language-game with the word 'pain'.
Wittgenstein's analysis of the criteria going for such a
word reveals that the referent is not identical with the
behaviour which allows the application of the word. This
seems to involve another sort of presupposing
relationship.
ii) The system of assumptions which acts at the
bottom of the language-games (Wittgenstein 1969). This
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also seems to be connected with a presupposing
relationship. But this claim is controversial. In fact,
the system of assumptions was analyzed by Hudson (1978).
According to Hudson's reading of Wittgenstein, the
fundamental propositions which lie at the bottom of our
language-games are in fact presuppositions in the sense of
logical implications (1978: 97-9).






I - PRELIMINARY REMARKS
The aim of this thesis was to present the early
and the later Wittgenstein's contribution to the
controversial question of semantic presupposition. The
analysis was restricted to the semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position.
In this spirit, I presented the question with
which I am concerned and discussed the main aspects of its
framework. This prepared the field for analyzing both the
early and the later Wittgenstein's historical contribution
to the question.
In this final chapter, I shall discuss some of
the lessons that may be learnt from the analysis of
Wittgenstein's accounts concerning the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position. In order to do so, I shall follow the
steps below. First, I shall discuss some aspects
concerning the characterization of the problem and the
discussion of its framework. Second, I shall discuss the
main aspects concerning the Tractarian solution to the
problem. Third, I shall discuss the main aspects
concerning the "Investigations" solution to the problem.
Fourth, I shall try to find out what lessons may be
learned from running through the whole discussion in this
work.
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II - THE PROBLEM AND THE DISCUSSION
OF ITS FRAMEWORK
In the first part of my work, I characterized
and discussed the framework of the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position. From the analysis of the controversy
originated by Strawson's challenge to Russell's Theory of
Descriptions I extracted the elements for formulating the
problem. My first step was to characterize what I called
the general concept of semantic presupposition. In order
to do this, I appealed to the Strawsonian relation of
semantic presupposition which is between statements and
generalized it so that it might comprehend Fregean
thoughts, Russellian propositions, Tractarian
propositions, and later Wittgensteinian statements.
Suppose 'P'and ' Q' stand for a pair of
Strawsonian statements (or Fregean thoughts, or Russellian
propositions, or Tractarian propositions, or later
Wittgensteinian statements). The main features of the
general concept are: i) it is a relation where 1P' and 'Q'
are mentioned and not used; ii) it is different from
logical entailment; iii) if 'P'semantically presupposes
'Q', then 'Q' affirms the existence and uniqueness of the
object referred to by the description contained in 'P';
iv) ' Q' has no semantic presuppositions; v) if ' P *
semantically presupposes 'Q', then the negation of 'P' is
not ambiguous as in Russell's case. On this subject, the
following comments may be made.
First, the general concept is inspired by
Strawson's analysis of the referring role of definite
descriptions in subject-position. This may be inferred
from the fact that in the definition of semantic
presupposition, 'P' and 'Q' are not used, but mentioned.
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Even so, the features of the general concept are such that
it comprehends Strawson's concept as one of its instances.
As a matter of fact, the general concept does not require
that an expression may simultaneously have a sense and no
denotation. This is a feature belonging both to the
Fregean and the Strawsonian account, but not to the
abstract logical relationship involved by semantic
presupposition.
Second, as far as the purpose of my work is
concerned, the relation expressed by the general concept
was clearly distinguished from the relation of logical
entailment. The problem whether presupposition differs or
not from entailment generates a well-known controversy.
Although I did not enter into this discussion, I believe
that the definition of the general concept in terms of
truth-values was clear enough to show that at least the
relationship involved by my problem is different from
logical entailment.
/vt
Third, relation expressed by the general concept
requires that the presupposed existential sentence has a
peculiar status in all the accounts involved. In fact, all
declarative sentences containing a determinate definite
description in subject-position will semantically
presuppose the same existential sentence containing the
description in question in subject-position. What is more,
the existential sentence presupposed has no semantic
presuppositions. This not only complies with Strawson's
claim that existential sentences have a peculiar status,
but also reveals the manner in which the general concept
deals with this feature.
Fourth, the relation of semantic presupposition
as expressed by the general concept does not require that
negation be ambiguous. Actually, the inconveniences which
would result by assuming that negation is ambiguous would
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be so many that the better conjecture is to suppose that
neither Strawson nor the general concept requires such an
ambiguity for the word 'no'. Now this raises a twofold
consideration. On the one hand, although Strawson is not
clear about this issue, the result of my analysis suggests
that the conjecture that negation is not ambiguous is a
better interpretation of his account. On the other hand,
my analysis also suggests that nothing impedes a logician
like Van Fraassen of constructing a formal system in which
negation is ambiguous. In this case, the system would not
be rigorously Strawsonian.
Now the main result concerning the general
concept of semantic presupposition is that, although
inspired by Strawson's account, the concept is general
enough so as to include, as some of its instances, other
concepts belonging to quite heterogeneous accounts. This
feature revealed to be very useful in the course of my
work. Actually, the feature allowed the construction of
two instances of the general concept of semantic
presupposition: the relation of semantic W-presupposition
and the one of E-presupposition. Each of them could be
tested against the corresponding system in early and the
later philosophy, thus providing an adequate answer to my
research question.
Of course, the general concept as defined in my
work does not solve by itself the main questions that are
raised as regards the logical relation of semantic
presupposition. As a matter of fact, the difficulties
concerning the construction of a consistent theory of
meaning and the ones concerning the formalization of
semantic presupposition are also difficulties belonging to
the general concept. But the discussion of such
difficulties was left aside. For the concept was used to
serve the main purpose of my work, that is, checking
whether or not the early and the later Wittgenstein has
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anything to say about semantic presupposition. In this
respect, the general concept revealed to be useful, for
although the accounts involved are different, the relation
of semantic presupposition expressed by the concept was
applicable in every case. What is more, the discussion
that followed throughout my work revealed that it is in
fact possible to construct the general concept of semantic
presupposition and test it against the accounts involved.
The characterization of the general concept
allowed the formulation of the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position: do definite descriptions in the subject-
position of declarative sentences yield statements (or
thoughts, or propositions) that semantically presuppose,
in the sense of the general concept, the existence and
uniqueness of the object referred to by the descriptions?
It is worth noticing that the above question was not asked
in order to obtain a full-blown account of semantic
presupposition, but only to prepare the setting for
analyzing the early and the later Wittgenstein's answer to
the problem.
The results concerning the discussion of
Frege's, Russell's and Strawson's account raise the
following comments.
First, in "On Sense and Reference" it was
possible to spot the important Fregean relation of
semantic 'prerequisite' for definite descriptions in
subject-position. The analysis of the semantic
prerequisite and its comparison with the general concept
of semantic presupposition revealed that the former is an
instance of the latter. This confirmed the suspicion that
Frege held a view of semantic presupposition which is
analogous to Strawson's.
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But the most important result in this stage was
the finding of two different referential mechanisms for
the Fregean proper names. The Fregean simple proper names
are submitted to a semantic principle which can only be
metalinguistically expressed, whereas the Fregean compound
proper names, which include definite descriptions,
generate semantic presuppositions in the sense of the
general concept. This reveals that Kripke1s claim that
Fregean simple proper names are abbreviated or disguised
descriptions is mistaken.
Another striking result was realizing that,
although referentially dualistic, Frege's account is
consistent. True, Frege claims that the existence of
expressions which semantically presuppose the existence
and uniqueness of their denotations is an imperfection of
ordinary language. But Frege was able to prevent the
inconvenients of such an imperfection in his logically
perfect language by means of adequate stipulations. This
revealed that simple proper names which directly refer to
their denotations may coexist with definite descriptions
which only indirectly refer to their denotations. In other
words, the Fregean semantic principle may coexist with
semantic presuppositions in the sense of the general
concept. This leads to the important conclusion that it is
possible to construct a logically consistent language that
simultaneously involves the Fregean semantic principle for
simple proper names (or any equivalent) and the relation
of semantic presupposition for definite descriptions.
It was also found that Russellian logically
proper names, although they do not have a sense, refer to
their denotations in a way which is similar to the Fregean
simple proper names in a logically perfect language. The
logically proper names are submitted to the Fregean
semantic principle.
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Now the application of the above findings to the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions strikingly revealed that the Russellian
logically proper names may coexist with Fregean or
Strawsonian definite descriptions. This is so because the
gap between ordinary language and the Russellian logically
perfect language is so big that it may be filled in two
different ways. The description in subject-position may be
interpreted as reducible either to an equivalent of the
Russellian paraphrase or to an Strawsonian referring
expression.
In my opinion, it seems that this result was
somehow announced by the fact that the Theory of
Descriptions was formulated many years before the doctrine
of logically proper names. Russell wrote "On Denoting" in
order to solve the specific problem of the referential
mechanism involved by definite descriptions, whereas his
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" had the more ambitious
intention to present his philosophical view of the
relations between language and the world. True, the Theory
of Descriptions was perfectly supplemented by the doctrine
of logically proper names and followed the spirit of
Russell's thought. But the fact remains that the doctrine
of logically proper names might supplement another quite
different theory involving definite descriptions as
authentic referring expressions which semantically
presuppose the existence and uniqueness of their
denotations.
Anyway, this result revealed that Strawson's
criticism of Russell in "On Referring" is mistaken. For
Strawson anachronistically appeals to the doctrine of
logically proper names in order to criticize the Theory of
Descriptions.
The most important result of the whole
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discussion in the first part of my work was the finding
that the Russell/ Strawson controversy, as long as it only
involves these authors' conflicting views of the
relationships between proper names and definite
descriptions, is undecidable at the purely semantic level.
The discussion yielded the two following facts: i) the
Fregean dualistic account of the referential mechanism of
simple proper names and definite descriptions is
consistent; ii) the Russellian logically proper names are
submitted to the same semantic principle as the Fregean
simple proper names. Now the conjunction of both facts
revealed that, as far as the accounts involved are
concerned, there are at least two consistent hypothesis in
the explanation of the referential mechanism of simple
proper names and definite descriptions. On the one hand,
the mechanism may be explained by an equivalent of the
dualistic Fregean account. On the other hand, the
mechanism may be explained by an equivalent of the
monistic Russellian account. This is so because definite
descriptions have in fact an ambiguous referential status
in ordinary language: they share the features of both
referring expressions and predicates. What is more, the
accounts of logically proper names and definite
descriptions are relatively independent of each other.
This means that they may be combined in different ways,
yielding different accounts of the referential mechanisms
involved by these expressions. This fact suggests the
interesting possibility of constructing the formal system
"F-Principia" which would be equivalent to the system in
"Principia" except in that definite descriptions would be
authentic referring expressions. Thus, Strawson's
challenge of Russell's model simply revives the Fregean
alternative model for the referential mechanism of
descriptions. As a result, in order to be solved, the
problem would require the introduction of further semantic
or pragmatic aspects.
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The above discussion provided the framework of
my problem and prepared the field for the analysis of
Wittgenstein's views in the second part of my work.
Ill - THE TRACTARIAN ACCOUNT
As a whole, the analysis of the Tractarian
solution to the problem of semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position
revealed that the early Wittgenstein adheres to the
Russellian Theory of Descriptions. True, he introduces
some modifications, such as: i) the appeal to two-place
predicates; ii) the rejection of the identity-sign; iii)
the claim that generality has a non-truth-functional
character; iv) the rejection of the axiomatic method. But
the analysis of the Tractarian modifications has shown the
following results.
First, the appeal to two-place predicates is
consistent with the Russellian Theory of Descriptions.
Second, with the help of Hintikka's analysis of
identity in the "Tractatus", it may be proved that even
though the early Wittgenstein rejects the identity-sign,
the resulting system is expressively equivalent to the
system of "Principia". But it is worth recalling that the
identity-sign is rejected on the basis of a weakly
exclusive interpretation of the Tractarian variables.
Thus, by means of appropriate rules of translation, the
Tractarian expressions may be transformed into Russellian
ones and conversely. Although this is Hintikka's finding,
it reveals that some analyses of the Tractarian
corresponding aphorisms are mistaken. For example, the
analysis made in Anscombe (1967: 148) is based on the
mistaken inclusive interpretation of the Tractarian
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variables.
Third, although no one knows for sure what the
Tractarian treatment of quantification is, the best
conjecture is to assume that it involves both the
construction of logical prototypes and truth-functions.
This interpretation has similarities with the one found in
Russell's "Introduction" to the "Tractatus" and with the
one found in Fogelin (1976: 56 ff.). If correct, it
reveals the originality of Wittgenstein's account of
generality. According to the Tractarian account, general
propositions may be constructed without appealing to
truth-functions. The latter would be necessary only for
evaluating the general propositions. As a result, the mere
introduction of the adequate symbolism would allow the
construction of well-formed general propositions. And
given that logic is the essence both of language and the
world, the general propositions would be able to describe
the world so efficiently as clusters of atomic
propositions. Now this interpretation seems to agree with
the spirit of both the ontology and the logic expounded in
the "Tractatus".
Fourth, there are strong indications that,
although the early Wittgenstein replaces the Russellian
method by the method of truth-tables, the
Tractarian system still is equivalent to a sub-
"Principia".
Thus, it has been shown that there is at least
one interpretation of the "Tractatus" according to which
the Tractarian system seems to be equivalent to the
propositional calculus and first-order predicate logic in
"Principia Mathematica".
In addition, it seems that if there are





that they are not logically equivalent, the differences
would not entail that the systems are radically different
or that the Tractarian system is an original alternative
to "Principia". In fact, it is more likely that the
systems would have most of their theorems in common and
that they would have to face only minor differences. Thus,
although many Russellian expressions are ruled out as
nonsensical by Wittgenstein, they may always be replaced
by some Tractarian equivalent and vice versa, for both
systems have the same expressive power. And if we supply
a method of treatment of quantification in a Russellian
mould, we can make both systems logically equivalent. This
result is a corollary of Hintikka's proof that it is
possible to construct a first-order predicate calculus
without a sign for identity (Hintikka 1956). So, the
decision of using one of these systems rather than the
other is determined by practical reasons.
As far as the problem of semantic
presuppositions generated by definite descriptions in
subject-position is concerned, the above result is
disappointing. But I took the analysis further and found
out the following.
First, in the system Wl, that is, the Tractarian
system without the Theory of Descriptions, it is possible
to construct the concept of semantic W-presupposition
which simultaneously constitutes an instance of the
general concept of semantic presupposition and complies
with the Tractarian principle of bivalence. The concept of
W-presupposition was constructed on the basis of the fact
that, according to the Tractarian system, if an utterance
is nonsensical, then it is truth-valueless. Thus, the
relation of W-presupposition was defined as follows. If
'P' and 'Q' are Tractarian propositions, then 'P'
semantically W-presupposes * Q' if and only if: i) when 'P'
is true or false, 'Q' is true; ii) when 'not P' is false
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or true, 'Q' is true; iii) when 'Q' is false, 'P■ and 'not
P' are nonsensical and consequently truth-valueless. The
relation of W-presupposition may be expressed within the
Tractarian system. Even so, the Picture Theory of Meaning
opposes the concept of W-presupposition. This result was
obtained by interpreting aphorisms 2.0201-2.0212
differently from Black (1964) and Fogelin (1976).
2.0201-2.0212 was interpreted as an argument in favour of
simple signs that rejects the concept of W-presupposition
on the basis of the requirement of simple signs and the
Picture Theory.
Since the Picture Theory appeals to a kind of
isomorphism involving the primitive simple signs, this
suggests that the isomorphic theories of meaning which are
similar to the one expounded in the "Tractatus" would
oppose the relation of semantic presupposition. For the
latter involves an indirect referential mechanism that
cannot be explained in terms of the one-to-one
correspondence which supports this kind of isomorphism. In
other words, if the description 'the D' semantically
presupposes that 'D uniquely exists', then 'the D' is not
directly connected to the object to which it refers, say
'a', but depends upon the truth of a uniquely existential
sentence in order to have a reference. Thus, the connexion
between 'the D' and the object to which it refers is
indirect and not obtained by means of a one-to-one
correspondence, as it occurs in the case of a proper name.
This means that the expressions of our language would have
at least two different ways of connecting with the world:
some of them would be similar to Fregean simple proper
names and connect directly with their denotations, whereas
others would be similar to Fregean definite descriptions
and connect indirectly with their denotations. Now this
would involve the appeal to two different functions for
connecting the words of language with their corresponding
denotations in the world: i) the function connecting the
214
primitive simple signs with their corresponding simple
objects; ii) the function connecting symbols for complexes
(definite descriptions) with their corresponding
denotations by means of uniquely existential propositions.
Now only the function defined in 'i' would be consistent
with isomorphism. The function defined in 'ii' is not
consistent with the one-to-one correspondence which is
required by isomorphism. As a result, the appeal to the
relation of W-presupposition by an isomorphic theory of
meaning of the Tractarian kind would lead to an
inconsistent model.
Second, in the minimal system W2, that is, the
Tractarian system without the Theory of Descriptions and
the Picture Theory of Meaning, it was shown that the
Tractarian primitive simple signs by themselves do not
oppose the concept of W-presupposition. This is so because
the primitive simple signs, which probably inspired the
appearance of the Russellian logically proper names, refer
in a way which is similar to Fregean simple proper names.
Although the primitive simple signs do not have a sense,
they are also submitted to the Fregean semantic principle.
As a result, the model of language involving both the
Tractarian primitive simple signs and definite
descriptions which generate semantic W-presuppositions
would constitute a consistent hypothesis.
The above analysis of the Tractarian account
confirms my claim that the Russe11/Strawson controversy,
as long as it only involves the conjunction of any of the
accounts of proper names and definite descriptions
discussed, is not entirely decidable at the purely
semantic level. In fact, the discussion on the degrees of
incompatibility between the Tractarian system and the
concept in question revealed that the issue is still
undecidable in the terms of the Russe11/Strawson
controversy. For neither the Fregean doctrine of the
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referential mechanism of simple proper names nor the
Russellian doctrine of logically proper names is
incompatible with definite descriptions which generate
semantic presuppositions when in subject-position. Thus,
the Tractarian view of primitive simple signs may be put
together with an account of definite descriptions which
generate semantic presuppositions. The gap between the
TLP-language and the W-language is too big and may be
filled by an alternative account to the Theory of
Descriptions. The controversy remains undecidable if one
only appeals the doctrine of simple signs. It has been
shown that it is the appeal to an extra semantic feature,
namely the Picture Theory of meaning, that decides the
issue.
IV - THE ACCOUNT IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS"
The later Wittgenstein's solution to the problem
of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position tends to the rejection of
the relation expressed by our general concept. But
obtaining this result required some important alterations
in our research question as formulated in chapter 1. In
fact, the Tractarian system provides an answer to a
question formulated in semantic terms, whereas the
philosophy expounded in the "Investigations" provides an
answer to a question formulated in pragmatic terms.
Thus, the first important finding was realizing
that the Wittgensteinian general pragmatic question, if
applied to the words 'description' and 'presupposition',
for example, yields family resemblance views that do not
constitute a complete answer to my problem. The latter
requires a more specific pragmatic question concerning a
particular language-game involving both the referring use
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of definite descriptions in the subject-position of
declarative sentences and the relation of semantic
presupposition. Although we would hardly find in the
"Investigations" any stressing of the referring use in the
same way as, for example, Strawson does, the specific
question is in the spirit of the later philosophy.
Besides, an answer to such a question would be the closest
we can get to a complete answer to my problem. As a
result, an alternative specific pragmatic question of
which the answer would provide the elements needed for
getting as close as possible to a solution of the semantic
problem with which I am concerned was formulated.
The alternative question concerns a restricted
version of the language-game of reporting an event. This
particular language-game may involve the use of
declarative sentences containing definite descriptions in
subject-position with the purpose of conveying information
and in this way may depend on the referring use of
definite descriptions in order to be played conveniently.
The specific pragmatic question was formulated as follows.
Do we use the words 'the', 'statement', 'true' and 'false'
in the language-game of reporting an event in a way such
that the assertoric use of a declarative sentence
containing a definite description in subject-position
yields: i) a true or false statement depending on the
adequacy of the predicate to the object referred to by the
description only if another statement about the existence
and uniqueness of the object described is true; ii) an
utterance which is discarded as an incorrect move only if
the statement about the existence and uniqueness of the
object referred to by the description is false? This
question defines a specific relation of semantic E-
presupposition to be tested against the language-game
considered.
Another finding was the fact that the
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alternative specific pragmatic question concerning the
language-game of reporting an event; although formulated
in a restricted way; is connected with Strawson's analysis
of the referring use of definite descriptions. Thus; the
framework that supports the Strawsonian question is also
connected with my specific pragmatic question. In
addition, some aspects discussed in the evolution of the
Russe11/Strawson controversy; such as the ones introduced
by Donnellan and Kripke are also connected with the
specific pragmatic question. Although designed for more
general purposes, the Kripkean notions of 'semantic
reference' and 'speaker's referent' were submitted to some
restrictions and revealed themselves very useful in the
course of the restricted analysis. The above discussion
suggests that, although the later Wittgenstein restricts
the analysis to specific uses in specific language-games,
some of the questions of traditional philosophy still have
a room in the "Investigations". In my opinion, this throws
a new light on the way the later Wittgenstein subverts the
problems of traditional philosophy: in most cases, such
problems are dissolved, for they are intended to provide
a general answer about the general functioning of our
language; in some cases, they may still persist in a
restricted domain, for now they are intended to provide a
specific answer about the way we play a specific language-
game .
This fact led to the important distinction
between the coincidental and the non-coincidental
referring use of which the analysis has shown that the
language-game of reporting an event in ordinary English
involves the rejection of the semantic concept of E-
presupposition. In fact, the two sub-cases involved by the
coincidental referring use of descriptions in the
language-game of reporting an event require considerations
concerning the speaker's referent and this reveals the
appeal to pragmatic, rather than purely semantic,
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considerations. The same happens with the three sub-cases
involved by the non-coincidental referring use of
descriptions in the language-game considered.
Given that the specific pragmatic question
concerning the referring use of definite descriptions in
the language-game of reporting an event is answered by
means of pragmatic considerations which led to the
rejection of the concept of semantic E-presupposition, the
next step was to ask whether the later Wittgenstein
appeals to any variant of the pragmatic presupposition.
The concept of pragmatic E-presupposition was suggested
for the language-game of reporting an event and defined as
follows: whenever a speaker sincerely uses in the
referential way a definite description in subject-
position; the hearer assumes that the speaker truly
believes the description has a reference; if there is a
referential failure, the utterance involved reveals to be
an incorrect move and is dropped both by the speaker and
the hearer. The analysis revealed that the concept of
pragmatic E-presupposition is also to be rejected as an
explanation of the referring use in the language-game
considered. For the concept appeals both to the
distinction between the asserted and the presupposed and
to the existence of hidden "mental processes" in the
reporter's mind. By the same token, most of the pragmatic
theories listed in chapter 1 are also to be rejected as
explanations of the referring use in the language-game of
reporting an event.
As applied to the Theory of Descriptions, the
analysis revealed that the Russellian paraphrase is not an
adequate explanation of the referring use of definite
descriptions in subject-position in the language-game of
reporting an event. For a declarative sentence containing
a definite description in subject-position and its
corresponding Russellian paraphrase would have different
219
uses, and thus different meanings, in the language-game.
Even so, the Theory of Descriptions may have a place in
the language-games of logic and mathematics.
In short, the referring use of definite
descriptions in the language-game of reporting an event
does not seem to require any of the complex mechanisms
involved by the models listed in chapter 1. The referring
use is not something in an occult sphere that accompanies
the sentence containing a definite description in subject-
position. As a matter of fact, the referring use cannot be
considered independently of the description used and does
not involve any "mental processes".
Although restricted to the language-game of
reporting an event, the analysis of the later
Wittgenstein's account somehow confirms my claim that the
Russe11/Strawson semantic controversy requires the
introduction of extra aspects in order to solve the
question about the referring use of definite descriptions.
In other words, the solution in the spirit of the
"Investigations" was only possible by the appeal to the
concept of speaker's referent which is an extra aspect
with respect to the original Russe11/Strawson semantic
dispute. Thus, the framework of the semantic problem is
shown to be too restricted and the question is solved by
supplementing the original framework with some pragmatic
considerations .
The analysis of a particular way of playing the
language-game of reporting an event is not, and could not
be, a comprehensive analysis of the referring use of
definite descriptions in every language-game. Even so, the
mechanism involved in the case of reporting an event gives
a clue for the analysis of the problem of semantic
presupposition in related language-games, such as, for
example, speculating about an event. It seems that in most
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of these cases most of the variants of both the semantic
and the pragmatic concept would tend to be rejected.
Nevertheless, there are other language-games in
which a relation which is at least analogous to semantic
presupposition is present. This may be inferred from the
analysis of language-games expounded in paragraphs 15 and
48 of the "Investigations". This fact suggests that the
later Wittgenstein might accept, in certain specific
language-games, some relations that are at least analogous
to the one of semantic presupposition.
V - THE TRACTARIAN ACCOUNT AND
THE ONE IN THE "INVESTIGATIONS"
At the end of my analysis of Wittgenstein's
solutions to the problem of semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position, I
would like to make the following points.
First, the analysis of the early and the later
philosophy gives some form of confirmation to my claim
that the Russe11/Strawson controversy, as long as it only
involves these author's theories of proper names and
definite descriptions, is undecidable at the purely
semantic level. In the case of the early philosophy, the
claim is fully confirmed. For the system W2 may be
supplemented by one of two alternative ways of explaining
the referential function of definite descriptions in
subject-position: either the Russellian paraphrase or the
Strawsonian semantic presupposition. The Tractarian
primitive simple signs may be conjoined, without yielding
a contradiction, either to the Russellian Theory of
Descriptions or to the Strawsonian Theory of
Presuppositions. In the case of the later philosophy, the
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claim is only partially confirmed. For the analysis was
restricted to the language-game of reporting an event and
this is a very small domain of our language. Even so, the
analysis suggests that some related language-games would
involve analogous mechanisms and that the problem would be
solved by adding the consideration of the pragmatic
dimension concerning the speaker's referent.
Second, both in the early and the later
philosophy, Wittgenstein opposes the controversial concept
of semantic presupposition.
In the "Tractatus", the adoption of the modified
version of the Russellian Theory of Descriptions and the
principle of strict bivalence are the most evident reasons
why the early Wittgenstein opposes the concept of semantic
presupposition. But taking further the analysis yielded an
important result concerning our problem. In fact, the
shift from system W1 to system W2 revealed that the
Picture Theory of Meaning also opposes the relation of
semantic presupposition generated by definite descriptions
in subject-position.
In the "Investigations", the analysis has to be
restricted to specific language-games involving the
referring use of definite descriptions in subject-
position. But the appeal to pragmatic considerations
entails that the semantic concept is not an adequate
explanation for the referring use of definite
descriptions. Although there are some language-games which
involve relationships that are analogous to semantic
presupposition, the appeal to the latter seems to be
simultaneously too generic and too restricted. It is too
generic because it puts the semantic relationship as the
common characteristic pervading all cases. Now according
to the "Investigations", the phantom of the 'common
characteristic' must be avoided. It is too restricted
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because it abstracts from the notion of 'speaker's
referent' which is an important factor to be considered in
the analysis of the referring use of definite
descriptions .
Thirds both in the early and later philosophy
the reasons for opposing the controversial concept of
semantic presupposition are consistent with the
corresponding account of language. What is more; some of
the reasons are original and instructive. On the one hand;
the Tractarian Picture Theory of Meaning establishes an
original kind of isomorphism which firmly opposes the
logical relation of semantic presupposition and teaches us
that any semantics that directly correlates the words with
their references in a pictorial mould would similarly
oppose such a concept. On the other hand; the analysis of
the referring use in specific language-games opposes the
logical relation of semantic presupposition and teaches us
that such a relation unduly abstracts from the speaker's
referent.
Fourth; in my opinion, I think Wittgenstein is
right in his opposition to the controversial concept of
semantic presupposition. But I would add that none of his
accounts seems closer to the most adequate answer to our
problem.
In fact, although the "Tractatus" opposes the
concept of semantic presupposition, the philosophical
price to be paid by the system is too high. The Tractarian
transcendental semantics has the following unpalatable
consequences:
i) Although the model is universal, it is too
strict in the sense that it excludes from the domain of
what can be said everything but the set of declarative
propositions and their relations expressed by the logical
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connectives. Thus, most of what is said in everyday
language and philosophy — if not everything —would be
relegated to the Tractarian index.
ii) The universality of the Tractarian model is
based on purely semantic considerations, whereas a
complete explanation of the functioning of language seems
to require the introduction of pragmatic considerations as
well. For example, the analysis of the referring role
played by descriptions in subject-position includes the
consideration of the non-coincidental referring use. but
the latter has no place in the Tractarian system.
iii) The transcendental conditions of
possibility of assertoric propositions also include the
subject, which is a limit of the world (Wittgenstein
1922a: 5.632). But then the Tractarian conditions of
possibility of language would involve the subject and the
transcendental semantics would ultimately reveal itself as
a transcendental pragmatics. This fact seems to obtain at
least some confirmation from Wittgenstein's claim that
solipsism coincides with pure realism (1922a: 5.64). But
the blurring of the distinction between semantics and
pragmatics even though it occurs at the transcendental
level would be a high price to pay for adhering to the
Tractarian model. For although definite descriptions are
explained by a variant of Russell's paraphrase, the way
they are analyzed in the "Tractatus" is still purely
semantic and leaves aside important pragmatic
considerations.
iv) The transcendental semantics of the
"Tractatus" provides a too complicated model for the
explanation of the functioning of definite descriptions in
ordinary language. For Wittgenstein explains the rather
striking fact that all propositions of the usually
misleading ordinary language are in perfect logical order
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by the relationship between ordinary language and the W-
language of elementary propositions. Now it is the
definiteness of sense of the propositions of ordinary
language that requires the possibility of simple signs
denoting simple objects. But insofar as we do not have any
a priori access either to simple signs or to elementary
propositions, the logically perfect language they build up
subsists only as a transcendental postulate of
definiteness of sense. And the fact that the propositions
of ordinary language are in perfect logical order is
explained by the postulated correspondence between their
subject-predicate form and the unknown logical form of
elementary propositions. Now this reveals how true is the
Prototractarian dictum that the tacit conventions on which
the understanding of ordinary language depends are
enormously complicated (1922b: 4.002).
v) The Tractarian model may be accused of making
an unnecessary duplication. As a matter of fact, the
"Tractatus" postulates that the W-language is the fully
analyzed form of ordinary language. The latter would be
ultimately explained by the former. But then the above
tacit conventions turn out to be far more complicated than
one might possibly imagine. And perhaps what has to be
supplied by thought without being put into words in the
construction of every proposition of ordinary language
containing a definite description in subject-position may
exceed human powers. From this point of view,
Wittgenstein's logically perfect language is a serious
candidate for Occam's razor.
As a result, although carrying the seal of
Wittgenstein's originality, the Tractarian solution to the
problem of semantic presuppositions generated by definite
descriptions in subject-position does not seem to be the
best one. In fact, it is too strict, involves too many
constraints and is ultimately unable to explain all the
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facets of the referential mechanisms involved. What is
worse, it involves philosophical assumptions which lead to
undesirable consequences.
Now the later Wittgenstein's solution seems to
be a better alternative than the above. For it does not
seem committed to the complicated philosophical
assumptions involved by the "Tractatus". What is more, the
later Wittgenstein's intention is rather to dissolve than
solve our philosophical puzzles. Even so, the later
philosophy also has its difficulties. For as far as the
philosophical assumptions are concerned, the later
Wittgenstein has shifted the axis of the research from the
Tractarian semantic standpoint to a pragmatic one. Now
this raises the question of an implicit relativism as the
philosophical price to be paid by the "Investigations".
The later Wittgenstein's relativism may be inferred from
the following considerations:
i) Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as compared
to the one expounded in the "Tractatus", seems to exhibit
an ungrounded shift in its intentions. It is well-known
that the "Investigations" is committed to the task of
describing ordinary language as it is in order to dissolve
metaphysical problems. But the philosophical basis for
making the shift in question seems to be unwarranted. The
problem is connected with a passage in the "Blue Book":
"There is no common sense answer to a
philosophical problem. One can defend common sense
against the attacks of philosophers only by solving
their puzzles, i.e., by curing them of the temptation
to attack common sense; not by restating- the views of
common sense" (1934-6: 58-9; italics mine).
Here, Wittgenstein takes philosophical problems as
resulting from the temptation to attack common sense. And
his purpose is to cure the philosopher of such a
temptation. Of course, the cure cannot consist in simply
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restating the views of common sense, for that would be
dogmatic. As a matter of fact, the philosopher's attack on
common sense challenges the reliability of common sense
itself and cannot have the reaffirmation of this very
reliability as a reply. But then one may feel tempted to
ask about the criteria for a Wittgensteinian cure of the
philosopher's temptation to attack common sense. The only
possible answer is that these criteria belong to grammar,
namely to the way we actually use language in the
particular form of life we are living. If this is true,
these criteria give the foundations of common sense.
Consequently, Wittgenstein cures the philosopher's
temptation of nonsensically attacking common sense by
making explicit the criteria of making sense in ordinary
language. But he gives no grounds for these criteria.
True, he cannot give grounds for them, because they lie at
the end of the chain of reasons. And Wittgenstein
acknowledges that he needs an ungrounded starting point in
an important passage from the "Philosophical Grammar":
"I must begin with the distinction between sense
and nonsense. Nothing is possible prior to that. I
can't give it a foundation" (1931-4: 81; italics
mine).
But if Wittgenstein does not give grounds for the above
criteria, he is taking them for granted. One may begin
with the sense/nonsense distinction without necessarily
respecting the criteria of making sense in ordinary
language, for this amounts to merely making explicit the
foundations of common sense. As a matter of fact, one may
mistrust these very criteria and attempt to replace them
by more adequate ones. If so, the philosopher's attack on
common sense may be vindicated. As a result, Wittgenstein
seems to be in the very position he criticizes, namely the
Moorean position of merely restating the views of common
sense in order to defend it against the philosopher's
attacks. The sole difference is that Wittgenstein, in a
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subtler way, restates the view of common sense by means of
the description of the grammatical criteria required for
making sense in ordinary language. Thus, in order to cure
the philosopher's nonsensical temptation to attack common
sense, he describes the grammatical criteria presupposed
by common sense itself. In my opinion, he is just
relocating the problem. His attitude seems to lead to
another form of dogmatism. Wittgenstein might perhaps
reply that he is not restating the views of common sense
at all, but only describing the way ordinary language
functions and, in so doing, showing that metaphysical
problems result from a misunderstanding of this
functioning. He might add that the description of the
functioning of language involves not only the
consideration of grammatical criteria but also a whole
system of assumptions which lie at the ungrounded basis of
our actions (1969: 102; 105). Nevertheless, the reply only
reveals that Wittgenstein's assumptions are different from
the ones which tempt the traditional philosopher to attack
common sense. Thus, he is in no better situation than the
traditional philosopher himself. Ultimately, Wittgenstein
is just confronting the metaphysical view with the
grammatical foundations of the commonsensical view. And
the grammatical foundations of the commonsensical view
cannot be the judge of the metaphysical one with no
further ado.
ii) Now consider the way the model of the
functioning of language is confirmed by the
"Investigations". The later Wittgensteinian approach seems
to be structured in a way such that its final judge is the
success of its application to language. But this creates
a very strange situation. On the one hand, Wittgenstein
suggests the possibility of replacing the theory of
meaning by a mere description of our use of words. As a
result, the polymorphous character of language is revealed
and the great majority of metaphysical problems is
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radically dissolved. On the other hand, the description of
the use of words is not theoretically justified. There is
no guarantee that the description of use in ordinary
language will always yield the perspicuous representation
postulated by Wittgenstein. It is true that up to now
every single analysis performed in the "Investigations"
may be taken as a confirmation of the account. But the
oddity of some results seems rather to disconfirm it. For
example, N. Malcolm's "Dreaming" (1959) may be taken as a
reductio ad absurdum of Wittgenstein's method in the
"Investigations".
iii) If Wittgenstein's later philosophy stresses
the way we actually do things as the ungrounded end of the
chain of reasons, then there is no privileged
philosophical justification for anything. The ultimate
ground is a form of life. But if this is so, then what is
the reason for Wittgenstein's devoted and intense
animosity against traditional philosophy? After all, it is
the way some people do talk and act as regards some
specific problems. Any description of our form of life
would have to include the family of language-games of
philosophy. The actual use of our language involves the
philosophical one. What is more, the language-game played
in the "Investigations" is actually used only by
Wittgenstein and a small group of strict Wittgensteinians.
The philosophical community does not exhibit a significant
agreement about Wittgenstein's suggestion that philosophy
is a deviated language-game. If so, why should the
Wittgensteinian way of doing philosophy be privileged and
preferred to the language-game played, say, in the
"Tractatus"? The "Investigations" affirms that ordinary
language is all right as it is, the only thing we need is
a perspicuous view of its grammar. By contrast, the
"Tractatus" affirms that ordinary language is all right
because it depends on the postulated perfectly descriptive
language which is prior to it and underlies any meaningful
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language. Paradoxically, in the light of the
"Investigations", both Wittgensteinian philosophies may be
taken as based upon principles which are dogmatically
stated and cannot be ultimately justified. Wittgenstein's
later philosophy is in danger of succumbing to a subtler
form of relativism. The above problem is connected with
the question whether or not the later Wittgenstein was a
linguistic idealist. For example, Anscombe believes
Wittgenstein is able to steer in the narrow channel
between linguistic idealism and empiricist realism
(Anscombe 1981: 115). She thinks Wittgenstein's account
entails that knowledge is not guaranteed by the
language-game. And this means the later Wittgenstein has
attained realism without empiricism (Anscombe 1981: 133).
But her claim is made on the assumption that, according to
the later Wittgenstein, there is not a right or a wrong,
but only conflict, or persuasion, or decision (Anscombe
1981: 132). And this means that all our actions are guided
either by our emotions or our will, not by our reason. As
a result, Anscombe has only succeeded in confirming my
claim that the later Wittgenstein is in danger of
succumbing to a subtler form of relativism.
If the above criticism of the later philosophy
is correct, two important consequences follow. The first
is that the application of the programmatic principle
atomizes language into a diversity of overlapping and
criss-crossing language-games and impedes any unitary view
of language as a whole or of particular linguistic
phenomena. What is worse, the philosopher's task is
reduced to the endless job of merely describing uses of
words with no recourse to theoretical explanation. The
concepts of family-resemblance and language-game are
opaque to theoretical constructions. Philosophical
theories, like the Theory of Descriptions or the Theory of
Semantic Presupposition, are nothing but houses of cards
to be demolished. The second consequence is that although
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the programmatic principle is coupled with a theoretical
view, a philosophy of language which intends to give away
with all metaphysics, there is nothing which makes this
peculiar philosophy, namely the language-game of the
"Investigations", a privileged one in the domain of
philosophy. Anyone may challenge Wittgenstein's reliance
on ordinary language simply by blaming it for being based
on an incorrect grammar and by restating the need for a
logically perfect language. If so, not even deep grammar
considerations would yield a perspicuous view of the
functioning of ordinary language. As a matter of fact,
there is nothing in Wittgenstein's later account which
impedes such a move.
As a result, the account in the spirit of the
"Investigations" only apparently seems to be better than
the one in the "Tractatus". It is true that the
"Investigations" seems to yield an account which is not so
strict and does not involve so many constraints as the
Tractarian one. But although apparently explaining the
referring use of definite descriptions in subject-position
by means of predominantly pragmatic considerations and
thus avoiding many of the unpalatable consequences of the
Tractarian system, the account in the spirit of the
"Investigations" pays the high philosophical price of
succumbing to relativism. This does not seem to be a good
solution to our problem either.
VI - FINAL REMARKS
Now the whole discussion throughout my work
leads to the main lesson we may perhaps learn from the
analysis of the problem of semantic presuppositions
generated by definite descriptions in subject-position.
The lesson concerns the epistemological implications of
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the semantic and pragmatic models involved by the analysis
of the referential role of definite descriptions in
subject-position. It seems that Wittgenstein's solutions
illustrate the epistemological limits which are imposed by
the models involved. And I must confess that the whole
discussion in my work leads to the puzzlement and
perplexity one gets whenever a philosophical problem is
exhaustively discussed. In order to make my point clearer,
consider the adequacy of our pragmatic and semantic models
in the explanation of linguistic phenomena.
First, the Tractarian account is firmly based on
a transcendental semantics. This means the early
philosophy is based on necessary and universal principles
which guarantee the objectivity and the truth of the
propositions describing states of affairs in the world. At
first sight, this seems to be correct, but soon one
realizes that the price to be paid for this is high: the
account turns out to be too reductionist and too strict
for explaining all the phenomena involved. For example,
the Tractarian system is anchored in simple objects which
make the substance of the world. This means that every
descriptive language transcendentally requires the
logically perfect W-language which is in isomorphic
relationship with reality. So far, so good. But the
inconvenient thing is that language has to be reduced to
the domain of description. Ultimately, the logic of
language is the logic of description which mirrors the
logic of the world. This seems to be too restrictive. In
addition, every linguistic phenomenon has to be ultimately
explained in terms of the W-language. As a result, the
phenomena that are opaque to this kind of explanation are
relegated to a mystically inexpressible dimension.
Second, the account in the "Investigations" is
based on restricted analyses of specific language-games.
These analyses are at the same time pragmatic and inspired
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by the method of transcendental philosophy. They are
pragmatic because the later Wittgenstein's main concern is
the use of our words. They are inspired by the method of
transcendental philosophy because the later Wittgenstein
seems to be still searching the conditions of possibility
of the language-games he considers. Now this means the
later philosophy is based on particular principles that
guarantee the functioning of determinate language-games
expressing a certain form of life. From this standpoint,
the later Wittgensteinian account seems to be a more
adequate tool than the "Tractatus" for characterizing the
use of definite descriptions in our language. But the
price to be paid for this is once again too high: although
the account is more flexible and explains most of the
phenomena involved, there are no necessary and universal
principles capable of guaranteeing the objectivity of the
model itself. In other words, the solution in the spirit
of the "Investigations" is able to explain a wider range
of linguistic phenomena than the Tractarian system. But
the unpalatable counterpart is that the end of the chain
of reasons in the "Investigations" is a form of life, and
not a rational principle. As a result, the later account
is in danger of succumbing to relativism.
In short, if one stresses the semantic features,
the objectivity is saved, but the phenomena remain
unexplained; if one stresses the pragmatic features, the
phenomena are better explained, but the objectivity is in
danger of disappearing. I think this might be explained in
conformity with the following line of argument.
On the one hand, the semantic standpoint
abstracts from speakers and contexts, focusing the
attention on the relation between the linguistic
expression and its referent. Although the starting point
is obtained in abstraction from the linguistic phenomenon
as a whole, the above procedure leads to an important
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objective foundation of language, for every expression
will have guaranteed a referent. But the difficulties
appear whenever one tries to find the way back to the
linguistic phenomenon as a whole. For this will entail the
introduction of new aspects into analysis, and the
objective constraints imposed by the purely semantic
considerations will resist to the widening of the aspects
involved by the phenomena to be explained.
On the other hand, the pragmatic standpoint does
not abstract from speakers and contexts, considering the
linguistic phenomenon as a whole. Now the starting point
of analysis has a wider range than the one involved by
purely semantic considerations. As a result, the
linguistic phenomena get better explained by the pragmatic
standpoint. But the difficulties appear whenever one tries
to give an objective foundation to the pragmatic account.
For the foundation requires relating the linguistic
expressions to their referents in abstraction from
speakers and contexts, and this would mean to reject the
starting point, that is, the consideration of the
linguistic phenomenon as a whole. In other words, giving
an objective foundation to the pragmatic account would
require narrowing the aspects involved by the phenomena to
be explained, and this would conflict with the previous
widening of such aspects.
This awkward situation seems to reflect much
more the limitations of our conceptual models in the
explanation of reality than the early and the later
Wittgenstein's particular difficulties in the explanation
of the phenomena involved. But an adequate justification
of my claim would be a matter for further investigation.
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